Beyond Borders
Beyond Borders
The Passerelle Collection
The Passerelle Collection, realised in the framework of the Coredem initiative (Communauté des sites de ressources documentaires pour une démocratie mondiale – Community of Sites of Documentary Resources for a Global Democracy), aims at presenting current topics through analyses, proposals and experiences based both on field work and research. Each issue is an attempt to weave together various contributions on a specific issue by civil society organisations, NGOs, social movements, media, trade unions, academics, etc.

The publication of new issues of Passerelle is often associated to public conferences, «Coredem’s Wednesdays» which pursue a similar objective: creating space for dialogue, sharing and building common ground between the promoters of social change.

All issues are available online at: www.coredem.info

Coredem, a Collective Initiative
Coredem (Community of Sites of Documentary Resources for a Global Democracy) is a space for exchanging knowledge and practices by and for actors of social change. More than 30 activist organisations and networks share information and analysis online by pooling it thanks to the search engine Scrutari. Coredem is open to any organisation, network, social movement or media which consider that the experiences, proposals and analysis they set forth are building blocks for fairer, more sustainable and more responsible societies.

Ritimo, the Publisher
The organisation Ritimo is in charge of Coredem and of publishing the Passerelle Collection.

Ritimo is a network for information and documentation on international solidarity and sustainable development. In 75 locations throughout France, Ritimo opens public information centres on global issues, organises civil society campaigns and develops awareness-raising and training sessions. Ritimo is actively involved in the production and dissemination of plural and critical information, by means of its website: www.ritimo.org
Beyond Borders: Understanding, Fighting and Overcoming the Walls that Surround Us

CAROLINE WEILL
Coordinator of the editorial committee

Without doubt, we currently live in a world of walls: between Mexico and the USA, Israel and Palestine, India and Bangladesh, Hungary and Serbia, around the Spanish enclaves in Morocco... Everywhere we look, there are walls dividing lands and peoples. As we make our way into the 21st century, we are witnessing a global trend where countries are closing their borders, and restricting who comes onto their land. Not only is this toughened stance doing little to deter people; it is contributing to an alarming rise of human rights violations. Whether it be migrants travelling through Libya being sold as slaves, or the thousands who have died trying to cross the Mediterranean; whether it be the refugee camps or the migrants being hunted down, harassed and humiliated... All these attacks on our common humanity are frighteningly close to becoming the new normal.

Borders, border control, and what is happening in these spaces are at the center of public debate and media coverage of migration issues, fuelling controversies and misconceptions, particularly in Europe and North America. The border embodies a great number of social, (geo)political, economic and historical issues, generating a proliferation of ideas, projects and actions. It is therefore crucial to examine and think deeply about the border and everything that it symbolises in order to imagine the future of territories and their people. It is not simply about taking a narrow approach in order to find a “solution” to the “migration crisis”, but about building a future where fundamental rights are respected, where people can move freely, where refugees are welcomed and human dignity is upheld.
This issue of *Passerelle* aims, therefore, to do two things: to inspire people to analyse and think through the global issues surrounding borders as a social, economic and political reality; and to give a voice to the people that are challenging closed-border policies and offering ideas and alternatives that call into question the current predominant border regime. It is divided into three sections.

The first section looks at the making and reality of borders today. Like everything that makes up humanity and society, the border is a social and political construct that is the product of historical processes. The very nature of these borders is changing, driven by the increasingly technological approach to border control. Border control is increasingly centred on transportation networks and hubs. And the Dublin Regulation’s fingerprinting database has effectively meant that the border is now something we carry around on our fingertips... Between re-territorialisation and dematerialisation, what does a border zone look like today?

The second section will explore the political and economic issues that underlie current forms of border control, and look at the justifications involved: What is the purpose of a border? And who benefits from it? Alongside the building of fences and walls, the militarisation of borders and the increased amount of surveillance, a narrative of “migrant invasion” is becoming more popular among certain nationalistic and xenophobic sections of the population. And border control has become a geopolitical issue in itself, with externalisation policies, international police cooperation, and countries engaged in negotiations that reinforce closed border policies. It is crucial that we understand the political message behind the move to “strengthen” borders. The economic issues linked to the closing of borders are also of key importance: “development” disparities, the exploitation of migrant workers, a booming arms and surveillance industry, high-tech border walls, retraining the army towards roles in border control.... These all form part of a veritable closed border economy.

And the final section focusses on the stories of resistance and the thinking that challenges borders and the role they play in our current world. These articles comprise both the stories, accounts and experiences of the people that contravene border laws and their personal or collective analysis. Some of these people take action independently; others form part of migrant networks and groups that support them. How can we protect people’s fundamental rights when public policies that involve closing borders are fuelling extreme violence? There are many ways to take action and fight back as illustrated by the different examples of collective organisation, direct action, and day-to-day solidarity. There are a whole myriad of responses to injustice, instigated by a diverse range of people, and they are cropping up wherever you look. This section also looks more closely at “practical utopias” which aim to create a world where everyone is entitled to true freedom of movement. Are we able to imagine a world “without borders”? What would the social structure of such a world look like? The experiences of
those that challenge nation-states and their borders and who offer sometimes radically different perspectives are also explored in this section: these include independent regional movements that are changing the rules of the border game, nomadic communities who have a different understanding of the world, internationalist movements, to name a few.

This issue thus seeks to link up what is an extremely topical issue to the more long-term dynamics involved in different areas of the world. It seeks to shed light on the various geopolitical and economic forces at work, as well as draw attention to past and present civic actions and movements. The latest issue of Passerelle thus strives to stimulate debate and reflection, to provide first-hand accounts and suggest avenues for political action that will enable us to get a better grasp on border issues. In this way, we will be better equipped to work, through international solidarity, towards achieving social justice and protecting the fundamental rights of everyone.
# Table of Contents

**Beyond Borders: Understanding, Fighting and Overcoming the Walls that Surround Us**

CAROLINE WEILL

5

## The Concept of Border in a Globalised World

### A. A Short History of Borders

Borders, Closer to Usthan Ever Before

ANNE-LAURE AMILHAT SZARY

12

“Freedom of Movement”: Thoughts on The World of Yesterday

EMMANUEL BLANCHARD

19

The Nation-State and Borders in West Africa: the Challenge of Globalisation

PAPA DEMBA FALL

27

The Garifunas: A Nation Across Borders, Besieged by the Nation-State

CARLOS AGUDELO

33

## B. The Border, Between Reterritorialisation and Dematerialisation

Walled In

CDTM-MONDE SOLIDAIRE LA FLÈCHE

41

Urban Borders: the Wall of Shame in Lima

DIANA RIVAS GUTIERREZ

46

Virtual Borders: the Strategy of Driving Back, Dispersing and Identifying

LOLA COURCOUX

50

Eurodac: social and political impacts of the digitization of the external European border

BRIGITTA KUSTER AND VASSILIS TSIANOS

57

## C. Focus Sur Des Zones Frontalières

The Prism of Gender on the Morocco-Spain Border

ELSA TYSZLER

63
### TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Border Zones, Detainment and the Rule of Law**  
LAURE BLONDEL  
71

**A Labyrinth of Border Towns**  
BEATRIZ PLAZA ESCRIVÀ  
79

### THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STAKES OF CLOSED BORDERS  
86

#### A. POLITICAL STAKES  
87

**Borders as Symbols of National Sovereignty**  
CATHERINE WITHOL DE WENDEN  
88

**Inside the Political Machine of the Israeli Wall**  
DAMIEN SIMONNEAU  
92

**Venezuelans Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place**  
FRÉDÉRIQUE LÉVÊQUE  
100

**Externalising Borders and International Negotiations**  
THE COLLECTIVE CÉVENNES SANS FRONTIÈRES  
103

#### B. ECONOMIC STAKES  
106

**The border spectacle of migrant ‘victimisation’**  
NICHOLAS DE GENOVA  
107

**Products of the Border**  
EMMANUELLE HELLO AND JUANA MORENO NIETO  
111

**The Booming Business of Borders**  
OLIVIER PETITJEAN (WITH RACHEL KNAEBEL AND ANNE-SOPHIE SIMPERE)  
117

### RESISTANCES AND ALTERNATIVES TO BORDERS  
122

#### A. THE MEANS OF RESISTANCE  
123

**Tunnelling borders**  
BRYAN FINOKI  
124

"We are not going back!" Fighting Back in Ventimiglia, on the French-Italian Border. Excerpts.  
LE MAGUIS  
129

**How locals are approaching the crackdown on the French-Italian border. The experience of the association Roya-Citoyenne**  
LUCA GILIBERTI  
135
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>From Donations to Direct Actions: Queer Solidarity with Migrants in the UK</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lesbians and Gays Support the Migrants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Caravan of Mothers of Missing Central American Migrants: Resistance and the Quest for Truth and Justice for Missing Migrants</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marta Sanchez</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aboriginal Passport Ceremonies and Asylum Seekers and Refugees</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joseph Pugliese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>B. Imagining Another World?</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An Overview of Internationalism</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gustave Massiah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freedom of Movement: Value or Strategy?</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antoine Pécoud</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tuareg Nomadism: a World in Motion in a World of Walls</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hélène Claudot-Hawad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Confederalism and Borders</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loëz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Borders and Membranes</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pierre Calame</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emmanuel Charles and Caroline Weill</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contributors</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sitography</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Borders: Selective Filmography</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recent Issues Of The Passerelle Collection</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE CONCEPT OF BORDER IN A GLOBALISED WORLD
A. A SHORT HISTORY OF BORDERS
Borders, Closer to Us than Ever Before

ANNE-LAURE AMILHAT SZARY
Geographer and border specialist

Borders that were for so long nothing but a distant and immaterial reality in the lives of the majority of women and men, are now placed at centre stage. Walls are invading our screens, and those who try to cross them become part of our political debates, to the point of saturation. How can we explain such a shift, and above all, what political meaning does it bear?

Observers feel overcome by a strange feeling when facing a border, one of extreme geopolitical simplicity: what can be understood from a line? A sort of self-evident reality that removes all discussion about what to do in regard to its existence, as well as the possibility of imagining things differently for the borders of tomorrow. This process is strengthened by a commonly shared feeling: in the past, there were good borders, easily drawn on the map, because they were “ours”, relatively open even though you had to queue up at the checkpoints for holidays, and the bad ones, the “others”, that is to say the Eastern block that faced us, closed to the point of sometimes taking the form of a wall designed to separate these two worlds. This “iron curtain” was a perfect manifestation of the two faces of borders: on the Western side of Berlin there were irreverent graffiti, while on the other, rabbits multiplied in a no-man’s land, which if one attempted to cross could lead to a fatal shooting (this wall caused 136 deaths in its 28 years of existence).

It seems essential to start by breaking any binary approach to borders, as a border is indeed an extremely complex social and symbolical reality. To send the defenders of closed borders back-to-back with open border activists only creates an impasse. If we examine the issue more closely, we cannot confront open borders with others that are closed: they all operate as places for screening globalisation flows. These places undergo constant change, inasmuch as they are both simulta-
neously open and closed. In English, this process is best explained by the concepts of debordering and rebordering. Modern day borders present one of two sides of this reality, according to the type of person/goods/information/capital that comes before them. This is why we propose to speak about “borderities” to qualify the variable ability of humans to move from one country to another. This quality depends first and foremost on the place of birth, as the differential value of our passports is a focus of the dramatic inequality in the contemporary world. It is nevertheless possible to correct the effects of such classifications: particularly, the amount in our bank account allows us to buy certain passports (such as the case of Cyprus, which allows one to become European citizens). However, the networks of interconnectedness and mutual aid also provide access to circulation paths that enable people to overcome these obvious obstacles. So paradoxically we end up with a situation whereby a political invention materialising a collective group is working on an increasingly individual basis.

Any reflection on the status of borders in our society therefore implies framing the discussion differently than in the preconceived duality: borders are one of those complex types of spaces that only exist in the tension between the concept and its realisation. It is in fact a process that operates between two modes of existence: a representation (the way in which we define the word, what we imagine a border is: the limit between two Nation States, for instance), and its material manifestation (the way in which this representation is implemented on the ground, such as barriers, barbed wire, etc.). The relationship of the border to the map is particularly enlightening in this paradox: without a map, there are no borders, whatever your viewpoint might be. On the ground, to define exactly where the imaginary line that separates country A from country B is extremely difficult, even if a river or a mountain is supposed to topographically support this political construct. Riverbeds indeed shift from one year to another, according to water rises and floods, as does the line of a mountain ridge, depending on the quantities of snow and ice… And the further we are from the place of separation itself, the more we need a mapping tool to materialise this distinction and its meaning. Borders are the essential representation of themselves, they only exist viewed through this prism that we can qualify as a performance. They need to be named, loaded with meaning, for them to become a reality. If we are far removed from the line itself, the map provides us with the technological tool that allows us to implement a political idea: without this support, how could we implement the way in which the modern world is divided and cut up?

Historically, it has been agreed upon that we should date in a rather precise way the birth of these linear borders as we know them today. They were born in 1648, at the signature of the so-called Westphalia Treaties (named after this region that is now part of Germany) that put an end to one of the first inter-European military bloodsheds, the Thirty Years War. They were supposed to be

the tool of perpetual peace, due to the territorial stability they established. This act of birth had something definitely revolutionary about it from the point of view of spatial organisation of the political groups still in the process of being established, at the very origins of our contemporary Nation States. The idea of territorial continuity even overruled feudal organisation where people were subjected to their lords, who often owned land and dominated their human and non-human resources (land, game reserves, etc.) in a non-contiguous manner (cf. the Norman Kingdom that was established in the South of Italy and Sicily).

We thus entered an era of modern tautology – which still appears to be difficult for us to change today – and that brings together the notions of State, Territory and Sovereignty. However, this stability is only visible on the surface: international order has profoundly evolved in recent decades, such as the illustrious enlargement of the members of the United Nations, that has grown from the initial 51 founding members in 1945, to 193 today.

This founding gesture of borderlines had an apparent simplicity to it, being linked to such a powerful form, the line. It wasn’t however exempt of contradictions. Of course, using topographical supports whose linearity was suggested by maps was very convenient for those drawing up the boundaries, the ministers and other ambassadors. Nothing indicated in these initial tools that the course of a river could change or that the mountain was a slightly less pointy pile of rocks than foreseen... but especially that these rivers and mountains should provide local populations with a place to share resources: shared mountain pastures where local inhabitants of the various valleys regularly met, mills for grinding the grain grown on both banks of the river.
This initial equivalence established between the border and the topography created one of the most long-lasting political fictions in existence: the idea of a natural border. It went hand-in-hand with an equally powerful counter narrative, once again with a strong binary component, which opposed artificial borders and those that are not. To state that a natural border is not artificial would seem obvious, and yet! By including this discourse in our school textbooks up to this day, we are obliterating the historical origin of our borders and perpetuating the naturalisation of royal power, transferred without query to the heart of the republican model. The original reasoning was the following: 1) the king (or queen) rules by divine right, and is the temporary representative of a power that transcends him-herself while justifying his-her authority. 2) God created the land and the rivers and mountains that structure it. 3) If borders follow these topographical elements, they are invested with the same power, equally immovable and indisputable: essentialized. This sequence resembles a syllogism: nowadays, even if we have undermined the premises of the proposal, nobody questions the logical stability of the structure itself. However, as a border corresponds to an arbitrary line, the fact it’s being superimposed on a territory should not mask its “artificial”, cultural and political, rather than its natural essence.

The dynamics of the symbolic nature of a borderline are so powerful that even when it undergoes political change, the area it crosses retains the mark of these lines for many years. One could say that borders are a sort of territorial scar. This dynamic force is not only linked to the strength of the central powers that initiate the stabilisation of their power relationships around a symbolic line destined to differentiate two national groups. We often forget the fact that local populations quickly seize these political realities and, in their daily life, progressively “put some distance into proximity relations”\(^2\), to the point that the different uses of space become part of the scenery and the linguistic evolution. People frequently refer to smuggling and the illegal aspects of these flows, but the daily workings of the border include the highly legal profiteering of the differences caused by its presence, such as the cost of goods (including border crossings to sell production/buy consumer goods) but also in the culinary exchanges, for example. This means that borders are a space of services and often create urban development. Opening borders may create a crisis inasmuch as this type of space is organised around controls and induced transhipments. The invention of borders has enabled the introduction of consumer markets as well as the creation of perimeters of citizenship. The creation of Nation States effectively corresponds to a construction that is both political and economic in a dual modality that still persists today.

Part I: The Concept of Border in a Globalised World

rations and the emergence of global challenges such as climate change, what is the purpose of modern day borders? Very few political actors can boast of being able to answer this question. Yet today everything is happening as though these imaginary lines that Europe introduced almost four centuries ago, and which they’ve exported to the rest of the world through colonisation, are more important than ever before.

This can be explained not only through this “methodological nationalism” to which they have contributed to create and the fact that it remains highly complicated, even at the beginning of the 21st century, to think beyond the national references. All too often we forget the degree to which national construction was a powerful factor in the unification of both our imaginary and our institutions, especially schools and universities. The places where intellectual and mediatised debate occur, even in this age of electronic social networks, continue to be held prisoners by national references. Paradoxically, thanks to GPS technology, we now know exactly where the borders run and can mark them in a precise way, both on land and at sea, the latter witnessing an unprecedented territorial division. Territories are the object of a genuinely renewed interest in terms of contemporary international law. From an economic standpoint, border controls constitute in themselves a rapidly growing market. In the context of geopolitical paradigm transformation where war, in the classical sense of the word (which for a long time had been a stimulator of technological innovation and industrial development), has disappeared, replaced by internal conflicts, this type of dynamic innovation continues thanks to the conversion of military-industrial complexes into “security-industrial” ones. The latter offer the advantage of cutting edge security equipment that can be used in military or civil contexts alike, and are especially useful for surveillance of sensitive industrial sites. In a very literal way, borders have taken on a new relevance in our material and cognitive, as well as our strategic and economic, environments.

The spotlighting of borders in media debates is all the more surprising as they camouflage the deep transformation of how they operate. Their function and form no longer coincide in the way they did at the time of the Treaty of Westphalia… The role of movement control and identity marking at international borders no longer operate on the line itself: the diffracted border is exported, to a multitude of points linked to a network, to the point one sometimes says it “pixellises”. The evolution of the functions of border institutions evolve more slowly than their material manifestations: the concept of a line is vanishing as the control procedures are being carried out upstream (pre-customs clearance of goods transported in containers, carried out at the port of departure rather than port of arrival, for example), or downstream (identity controls and migratory status carried out at points well after the physical border has been crossed). And when these identity controls are carried out on the transport infrastructures themselves, by private operators, there is even a privatisation of the border. At the same time, it is becoming increasingly long for those who are not in a position
to cross the borders with valid documentation: this creates a space of waiting, a space where time is suspended, and that crushes lives by the violence of its nature. Nowadays, the role of border controls is not that of spotting suspicious individuals or identified cargos, but the algorithmic calculation of the potential danger that is represented by a given component of a globalisation flow.

Making a country more impermeable by building a wall on a line provides a very weak solution to this equation. We can also see that in this period of regression some actors ignore borders and all their constraints, such as the international operators who rent land with the sole objective of exploiting it for exports. These so-called land-grabbing operations allow economic actors to appropriate land and its resources without having to shift any political borders. In light of the these growing phenomena of capitalist extra-territoriality, what meaning do political borders still bear?

How can we respond to the waves of violence caused by the closing of borders, as the death rates keep on soaring for those who attempt to cross them. Support networks have emerged to help the men and women living in poverty for whom borders are closed, in an attempt to fight the dehumanisation created by contemporary borders; but this only true for the minority. For the majority, we are all caught up in the trap of the dialectics of opportunity/security deployed at borders, as suggested by the geographer Jean Gottmann. We are all tempted to cross borders in our search for better opportunities, but fear that if others do the same it will pose a threat to our integrity.

The “no-borders” activists call less for the total removal of borders than for the redefinition of the way borders are operated, based on an open policy. If we went and removed them completely, they would doubtlessly reappear in another form, at the limits of our regions or our cities, in a medieval way. These modern lines die hard, as they continue to carry the weight of the first anthropological distinctions, especially the old life-style separation between nomads and settled populations. Nevertheless, if we examine this too superficially and make fast judgements based on a concrete wall seen on television, it is all too easy to believe they have always worked the way they do today, where the strictest enforcement of control has never been so tight. In this context, understanding borders is an increasingly important issue, but not only to capture the nuances of modern geopolitical evolution. Borders also speak about our relationship with inclusion and exclusion, of everything that forms the backbone of democracy and living together. They are a very powerful political and ideological symptom. We need to be careful however of what they hide as much as what they show: it is often “in the shadow of the wall”³ that the worst occurs. But “the worst is not (always) certain”⁴ ...

---

⁴ Original title (Le pire n’est pas (toujours) certain) of a text being written by the playwright Catherine Boskowitz, Production MC93- Bobigny, 2019.
“Freedom of Movement”: Thoughts on The World of Yesterday

EMMANUEL BLANCHARD
Teacher and Researcher, GISTI, Chair of the Migreurop network

“Indeed, nothing makes us more sensible of the immense relapse into which the world fell after the First World War than the restrictions on man’s freedom of movement and the diminution of civil rights. Before 1914 the earth had belonged to all. People went where they wished and stayed as long as they pleased. [...] There were no permits, no visas, no harassment. One embarked and alighted without questioning or being questioned, one did not have to fill out a single one of the many papers which are required today. The frontiers which, with their customs officers, police and militia, have become wire barriers thanks to the pathological suspicion of everybody against everybody else, were nothing but symbolic lines which one crossed with as little thought as one crosses the Meridian of Greenwich.”


The above quote is familiar to many readers of the French journal Plein droit, and has been cited for several years by those defending freedom of movement in order to highlight that the world of borders and barriers in which we live is not unalterable. Our highly repressive immigration system is in fact only a recent phenomenon; it can be altered or entirely abolished, so that we may return to “man’s freedom of movement and (...) civil rights.”

Aside from what Stefan Zweig and his contemporaries may have thought, most historians working on immigration issues and the obstacles preventing freedom of movement acknowledge that “the booming of the guns of August 1914 brought to a sudden close the era during which governments viewed foreigners

[1] This article was originally published in the French review Plein droit No. 116, March 2018, under the title “Liberté de circuler, un privilège”
without ‘suspicion and mistrust’ and they were free to traverse borders relatively unmolested.” These historians also agree on the ironic nature of our times: we live in an age where there have never been so many people crossing borders and yet the official stance on immigration has grown increasingly draconian. This has been the case since the seventies, after a brief period of liberalisation after World War II, but the turn of the 21st century marked the beginning of particularly brutal measures. The “lost world” of Stefan Zweig thus represents a framework or a time that we should revive. However, these “souvenirs of a European” represent the singular experience of a man from the Viennese elite, whose viewpoint was shared by only a fraction of those who were born and raised in Europe, let alone all those from the other three corners of the world. And as soon as Stefan Zweig was identified as a Jew, he also had to circumvent barriers that would prove fatal to some of his fellow men seeking safety. These barriers did not appear out of nowhere in the 1930s: some of them had begun to be erected at the turn of the 20th century, particularly against impoverished Jews fleeing persecution in Russia.

This article seeks to revisit the world as it was before 1914 when European states had little concern for border control, which would have required resources that they just didn’t have. The concept of “freedom of movement”, upheld by modern activists, was not around either. There was instead the related notion of “free movement”, which is not actually so different from our current border regime. For a privileged minority, essentially but not exclusively those from the “North”, borders are still no more than “symbolic lines which one crossed with little thought”. Today, just as it was in those days, however, the border regime is based on a three-fold hierarchy of rights, based on: direct or indirect racial discrimination; prejudice and suspicion towards the poor; and hostility towards refugees described as arriving in “massive” groups as a pretext for inciting xenophobic behaviour.

By the second half of the 19th century, people were asserting their right to leave their home countries in search of other lands, a movement that most countries in Europe were affected by. At the same time, the great powers (France and Great Britain in particular as well as Germany and the USA) were busily divvying up and colonising the world, especially in Africa and Asia. These two events were not unrelated, as the colonies of settlement (Australia, New Caledonia and Guyana) were considered “safety valves” that would provide an answer to the “social question” and which would serve as “home” for the working-class.

[3] Disagreements between specialists focus less on the general definition of these broad periods than on the actual dates when they began, depending on national or regional contexts: for example, to what extent and for which “travellers” did 9/11 represent a rupture at the end of the twentieth century?
[4] The term “refugee” is understood here as a social and political condition and not as a legal status, the international definition of which was not determined before 1914.
drifters and other convicts whose unsettled existence had long been a source of concern for the leaders of the major European countries.

“Inferior races” under house arrest
Whether or not colonial conquests were undertaken in the name of bringing civilisation to “inferior races”, the fact remained that as Europe expanded, so did the notion of race. And it took form in legal delineations and hierarchies. Colonised peoples were regarded as inferior because they did not have the same level of material, ontological and civilisational ammunition, nor had they acquired the mindset that went with the times, particularly those linked to liberalism. So they were called upon to “open their doors” to goods, to resources, but also to Europeans, and yet they themselves were deemed unworthy of being able to personally benefit from “free movement”. The issue was more one of intra-national travel than of transcontinental emigration (see below). Security and public policy concerns and, more to the point, the issue of tax collection (evasion and exile were the main ways to escape the tax system and colonial domination) resulted in policies and measures that were associated, in Europe, with an Ancien régime mentality. Assigning people to a territory and to a “master” (the colonial leader and their representatives) was reminiscent of serfdom and the statute labour systems, which had been successively abolished since the late eighteenth century, inciting Europe’s rural populations to migrate to cities or to new continents.

Both the criminal tribes of British India and those subjected to the French Code de l’indigénat (a set of laws creating inferior legal status for the indigenous peoples of French colonies and applied across the French Colonial Empire), were listed according to their ethnic group, and their movements were under strict control. They were even confined to certain areas to make it easier to monitor them. Although these regulations (requiring a permit in order to leave the country or outright bans on travel) were largely skirted around, this didn’t stop them from being regularly renewed and reinforced. And yet as early as 1882, in Algeria, the Governor General Tirman remarked that “it seems extreme that an indigenous person from one douar is not able to sleep in another douar in the same commune without incurring a penalty.” He had to bow down to colonial interests, but five years later, Victor Schoelcher, the driving force behind the 1848 law on abolition of slavery, was finally able to exclaim that,”The regime in force is nothing more than slavery! Slaves could not travel without a written pass!” It was on the eve of the First World War, just as European borders were being closed, that the the Indigénat Regime began to loosen its grip and colonised peoples were able to undertake long-distance travel (including to major cities) relatively unhindered, resulting in travel becoming more common.

Yet this didn’t mean the world was more open to people from Africa or Asia. Although the USA had, for several decades, been the country that attracted the
most immigrants, colonial ambitions and new post-slavery racial stratifications were making their mark on the Gilded age (1880-1900). Chinese citizens seeking to escape the collapse of the Qing dynasty were thus the target of laws aimed at putting an end to a laissez-faire approach to immigration. The Chinese Exclusion Act, adopted in 1882, was designed to halt the arrival of Chinese immigrants, of which there had been many since the 1860s, particularly in California. This initial law, followed by numerous others, was gradually extend to broader social categories (initially only Chinese workers were affected) and more nationalities (basically all Asians). It was not only emblematic of the institutionalisation of racial discrimination but, as many analysts point out, constitutes the backbone of our current immigration policies. Such policies include: an increasingly punctilious approach to identity papers; instead of the departure country being responsible for authorising who is allowed out (as had previously been the case), the country of arrival decides who is allowed in; private companies (recruiters, landlords, transporters) obliged to abide by the logic of state control; and all those that don’t fit into the increasingly restrictive profile of those entitled to “freedom of movement” becoming criminalised. The Chinese Exclusion Act, and its Canadian and Australian variations, which were even more brutal, had a massive impact on where immigrants were choosing to go. Many ports were entirely closed to Asians (full boat loads of Indians arriving into Canada were sent back). This resulted in migrants choosing closer destinations. Consequently, at the end of the 19th century, transcontinental emigration from Asia was significantly lower than it had been fifty years earlier.

The “de-globalisation” of migration affected Africa in particular. The gradual abolishment of the transatlantic slave trade, which began in the 1800s (Britain abolished slave trading in 1807) and continued until the 1880s (slavery abolished in Cuba and Brazil), clearly played a role in this. This did not mean, however, that this was the end of forced migration. European governments even cited the “need” to abolish slave trading within Africa and towards the Arabian Peninsular as a pretext to justify their military expeditions and interventions on the “black continent”. The Berlin Conference of 1884-85 formalised the “Scramble for Africa”, and so-called “humanitarian” principles as well as “freedom of movement” featured among the arguments put forward in order to justify the parcelling out of Africa. Europe’s colonial expansion involved “free navigation” treaties (on the Niger and Congo rivers in particular) and “free movement” of goods. Men and women, on the other hand, were subject to the logic of control that reigned at the time, although ancestral migratory routes were still in frequent

use. Residents from various areas knew how to take advantage of imperial competition to get around colonial borders. Yet any hopes of leaving Africa for distant lands were shattered not only by a lack of financial resources but also by a hefty set of repressive regulations. With the exception of soldiers, who were basically enrolled by force, as well as certain sailors and those rare individuals that were granted the right to pursue their studies, it was extremely difficult for an African to reach Europe. According to the 1931 census, there were only several thousand so-called “people of the colonies” living in Paris, which was frequently described at the time as the most cosmopolitan city in the world. This represented 0.1% of the total number of foreigners in France at the time. This figure does not include “Algerians”, of which there were significantly more as they were entitled to French citizenship.

**Controlling the poor**
Governments of major European countries were, up until the last third of the nineteenth century, preoccupied with monitoring the movements of “men without a master” (roamers, drifters, vagabonds, the self-employed working class). “Laws for the poor” had, for a long time, been a way to control people’s move-

ments (especially departures) and make passports (even for domestic travel), travel permits and passes with predetermined destinations obligatory, so that there was no risk of people in need seeking help in cities where they were not authorised to reside, nor had any ties. Those “barred from travel” and other “illegal immigrants” represented, however, a significant proportion of what were considered the urban “dangerous classes”, of which there was a constant stream – migrants that came from both foreign lands and from closer to home. Faced with this “danger”, up until the late nineteenth century, there was little in the way of government-led deportations. Yet between 1860 and 1910, in England alone, local communities and welfare agencies repatriated tens of thousands of Irish citizens and Jews from central Europe living in poverty.10

The relaxation in travel regulations was primarily thanks to economically-minded elite members of society, who did not want the logic of belonging somewhere to hinder the development of a massive labour market that could potentially be open to foreigners.11 For a long time, foreigners with higher-level qualifications were welcomed with open arms, although their desire to travel was held in check by the mercantile mentality of their home countries, concerned with appropriating their qualifications and keeping “trade secrets” safe. With the revolution in transport in the mid-nineteenth century, railways and steam boats would make the world a smaller place, and governments gave up on what remained of their prerogatives to control departures, only to focus on improving identification tools. The hundreds of thousands of British, German, Italian and Scandinavian citizens who, every year, joined the Americas (mainly the United States but also Brazil and Argentina) did not leave without identification papers. But even after an identification centre was opened on Ellis Island in 1892, virtually all immigrants managed to get through the fairly finicky processes of immigration control. Asians on the West Coast were an exception to this rule; as of 1910, they were sometimes held for months on Angel Island before being allowed into the US or deported. Some of them had no choice but to go into hiding, something that immigrants from Europe were not yet compelled to do.12

At the height of their political domination and colonial expansion, European states, which, apart from France, were all countries with a high emigration rate, had given up on trying to control those that were leaving. The strong population growth amongst the working class was a concern to the local elite, and they were not going to stand in the way of people “populating” other newer countries.

Things were to change after the First World War. US governments entered into a new isolationist phase and adopted xenophobic and racist measures that a growing section of the public were voting for: the Emergency Quota Act (1921) and the Immigration Act (1924) banned virtually all immigration from Africa and the Middle East. The purpose of these laws was primarily to put an end to immigrants from Central Europe or Italy so that the dominant class of wasps (white anglo-saxon protestants) would not be outnumbered. It was a gradual process, but the US was no longer an option for Europeans seeking to escape poverty or the political turmoil of post-war Europe, a continent which itself had become increasingly hostile to refugees.

Unwanted refugees
Throughout the nineteenth century, revolutions, changes of government and nationalist-driven conflict resulted in what was often presented as the exile of massive groups of people. One example was the “Great Emigration” from Poland which began in 1831 and continued for several decades. Yet it involved only several thousand people, most of whom were from the political, cultural and military elite and had transnational family networks. When refugees came from more modest backgrounds, they often embodied the role of the “freedom fighter” and always found refuge thanks to widespread political support, diplomatic channels and the social recognition of the “exile” figure. They often lived in appalling conditions, as remarked by the French who had found refuge in Great Britain (under the Restoration) and had accused the British of “letting them starve to death”. In France, “aid” and other “financial subsidies” were available to refugees after 1830 when first attempts were made to come up with a definition of what a refugee was, in a context where some were accused of abusing France’s hospitality. Although there may be similarities between the two, it is important to differentiate the “exiles” of the years 1800-1870 from modern refugees. Aside from the question of numbers, the former were activists driven by a political cause, exiled because of their actions and opinions (which were essentially nationalistic); the latter are trying to escape abuse targeted at them as a group, depending on who they are and the obstacles they represent to those seeking to impose ethnic or religious uniformity. However, the history of “refugees” is rooted in the geopolitical upheaval in Europe throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: ethnic and cultural preconceptions were the driving force behind the nationalistic ideology that developed over this period, which resulted

[16] These comparative depictions of the late nineteenth century refugee and the current day refugee don’t encompass the “legal” definition of the refugee nor all the different situations of forced exile that we witness in our current era (supposing that we could easily differentiate them from voluntary migrations).
PART I
THE CONCEPT OF BORDER IN A GLOBALISED WORLD

in large-scale “demographic engineering”.17 The figure of the modern refugee was associated with deportations, killings and population displacements18, firstly within the Russian Empire (hundreds of anti-Jewish pogroms began occurring after Alexander II’s assassination in March 1881) and the Ottoman Empire (with the mass killings of Armenians in 1894-96). Those that survived these mass killings were deported or took to the road in search of refuge: consequently, nearly 2.5 million Jews left the Russian Empire in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. And irrespective of whether they went to Germany, Great Britain, France or the USA, they were faced with “outbreaks of aggressive anti-semitism”. This was when “the defining feature of the twentieth century refugee began to appear: they had nowhere to go. Burdensome, lost, poor and often dispirited, the image that they embodied to the international community was that typical of the unwanted beggar”.19

In the early years of the twentieth century, certain countries which had previously left their doors open to all refugees, decided to abruptly shut them. Great Britain, which throughout the nineteenth century, had not turned away a single refugee,20 adopted the Aliens Act in 1905. Under the pretext of fighting against “unwanted immigrants” (the sick, disabled, poor and former convicts), the law was more specifically aimed at Eastern European Jews and was a response to anti-semitic sentiments and movements that had developed over the previous years. The law did, in theory, allow immigrants to seek asylum in cases of political or religious persecution, and made allowances for immigrants to join their families.21 Although the harshest of these measures were rarely enforced, the Aliens Act paved the way for further legislative tightening and was instrumental in the gradual establishment of a whole administrative system set up to control foreigners. Over the years, this system was to transform refugees into outcasts for whom the “harassment” and “obstacles” described by Stefan Zweig became increasingly insurmountable. In this respect there is a certain family resemblance between the1930s and the current era where one’s right to freedom of movement is suddenly snatched away the moment one finds oneself in need.22

The Nation-State and Borders in West Africa: the Challenge of Globalisation

PAPA DEMBA FALL
Director of the African International Migration Study Network at IFAN, Cheikh Anta Diop University of Dakar

There is the persistent and widespread belief that African borders have only existed since the Berlin Conference, that political entities that formed after Africa’s colonisation were cobbled together arbitrarily (1885-1910) and that they did not, at least initially, in any way reflect a common desire to live together as illustrated by the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire and Rwandan genocide.

Colonial boundaries, which were the subject of much criticism for a long time, have largely been assimilated and claimed by Africans who now identify with them. Over time, these boundaries have become a marker of identity, but also represent mental baggage, which gets a particularly strong expression during continental sports tournaments.

The demarcation of African borders, appropriated by the post-colonial state

The partitioning of Africa, which has remained almost unchanged since 1910, was primarily criticised for the artificial way in which the land was carved up, as borders cut across ethnic groups and regions. We may look at the example of two West African groups, which serve to outline the situation – the Fula people (who are referred to under different names) and live along the strip that runs from Senegal to Adamawa (Nigeria), and the Tuaregs, who are scattered across six countries (Mali, Burkina-Faso, Niger, Algeria, Libya and Tunisia).

The continent’s current geopolitical configuration is indeed the result of delineations and definitions established by colonial powers. However, it is important to note that various political formations – both acephalous types and those that took the form of a State (Almoravid Empire and the Kingdoms of Ghana, Sosso, Mali and Songhai) – existed in Africa long before its colonisers arrived. Information provided by Arabic chronicles and the oral tradition is not precise enough, however, to accurately plot out a map of precolonial sovereign areas.

By adopting the principle of inviolable borders inherited from colonialism, the founding fathers of OAU opted for the status quo and sought to quell any challenges to this concept, which would result in serious conflicts. Yet, nearly a quarter of a century later, not only did these borders fail to put an end to underlying conflicts, but they annihilated the federalist dream based on the exaltation of cultural proximity (Nkrumah 1963; Diop 1982). Indeed, attempts to “re-Africanise” the continent never resulted in any tangible results due to the fact that opposing forces put most of their energy and resources into reinforcing national sovereignty and prioritising economic ties with the former colonial powers.

Although colonisation played a decisive role in the shift from “border zones” to “border lines”, post-colonial States were responsible for turning them into actual barriers with the balkanisation of the Western side of the continent. These indeed served to separate areas with strong trade channels which colonisation had failed to regulate or control.

Establishing such regulations was no easy feat, and the border post represented a powerful symbol. Getting past it has constituted a veritable test since the early sixties, marking the beginnings of an obsessional exaltation based on a completely fabricated sense of nationalism.

The post-colonial State mainly used the pretext of security to advocate the idea of a homeland that had to be defended at all costs. Its key representatives, therefore, were the army, in charge of protecting the land’s integrity, and the One-Party State, whose role it was to unite all its diverse peoples under “one and indivisible Nation”.

Recent electrification and fortification of borders (in South Africa and Zimbabwe) illustrate an increasingly widespread desire to “protect the land from any kind of invasion”, and reveals the degree to which freedom of movement is under attack on the African continent.

In order to illustrate the integral role that borders played in Africa’s development, we may look at the example of Senegal, a country which in many ways is emblematic of the situation on the African continent.
Although Senegal is a small country in terms of land area, it has every kind of border imaginable: natural borders such as the Senegal river, artificial borders that “stretch across many fields” and maritime boundaries.

Three countries played a decisive part in defining Senegal’s borders: the borders with Guinea-Bissau and Gambia were negotiated with Portugal and the United Kingdom respectively, while changes to boundaries that occurred after Sudan (now Mali), Guinea and Mauritania were colonised were a result of rivalries between the civil and military sides of the French colonial administration. Consequently, although still a young country, Senegal’s shifting boundaries have been significant in the country’s short history.

The way in which Senegal’s borders were demarcated was entirely political, resulting in the dispersal of historically-connected communities: the Soninke people dispersed between Mali, Guidimaka (Mauritania) and Bakel regions (Senegal); the Wolof and Mandinka people ended up on both sides of the Senegal-Gambia border;

The fact that colonial borders were not demarcated and/or challenges regarding original agreements by neighbouring countries have resulted in various changes to Senegal’s boundaries over recent years.

- 26 of the 28 villages in the Kantora district became part of the Gambia in 1976 following claims by the latter.
- Disputes regarding the maritime boundary between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau has been referred to the International Court of Justice;
- Disputes over land rights on either side of the Senegal river resulted in the deadly 1989 Senegal-Mauritania conflict.

Due to the part it played in the history of Senegambia and its historical connections to different areas of the continent, the people of Senegal are a mix of different ethnic groups from diverse horizons. Hospitality towards indigenous peoples was already deeply rooted in Senegalese traditions. And the successive migrations that resulted from the political and social reconstruction of West Africa were a continuation of an outlook which gave meaning to the notion of “teranga” (hospitality towards foreigners), which is what the Senegalese people are typically known for.

While recent developments have not had any serious impact on the tradition of welcoming and integrating migrants, it should also be acknowledged that since Africa’s independence, various crises have resulted in restrictions on freedom of movement: these include the dissolution of the Mali Federation, political tensions related to Sékou Toure’s regime in Guinea and the Guinea-Bissau war of independence. There is also the fact it is difficult to control borders when there are no natural obstacles (no mountainous areas, no uncrossable rivers and no extensive forest areas of any kind).

The 1989 Senegal-Mauritania conflict is a clear illustration of how transforming borders into actual “barriers” was not an easy undertaking for the post-colonial State. Indeed, when the conflict between the two countries was at its worst, and
without any effective political action, it was only the religious guides, present since Islam was introduced into sub-Saharan Africa – that were able to restore peace and save the thousands of individuals living on their neighbour’s land. Long before official relations were reestablished, Mauritanian and Senegalese communities affiliated with trans-border muslim brotherhoods continued to make pilgrimages to the other side of the river to be with their brotherhood leaders.

The beginnings of migration protectionism in Africa
The relative recentness of political demarcations and an undemocratic cultural setting which excluded migrants from political debate were among the contributing factors that led to post-colonial states clamping down on freedom of movement.

The most common arguments put forward by proponents of territorial control include: a decrease in customs revenue and smuggling (seen as a scourge on the national economy), crimes committed by foreigners and the brain drain.

While these hardly justify restricting freedom of movement, they essentially evoke the same meaning as the words “...without prejudice to the responsibility of the competent authorities of the Member State”, which feature prominently in international agreements.

The intensifying economic and social crisis was a key factor in the development of migration protectionism, with different issues surfacing in different countries. These were either the result of an overall phenomenon or a combination of factors. The most obvious of these are:
• the growth of the informal economy and/or increased poverty, which made the migrant a convenient scapegoat (Equatorial Guinea);
• the rise of violence and xenophobia, creating political instability (Côte d’Ivoire);
• People retreating into ethnic or nationalist ideas of identity, undermining regional integration schemes (South Africa).

Trading of goods was encouraged because of regional specialisations and the fact that self-sufficiency just wasn’t realistic. Yet politicians paid little attention to the human aspect of these interconnected spaces. As a result, despite the challenging conditions that might have discouraged migration in Africa, migratory journeys were spontaneous. Some were focussed on reconnecting communities that had been arbitrarily divided by the border, which was a natural impulsion, while others resulted from the will and purpose of individuals to reach their goals in spaces that were connected well before the nation-states. […]
Mobility in West Africa: disruptions and continuities

There are now three identifiable trading areas throughout the western part of the continent, which are not affected by political borders or monetary zones. The traders belong to different ethnic groups, and over the centuries their commercial traditions have become increasingly professional:

1. Three ethnic groups control the Gulf of Benin (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Benin): the Hausa-Kanouri, the Igbo with their trading centre in Cotonou, and the Yoruba who undertake their trading and business activities as far as Senegal;
2. The Fan and Dyula ethnic groups are based in a central area which includes Côte-d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Burkina Faso and Eastern Mali. Their main activity is cattle trade.
3. The western sector, which corresponds more or less to historic Senegambia, operates as a trading area between Sahel and the savannah. The Mandinka ethnic group (also referred to as the Dyula) control trading in this area.

Modern migratory flows tend to follow the more dynamic coastal areas. The routes taken by migrants are usually the same as those used to transport goods. They also follow the colonial regional planning patterns which have mostly remained unchanged.

In the case of Senegal, the town of Saint-Louis is the embodiment of a trading centre and a merging of different ethnic groups who define themselves not by where they come from, but by their connection to the culture that is specific to Saint-Louis.

Continuing the tradition established by Senegambia and the French colonial empire, independent Senegal seems to have taken, unlike many countries in West Africa, a laissez-faire approach to freedom of movement. Indeed, aside from the situations mentioned above, there is a relatively relaxed approach to border control. [...] 

The spontaneous nature of inter-African migration is a clear illustration of the fact that African communities and lands are effectively, yet informally, integrated. In West Africa, this type of exodus often takes the form of seasonal migrations. [...] 

In addition to the benefits that cross-border migration brings to destination countries, the required freedom of movement takes off pressure in departure countries and makes it less likely that migrants will attempt to settle definitively in destination countries. Cross-border migration is also paramount to maintaining environmental balance and political stability in the regions concerned. In addition, migrants that have travelled long distances have gained an awareness of what it means to belong to new countries. This awareness enables them forge an identity that is not fixed, but being constantly reconstructed, integral to creating new forms of citizenship.
Such cosmopolitism may look like dissatisfaction with the nation-state, seen as incapable of meeting social demands for basic necessities, administrative requirements, etc. especially in isolated or marginal areas. Movement of both goods and people between Kedougou in southern Senegal and Labé in Upper Guinea, which have a long history, are also a response to the remoteness of the centralised State. We recently noticed that on the border of Senegal and Mauritania, locals sometimes “slip on” another country’s nationality in order to buy household appliances or visit a “brother”.

Deeply-rooted in Africa’s history, cross-border networks are the way in which grassroots communities reconstruct their societies through local cultural practices. They are a way of belonging to and embracing supranational spaces, as a result of the dialogue between communities that fell “victim” to a fortuitous division of land. Political attempts to control the situation are usually unsuccessful; they struggle with the deeply entrenched, age-old spatial and cultural practices which represent one of Africa’s major challenges in terms of sustainable development.

A borderless Africa? Several thoughts on the issue
As far back as we go in African history, the movement of people and goods has been an unchanging force centred around trading exchanges integrated at regional level.

Contrary to popular belief, colonisation did not change this. It simply restructured it to suit its objectives and methods with forced labour, appointment of African civil servants, etc. Although colonialism may have created forms of nationalism, West Africa experienced its only real experience of political integration under French colonisation, with the eight states united within the AOF (1895-1958).

The colonial education system laid the foundations for supranational awareness, to which certain politicians, such as the first President of Dahomey (now Benin), claimed to adhere:

“If it happened that you all decide that I’m a foreigner in Dakar, Bamako or Ouagadougou, I’ll say that that’s no loss: I am at home in Bamako, and there’s nothing you can do about it.” (Émile Derlin Zinsou, Bamako 1959).

Appeals for unity and pan-Africanism – which immortalised a good number of African leaders – failed because of the centrifugal forces that were opposed to it. It didn’t take long for the “balkanization of the AOF” to override more than a quarter of a century of life as one. […] Inherent to the process of globalisation is the disintegration of delineated areas of land, which requires redefining the State and redefining citizenship the world over. We naively believed that, because African boundaries were artificial and because national “States” had had no effect on trade flows throughout history, that these would be easy to deconstruct. It appears, however, that this represents an enormous undertaking.
The Garifunas: A Nation Across Borders, Besieged by the Nation-State

CARLOS AGUDELO
Sociologist

“... now that the topic of globalization gives way to discussions on the eradication of borders and people’s mobility from one country to the next, well, we the Garifuna people have been doing just that for as long as we’ve existed as a people, and despite all the challenges we’ve faced, we haven’t stopped doing just that, up to the present day”¹.

Mario Ellington, Garifuna community leader from Guatemala.

The history and contemporary context of the Garifunas, an indigenous people from Central America that traces its roots to both the African and Amerindian communities, has always been distinctly characterized by cross-border mobility. Having confronted the plights of slavery and dispossession during colonial times, they were constantly forced to seek out ways to survive; it is hence no wonder that their constant shuffling across national boundaries and borders eventually became an essential part of their culture and identity.

This text attempts to retrace the traits that have characterized the Garifunas as a “nation across borders”². This exploration will launch at their inception as a transnational indigenous people, to then arrive at an examination of the challenges they face today under the rise of Nation-States and their firmly entrenched borders. This vivid example of a transnational indigenous community, as well as its historical context and its continued existence under the yoke of repressive migration policies, faithful-

---

¹ Interview took place in Livingston, Guatemala (Agudelo, 2011).
² A nation across borders. Excerpt from the book titled “The Garifuna. A Nation Across Borders. Essays in Social Anthropology”, edited by Garifuna anthropologist Joseph Palacio. This work represents a compilation of articles on this community that were published by prominent researchers.
ly reflects the situation of many indigenous peoples spread across the world. Today, the Garifunas are under pressure to choose between mobility and the restrictions imposed by the Nation-State, yet this actually arises from historic tensions in the manner that Nation-States assert their restrictive authority as manifested through the monitoring of their borders.

The Garifunas, known until the 20th century as the Black Caribbean community (*caribes negros* in Spanish), are a mixed-race people who trace their origins to intermarriage between former African slaves and an indigenous Caribbean community – the Arawaks – which took place during the XVII and XVIII centuries on the island of San Vicente. Eventually, the British deported them en masse towards Central America, which is why in 1797 the Garifunas began settling the Caribbean coastline of four countries (Honduras, Belize, Guatemala and Nicaragua). Today, due to an ongoing migratory flux, a significant number of them live in the United States[^3]. Two core aspects of the Garifuna culture are their language and their spirituality, the latter expressed through *ancestor worship*. Their music, dance and culinary traditions denote both indigenous and African roots. In 2001, UNESCO named the Garifuna culture an intangible cultural heritage of humankind.

The mobility that has become the very essence of these communities has predicated a discourse characterized by cross-border and transnational territoriality. Along these lines, N. Gonzalez’ description of the Garifuna people as the “pilgrims” of the Caribbean seems pertinent, as it links their ethno-history with a recurring trend of mobility[^4].

### From San Vicente to Central America: Always on the Move

Their place of origin is the island of San Vicente in the Lesser Antilles and today it is still part of the broader “living space” for the Garifuna people. What is more, during colonial times they were the ones who defended the island from invaders, although ultimately, they were defeated by the British colonial empire and all survivors were deported towards the Caribbean coastline of Central America. Once in Central America, *Yurumein* (San Vicente, in the Garifuna language) came to symbolize the land of their ancestors; both a real and mystical territory where their origins were firmly entrenched. References to *Yurumein* are present in ongoing manifestestations of their spirituality, representing a shared sense of belonging – even today. The island came to be placed at the core of their memorial discourse; be it in their political mobilization processes, in their territorial claims or in defense of the new Garifuna geographical space spanning across Central America; even in their own assertion as a transnational people.

[^3]: Demographic statistics on the Garifuna population are merely estimations. General calculations indicate the presence of some 250,000 Garifunas in Central America, and about the same amount or more in the United States. This would amount to a total population of some 500,000 individuals.

The Garifunas arrived in Central America in 1797. Their initial dispersion and settlement process took place amidst disputes between the Spanish and the British over the control of the Caribbean coastline. The Garifuna settlement process in Central America took place via gradual and irregular migratory fluxes, moving back and forth between the initial settlement areas followed by fluctuations over time due to changing circumstances; until the settlement of the new areas was finally consolidated. The mobility between the Honduran coastline and later coastal settlements was the result of a growing need to find new areas in which to engage in subsistence practices (fishing and agriculture) as well as answering the pressing need for a labor force which arose from production cycles associated to timber extraction, trade and the transportation of both people and goods.

Starting in the 1820s, Central American nations became independent of Spanish rule and the ensuing delimitation of international boundaries did not exert a substantial effect on the mobility of the Garifuna people. The Central American Federation, founded in 1820, eventually dissolved in 1834. This resulted in the creation of five nation-states: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Since then, the Garifuna transnational mobility has relied on the newly founded states’ feeble control of their land and maritime borders as much as on the community’s ongoing search for better production and employment opportunities, accompanied by an underlying desire to improve their quality of life. Family ties among the Garifunas were already weaved onto a transnational framework; which still prevail to this day when it comes to rituals and celebrations that reignite kinship networks. Ceremonial rites typically convene...
extended families from Garifuna settlements across the four Central American nations. Currently, showing one’s national identity document is enough to enable cross-border movement across the aforementioned four nations.

The Garifuna “Nation” Within the Context of National Transformations

Towards the end of the 19th century, significant shifts took place throughout each of the newly formed Central American nation-states, particularly in regards to economic, productive and demographic factors. Gradually, these changes had a tangible impact on the livelihoods of the Garifuna communities that were spread across the region. One of the most significant events when it comes to these shifts was the increased influx of U.S. capital towards the economies in this region, particularly in the form of banana plantations and the industry’s corresponding processing facilities, as well as the associated transportation services that gave way to a major rail and port network. Aside from the banana industry and to a far lesser extent, other forms of agricultural production were also developed. Timber production (the sawmill industry) was the one of the most prominent secondary industries in the areas populated by the Garifuna community.

Production came to exert unprecedented pressure upon Garifuna settlements. Eventually a schism between production, migration and land ownership arose due to political measures and each respective government’s policies at the time.

[5] This regulation applies to citizens from all these countries, as part of the conventions dictated by the Central American Integration System (SICA, after its Spanish acronym), founded in 1991.
Although the ritual practices and an ongoing sense of belonging are shared by the Garifuna people, the territorial claims and defense techniques they employed began to display unique features due to country-specific dynamics at play. Meaning, a “new territorialization” takes root, one in which the national context molds social interaction and these distinct methods, which eventually overlap onto the Garifunas’ cross-border identity. The aforementioned factors operate as national differentiators, but do not shatter the shared identity of a “Garifuna nation”. “It must be pointed out that we are not competing with the State. We are a nation, an entity that by sheer chance is spread across several countries. As a nation, we have common interests and we must fight for them.”

The Garifuna Diaspora in the United States. A New Transnational Dimension?
The first wave of mass migration towards the United States took place in the 1950s due to the gradual shuttering of the banana companies, which had become the primary employers for the Garifuna communities in Honduras and Guatemala. A favorable context was in place for this migration flux due to the growing need for a skilled workforce by the United States’ Merchant Marines and the port industry. The first generations of Garifuna migrants benefited from certain advantages that enabled them to integrate successfully into the labor market and migrate legally. Family groups trailed the first migrants; first the men of working age, followed by the women. Although the situation became somewhat more complicated starting in the 1990s, this migratory flux peaking at various points has not halted since. The main destination for Garifuna migrants was the city of New York, more specifically Bronx County; where there was already a strong presence of Puerto Rican and Dominican immigrants.

One of the key features denoting the presence of this community was the reproduction of certain cultural activities and traditional religious practices, whilst maintaining a fluid relationship with their communities back home. Fund-raising activities were organized in order to build infrastructure back in their home towns throughout Central America (repairing churches, building or renovating health facilities, schools, etc.). Furthermore, religious rituals that required a significant financial investment were also funded in this manner. The strength of the Garifuna community’s religious fervor based on “ancestor worship” implied a strong link with their extended families and their home towns across Central America. It also highlights the U.S.-based Garifulnas’ ongoing quest for being able to easily move back and forth between their new and former homes.

The Challenge Brought About by the Immigration Crisis

During the 1990s, harsher screening policies and repressive measures that were implemented to combat illegal immigration were notably on the rise in the U.S.; accompanied by a sharp increase in migration into the country. The previous opportunities for successful integration into the workplace experienced a decline. New Garifuna migrants are suddenly confronted with roadblocks in the different paths towards legalizing their immigration status. What’s more, a large part of the Garifuna migrants who arrive in the U.S. during these years, become undocumented migrants. This phenomenon exerted a toll on their freedom of movement and ability to sporadically return to their home towns in Central America. An important feature of their ritual practices within the framework of ancestor worship – which entails returning to their home towns for certain religious celebrations – is weakened. Confronted with the inability to return due to lacking the requisite documentation (visa, residence permit or U.S. citizenship), the community begins to adapt their religious practices in order to continue to assert their group identity. One example of this is the aforementioned homage to ancestors and the sea, performed on the beaches of Bronx County.

Another critical aspect of the changing context for migration was the growing precarity of transit towards the United States, via Mexico. “The situation for our family members and fellow countrymen who want to come to the United States has become increasingly complex over the last few years. Previously, we, the Garifunas, had our own ways of getting here without having to endure what the other Central American and Mexican immigrants were forced to endure”. But

[7] In reference to the first waves of Garifuna migration who, until the 1990s, managed to arrive through family reunification policies and the existence of support networks that facilitated obtaining work visas (merchant marines, ports).
this gradually ceased and now you can see plenty of cases in which the younger members of our communities have disappeared in Mexico, trying to get here. We didn’t have that before.\textsuperscript{8}

Despite a generally negative context overshadowing the immigration process, the Garifuna people, as well as hundreds of thousands of Central Americans, continue to migrate towards the United States due to the increasingly dire situation in their own countries.

Even in the midst of this disheartening outlook, recent Garifuna migrants continue to benefit from the advantage of receiving support from family networks, as well as from other associations and connections, who are already firmly rooted in the United States as a result of prior waves of migration. This enables them to access housing, employment and basic services, despite their condition as undocumented immigrants. Furthermore, it provides considerable support when it comes to obtaining legal and migration counselling services. This represents an important element that fosters the ongoing migratory process, despite the negative factors arising from the current context.

Most first generation immigrants and their U.S.-born descendants are already U.S. citizens and their ability to flow seamlessly between the United States and Central America is not hampered by any immigration-related obstacles. These members of the Garifuna community regularly attend ancestor worship rituals and other festivities in their home towns. Generally speaking, the older ones amongst them tend to return to settle in their home towns during their retirement, occasionally travelling to the United States in order to visit their children and grandchildren.

Some Garifunas profess a discourse in which the United States is already included as a “new territory for the diaspora”, next to the four aforementioned Central American countries. This endows the migration process with a spiritual connotation: “We are headed to the United States because our ancestors want it so and despite the dangers entailed, they protect us. They also live there with us.”\textsuperscript{9}

The Garifunas profess to be part of a “common nation” that encompasses their people, religion, culture and the lands they have settled, despite the geographic boundaries that separate them at any given time. This is implicit in the fact they advocate for their right to freedom of movement across the areas in which the Garifuna nation has settled. Having a citizenship that corresponds to the place one is born or settles in, is merely considered an act of chance and is even secondary to their identity as a cross-border community.

\textsuperscript{8} Statement by a Garifuna male, legally residing in the Bronx since 1982. Interview took place in Bronx County – New York, in June 2016.

\textsuperscript{9} Statement by a Garifuna male from Livingston, Guatemala. Interview took place in July 2015.
Structural factors that pushed the Garifuna to migrate to the United States in the middle of the 20th century are still very much present in the current context. What is more, the very same reasons behind the drive to migrate are shared by hundreds of thousands of Central Americans. Nevertheless, as we have seen, certain unique elements apply in the case of the Garifuna migratory process. These cultural and spiritual factors represent additional stimuli that reinforce the “Caribbean pilgrim’s” penchant for mobility, consolidating their status as a “nation across borders”.

Closing Remarks
The Garifunas are a cross-border people, a “nation” endowed with a discourse of mobility that identifies their community beyond national boundaries. The freedom of movement that has characterized their constitution as a people has become the cornerstone of their identity. This process initiated with the slave trade, was consolidated by the British Empire’s plundering of San Vicente and the ensuing mass deportation towards Central America, and continued due to the precarious subsistence conditions that characterized their settlement of Central America. In present times, it underlies U.S.-bound migration, which is stimulated by the economic crisis ravaging the region. At first glance, the adverse conditions they have faced have molded into a general discourse that encompasses the aforementioned elements as part of a common identity in which cross-border mobility becomes the foundation of new territorialities and cultural assertion. Meaning, that mobility is transformed from a traumatic event into an empowering element that is key to understanding the Garifuna claim to cross-border mobility.

This article summarizes trends that the author has explored further in the following articles:
B. THE BORDER, BETWEEN RETERRITORIALISATION AND DEMATERIALISATION
Walled In

CDTM-MONDE SOLIDAIRE LA FLÈCHE

French International Solidarity Association

Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin wall on the 9th of November 1989, it appears that the world’s relationship with walls is far from over. There are between 70 and 75 walls that have been built or are in the pipeline over an area spanning 40,000 km. There is an increasing number of these walls, barriers and electric fences throughout the world, built as a response to immigration, drug trafficking, terrorism and military conflicts.

The Mexico-United States barrier

The barrier, which is approximately 1,200 km long, aims to prevent illegal crossings from Central America. Every year, more than 700,000 Mexicans and others from different parts of Central America try their luck. And, despite the sophisticated surveillance equipment, nearly half manage to get across, leaving a trail of bodies behind them, scattered across the deserts of Arizona and Texas. Donald Trump’s pledge to “build a wall”, as part of his 2016 election campaign, was one of his most ostentatious promises. Two years later, this promise is the source of a heated row with Democrats that led to the longest government shutdown in US history. Donald Trump is demanding over five billion dollars to build his wall, and his political adversaries are saying no. At an estimated cost of 26 billion dollars, the proposed wall is judged to be both useless and unfeasible. The political issues that have crystallised around the “wall” make it a pertinent symbol that highlights the tensions around migration issues in the USA.

The India-Bangladesh Wall

In 1993 India began building a 3,200 km-long wall separating it from Bangladesh with the aim of preventing migrants getting across the border. This wall, supposed to be protective, has become a hotbed of violence. The whole border region has seen its economy destroyed, and landlocked villages are left without access to water, electricity, healthcare and education. The Indian Border Security Force terrorises anyone who attempts to cross it.

The India-Myanmar wall

Spanning 1,600 km, it was built to curtail drug trafficking and terrorism. However, little thought has gone into its route, which leaves many Indian and Burmese communities on the wrong side of the wall.
Israeli-West Bank wall
This particularly symbolic wall was built by Israel in 2002 to separate Israel from Palestinian territories. It was intended as a “security barrier against terrorism”. At a total length of 723 km, it cuts into the West Bank and encloses Israeli settlements and the region’s main water sources. The wall impedes Palestinians’ right to free movement, breaks family and social ties and is disruptive to the economy of the Occupied Territories. The international court of Justice declared the wall illegal in 2004.

The Ceuta-Melilla fortress
Built between 1998 and 2001, even as people were still celebrating the fall of the Berlin wall, the border-fence, which surrounds two Spanish enclaves in Morocco, aimed to “put an end to the onslaught of African migrants”.\[1\] It seems the three barbed wire fences are no longer enough to deter migrants, as strengthening work has been underway since 2014. A new razor wire barrier between three and five metres high will provide additional reinforcement. There’s always room for more...

The Moroccan Western Sahara wall
The wall, which spans over 2,500 km, was built in several stages (the first of which was in 1980) by the Moroccan army to block Sahrawi military interventions and separate Morocco-controlled and Polisario-controlled areas, cutting the Western Sahara in half. It costs somewhere between two and four million dollars per day to maintain the wall.

The Morocco-Algeria wall
In the wake of the 1994 terrorist attack in Marrakesh, carried out by three young Algerians, Morocco imposed visa regulations on Algerian travellers. Algeria retaliated by shutting its land border. The result is the longest closed border in the world: a 1,600
metre no-man’s land dividing Algeria and Morocco. Twenty years later, Morocco is building a wall and Algeria is digging ditches. The official reason cited by the two countries is to fight against trafficking networks and terrorism in the Sahel.

**Barriers in the EU**

The response to the so-called “refugee crisis” since 2015 has been to build numerous fences and barriers throughout Europe. The main barriers sit between France and Britain, between Hungary Serbia and Croatia, between Macedonia and Greece, between Slovenia and Croatia, and between Austria and Slovenia. And these are in addition to existing barriers between Greece and Turkey, and Bulgaria and Turkey. These barriers seriously undermine the vision of Europe whereby people are supposed to be able to move freely between all Member States.

*The Calais wall*

The UK-funded Calais wall, officially called the “anti-intrusion wall” by the British government, was built in 2016 near the A216 motorway (Calais ring road) for the modest sum of 2.7 million euros. The four-metre high, kilometre-long wall is an addition to existing fences (50km of barbed wire fence around the port area and tunnel) which aims to prevent migrants from jumping into trucks.

*The Hungarian border barrier*

The fence was built between July and October 2015 on Hungary’s border with Serbia and Croatia. Hungary began the construction of the wall, stating that the European Union was not taking the necessary steps to prevent the major influx of people crossing into Europe by way of the Serbia-Hungary border. The fence thus prevents tens of thousands of refugees from getting to Europe, mostly Syrians fleeing the war:

*Botswana-Zimbabwe fence*

This electrified “security fence” is another example of a barrier designed to separate a rich country from a poor country. The Botswana government erected the 2.4-metre high, 810-kilometre long fence on its border with Zimbabwe in 2003, preventing thousands of people from crossing the border.

*The Egypt-Israel barrier*

In 2014 Israel completed a 242 km-long fence along its border with Egypt, a route taken by many illegal African immigrants and traffickers. In 2016, a 17 km section of the five-metre high fence was raised to eight metres.

*The Syria-Turkey wall*

In 2017, Turkey built a massive wall along its border with Syria. The wall, which took a year to build, is 564 km long and was made using 300,000 two-metre wide, three-metre high concrete blocks. According to the Turkish government, the wall was built to “secure its borders, prevent terrorism and illegal crossings and infiltrations.”
In an increasingly globalised world, border walls are multiplying at an alarming rate. The oft-cited excuse for these walls is, of course, “security”, but the reality is that these walls are fuelling a number of problems: they are disrupting the daily lives of communities living in border areas, disrupting economic relations and creating environmental problems (displacing wildlife, destroying ecosystems, etc.). Although walls have become a normalised response to insecurity, they offer no long-term solutions. They only force migrants to take routes that are longer and more perilous, and cause thousands of deaths every year. Border walls are tools of expulsion, exclusion, oppression and discrimination.

We join the call, along with many organisations around the world, for the 9th of November as a Global Day of Action for a World Without Walls, a call that was initially made in 2003 by Palestinians determined to challenge the illegal Israeli walls on the West Bank and around Gaza.
Urban Borders: the Wall of Shame in Lima

DIANA RIVAS GUTIERREZ

“All borders simultaneously constitute both separation and union” (Grimson)

In the midst of acts to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall, in this very day and age, towards the south of Peru’s capital, sits “The Wall of Shame”; so called for separating the low-income area of Pamplona Alta in the district of San Juan de Miraflores, from the ritzy neighborhood of Casuarinas in the Santiago de Surco district. This structure acts as a “subnational border”; due not only to its history and characteristics, but also to the fact that it is administered by the Peruvian military forces. Currently, the wall extends across 10 to 12 kilometers, which is why this article will highlight the section of the wall that separates the two areas denoting the highest level of inequality: the gated residential neighborhood of Casuarinas, from one of the many impoverished areas of Pamplona Alta known as Fronteras Unidas (“United Borders”).

The Wall of Shame

The history of the wall starts begins in 1971 with the so-called “Pamplonazo”; an attempt by Lima’s low-income residents to take over the lands in the area of San Luis. Between April and May of that year, the squatters (most of whom were originally from impoverished areas in rural Peru), armed with sticks, flags and sleeping mats, settled on the barren lands of Pamplona without prior permission. This was due to the absence of public policies that provided housing for the most disadvantaged and vulnerable segments of society, and done in order to seek out better housing opportunities and improve their own living conditions. Fear and contempt spread among the founding

[1] Anthropologist, specialized in urban anthropology as well as territory, gender and discrimination. E-mail address: a20133289@pucp.pe
residents of the San Ignacio de Loyola residential complex: this neighborhood, adjacent to Casuarinas, was in those times inhabited by Lima’s elite. That is why the owners of the San Ignacio de Loyola area elected to build their new homes facing away from these newcomers, partly due to fear of these “new neighbors” of a different social class; under the pretext of curbing future “incursions” into their land, reduce urban insecurity, put a stop to the fear spreading among the community and to avoid having to face a new urban landscape ripe with sleeping mats, makeshift tents, oblivion and poverty.

Immediately afterwards, during the 70s and 80s, the residents of Casuarinas placed the so-called Republican Guard (known as the Guardia Republicana in Spanish, a state institution once responsible for protecting the nation’s borders) at the outskirts of the neighborhood, once more under the pretext of avoiding encroachment on their territory and to deter burglars. This is how the presence of these law enforcement officials in an area already fraught with tension among social classes, became a living and breathing wall that was only torn down when the incumbent government finally dissolved the Republican Guard.

In the 1980s, the country underwent an internal armed conflict, time during which the State installed a military base between the outlying hills bordering Casuarinas and Pamplona Alta. The aim was to counter subversive acts in the area while also controlling access into Casuarinas. This era fraught with subversive acts eventually came to an end in Peru, but the logic behind the militarization process remained intact: the military base was first surrounded by a wall made out of stakes, which eventually grew into a concrete wall.

[2] Refer to Ritimo’s dossier on the topic: https://www.ritimo.org/Perou-justice-et-developpement-pour-tous [available in French, for those who are not familiar with Peru’s history]
Later on, the Colegio Inmaculada (a school located just next to Casuarinas), raised a fence around the perimeter in the area adjacent to the “12 de Noviembre” neighborhood (in Pamplona Alta), under the pretext of putting an end to thefts from its orchards and squabbles between the students, as well as suppressing the presence of insurgent groups in the area. This brought about the very first structural modification to the logic behind urban mobility in Pamplona Alta. Those most affected by this change were the residents of “12 de Noviembre”, who now had to go around the school in order to reach Panamericana Sur, one of the city’s main arteries, when previously they could reach it directly and with ease. This greatly affected both their commute time and transportation expenses.

Later on, towards the end of the 80s, the Villa Sol developers who were behind the construction of the Casuarinas Sur neighborhood, built a wall out of mud separating Casuarinas Sur from the neighborhoods composing “12 de Noviembre” and “5 de Mayo” (Pamplona Alta), under the pretext —once more— of curbing burglaries in the area, deterring the presence of “bad people” in the area and above all, prevent the depreciation of the plots in Casuarinas Sur due to the stark contrast between both places; large mansions overlooking a landscape ripe with trash, poverty and pig sties. Once more, conflict ensued between both neighborhoods, because the urban mobility framework of the Pamplona Alta had been affected when their right to free passage towards the Panamericana Sur was denied.

The constant battle to bring down and rebuild the wall was characterized by protests and sit-ins on the middle of the wall. To bring about peace, members of the Casuarinas neighborhood board and government institutions agreed to build a hidden “door” in the middle of the wall and set a timetable for its use. This agreement also included the allocation of jobs for residents of Pamplona Alta, as service staff (domestic workers, gardeners, construction workers and doormen, among others). In exchange, the residents of Pamplona agreed to “respect” the placement of the wall —basically remain silent on the topic— and agreed to keep the neighboring area free of vagrants, delinquents and trash.

Finally, towards the end of 2013, the municipality of La Molina alongside San Juan de Miraflores (Pamplona Alta) and Villa María del Triunfo, built a wall between both hills that measured more than 8 kilometers long. That is where today two doors that are open between 5 am and 11 pm are located, separating both neighborhoods. The La Molina municipality also employs Rottweilers that they raise themselves to guard the wall.

---

[3] “Insurgent groups” refers to terrorist groups that were very active in Peru during the 80s and 90s, under the umbrella of either Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso in Spanish) or the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru in Spanish, also known as MRTA after its Spanish acronym).
(Dis)(United) Borders: What is the purpose of the wall?
When we mention a border, we refer to a separation, demarcation or obstacle
in place (Diesbach de Rochefort 2002). As per this understanding, seeing how
Lima’s districts’ boundaries are still disputed4, the wall is used to mark a border,
which in turn implies the maintenance of a certain social order. Nevertheless,
as a border, the wall also represents the existence of interconnected networks;
and not merely isolation or separation (idem). Accordingly, from the moment
the “Wall of Shame” started being built, relationships characterized by code-
pendence and coexistence among neighbors from both sides of the wall were
at play. Still, these relationships have manifested in a routine and hierarchical
manner: the residents of Pamplona Alta have worked as service staff for their
neighbors in Casuarinas, and in many instances a workforce composed of the
former has been used to build a wall that serves to protect the latter. Paradoxi-
cally, the one side supplies meals, security, labor and many other services so
that the other side may enjoy their day-to-day lives in comfort. This hierarchical
codependence continues to thrive, because the one side needs work and the
other needs workers. In this manner and in the midst of Peru’s current classist
reality, the wall continues to operate not only as a geographic marker, but to
remind residents on both sides of the border of their rung in the social ladder.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

2002 • Anderson, Jeanine
Leoncio Prado: su historia, su palabra. SINCO Editores.

2002 • Diesbach de Rochefort, Nicole M.
Frontera: ¿Muro Divisorio Tejido de Relaciones?, en Estudios fronterizos vol. 3 no 5 Mexicali ene/jun.
Available at: http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0187-69612002000100001

2000 • GRIMSON, Alejandro

[4] Towards the end of the year 2000, many residents who lacked access to house ownership, paid
dues and “registered” in the COFOPRI (Organismo de Formalización de la Propiedad Informal, or the
Commission for the Formalization of Informal Properties in English) hoping to attain the long-awaited
dream of having access to decent housing while no longer being subject to tenancy. Nevertheless,
from those who registered, more than 150 of them were cheated out of their money, given that the
Commission was not established to grant plots of land as they believed, but rather to title land in
unregulated areas. This incident is what led those who felt scammed to initially take over the parcels of
land destined for the Señor de los Milagros municipal cemetery, and later to occupy the plots bordering
the wall (located further past the “5 de Mayo” area). They also established the Pro Housing Association
“Fronteras Unidas” (United Borders), which is currently engaged in a legal battle between the land
owners and the Cumbre de Casuarinas association. A leasing agreement has been signed between the
inheritors of the land and the association’s governing body, in which the residents of “United Borders”
agree to pay a monthly fee of $2 per home for the use of the land.
Europe’s geographical configuration and its borders have changed in many ways, with hotspots representing one of the main changes. These hotspots, located in Italy and Greece, are not simply a new type of retention centre but form part of a more comprehensive approach to migratory flows that are viewed as being “out of control”. This new approach to migration reflects the trend whereby borders are both increasing and becoming more invisible, becoming more “web-like”, through an array of measures and systems that go beyond actual border zones. These include physical barriers (such as those that exist in specific areas like airports, borders, retention centres, prefectures, humanitarian centres, accommodation centres, etc.) as well as legal/bureaucratic barriers (visa applications, asylum applications, applying for resident status, etc.) and biometric barriers (various databases including SIS, SIV and Eurodac).

Hotspots – migrant processing centres as the new strategy to “discipline” migration flows: systematising the sorting and identification of newcomers
In May 2015, the European Commission published the Agenda on Migration, as a response to increased migratory flows to Italy. The Agenda outlines the idea of establishing new reception centres called “hotspots” whose purported aim is to have a better system for receiving migrants by keeping them in controlled centres. Along with these new centres, the European Commission made the decision (22 September 2015) to distribute and relocate eligible migrants among Member States (160,000 migrants in total). This decision was presented as providing support to arrival countries depicted as being “overwhelmed” by migrants so that migratory flows can be managed better. The introduction of hotspots, the first of which appeared in
Lampedusa, was a way to “discipline” migratory flows, with all those rescued at sea taken to hotspots and it becoming increasingly difficult for any “lone” migrants within or outside the radar zone to cross the border. Hotspots thus constitute a pre-sorting zone where migrants seeking asylum (and eligible for relocation) are detained. Those viewed as “illegal migrants” are also detained in these centres. They may be sent directly back to their home country (North Africans in particular) or “simply” brushed off with a deportation notice. However, with relocation procedures proving unsuccessful, hotspots have progressively become ambiguous processing centres which one can only leave once one’s fingerprints are safely stored in the European database Eurodac. This represents both an entry into a legal system (Schengen and the Dublin Regulation) but also the potential criminalisation of those who go through this system but do not abide by it, i.e., those that don’t stay in the country they first arrived in but continue on to other European countries.¹

Although aggressive fingerprinting procedures existed before hotspots came along, the fact that they are now a mandatory step in the migration process, makes the procedure a symbol of the systematised digital identification processes being used to manage and control borders, and more specifically control mobility. At a legal aid clinic, C., a young Guinean man who arrived in 2017 said: “When I first arrived, I wouldn’t let them take my fingerprints. So, as it always goes, they put me in isolation and tortured me with a Taser gun and beat me. I managed to resist for a few days. As I hadn’t spent too long in Libya, I wasn’t too exhausted, so I tried not to give in. The others were too tired, I think, so they gave up before me. But in the end, it came to the same thing; I let them fingerprint me.” Hotspots effectively represent a digitisation of the migration process; on the one hand, all migrants are concentrated in specific areas (Lampedusa, Pozallo, Lesbos, etc.) – due to the fact that people have to go through these centres and follow the procedures that take place in them – and also because these centres, which effectively represent European governance, have more comprehensive, systematic methods of registering and classifying information on migration flows and on illegal border crossings than individual States do. So although fingerprinting is nothing new, hotspots have made this procedure more systematic with European officers specifically employed for this purpose (since hotspots were opened in Italy, virtually all migrants passing through these centres have been fingerprinted.).

These identification procedures are aligned with the legal provisions set out under the Dublin Regulation through the Eurodac fingerprint database, which was set up in 2003, and which aims to store the fingerprints of all persons that enter Europe in a single database, enabling authorities to identify migrants and compare the fingerprints of asylum-seekers, thereby ensuring that the Geneva Convention on asylum is being properly applied. The Eurodac database is used with two other databases: the SIV, which identifies individuals who hold a European

---

¹ Under the Dublin Regulation, asylum seekers must apply for asylum in the country in which they first arrive, that is, where they were first fingerprinted.
visa, and the SIS, which is a security database mainly used to tackle terrorism and organised crime. These three systems together form an enormous database on the movements of individuals in Europe. Fingerprinting has opened up a new legal framework where those people that have been “Dublinised” (those subjected to the Dublin Regulation) are potentially “deportable” – or to use the legal euphemism, “transferable” – as anyone that has been fingerprinted may be sent back to the country where his/her fingerprints were first taken (often the first EU country they entered). But wherever they go, this risk of deportation will go with them.

This fingerprinting system is another layer in the progressively technological approach to travel control which began with passport and visa requirements. Yet although most technologies are oriented towards controlling and identifying those arriving on European soil, there is an increasing emphasis on controlling travel within Europe in order to “keep these movements in check”, especially when it comes to the movements of those that don’t hold a passport and whose identity is unknown (not stored in any database). Hotspots thus represent a re-configured form of control which is no longer 2D (in terms of space and time) but 3D; the fact that individuals and their movements are traceable means that the border has become omnipresent, and that border control extends far beyond the retention centre. Border control is no longer confined to a single place and to a limited set of procedures but comprises an array of different processes and forms of surveillance – which D. Lyon describes as “the focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection or direction.” Consequently, different identification processes are implemented depending on the person’s situation at the time that he or she is identified; and this surveillance becomes increasingly pervasive over the span of the migratory journey with successive identification procedures which serve to systematically “identify undocumented migrants at each step (whether actually taken or a mere possibility) of their journey” and make all their movements and procedures traceable.

“Borderisation” processes in European countries: diversification and proliferation of borders

The “long summer of migration” of 2015 prompted various reactions within the Schengen Area, and resulted in “re-nationalising” Europe and the progressive closure of European borders. Although the decision to close internal borders received much media attention, with dramatic images of migrants driven back by closed physical borders, there has been little information on other aspects of border expansion processes. In June 2015, France once again departed from the Schengen rules by introducing reinforced border controls on its border with Italy and extending the actual border zone by introducing procedures and processes across an increasingly large geographical area. This amounted to a partial suspension of free movement between EU countries.

In July 2016, the Italian government decided to open a Red Cross humanitarian centre in Ventimiglia, which was to become representative of a new form of border control.34 many of those staying there describe the camp as decrepit, overcrowded and unwelcoming, but the fingerprinting system is what stands out in all the stories. Indeed, a fingerprinting system has been set up in the entranceway; one can only get into the centre once fingerprinted. This in itself reflects just how many different kinds of people contribute to border control operations and to identification and surveillance as tools to manage migration – not only representatives of the State but also NGOs and humanitarian centres. It was also in the spring of 2016 that Italy began undertaking mass arrests and rounding up migrants on the main routes taken to reach Europe, with the intention of sending these people to the Taranto hotspot located in Southern Italy. As a result, this hotspot didn’t do much more than re-identify those arrested in Italy: “In Italy, if they catch you on the border between France and Italy, they take you as far south as they can, to Taranto or Pozzalo. That way it’s harder for you to get back, it’s just to make your life harder.”5 These frequent deportations to Southern Italy thus reflect a trend towards mass management of migrants and the incessant dispersal of groups, with the goal not so much of stopping migration flows, but slowing them down. This approach therefore serves a twin purpose: to back up the identification checks undertaken in the hotspots in Southern Italy, checking and fingerprinting migrants that may have slipped through the cracks; and to slow migrants down, although they are never held for very long in the hotspots, and it doesn’t take them long to get back to Ventimiglia.

This strategy of slowing people down and dispersing them is also being employed in France. Starting in autumn 2015, additional security measures were intro-

---

[5] Interview with I. in Marseille, April 2018.
duced in and around the Calais “jungle” which involved many of its residents being arrested and placed in detention centres, with the aim of keeping them as far as possible from the camp. Often those subjected to mass arrests were sent to detention centres located at the other end of France (Toulouse in particular) and then abruptly freed. These attempts to drive people back illustrate both a pre-sorting process through tangible means (police checks, detention centres, expulsions, fingerprinting, etc.) as well as a more elusive process whereby the border zone has expanded and become something nebulous and intangible. Virtualising borders and increasing the number and types of border control methods are not only about making the digital identification system more effective. These also represent obstacles that delay, divert and slow migrants down from continuing their migratory journey, without actually stopping them altogether, thus representing a tactic to exhaust and deter them.

People are still being arrested in Ventimiglia and taken to hotspots in Southern Italy (there are one or two deportations every week⁷), and yet some individuals are not even detained or identified but simply released outside the hotspot. This suggests that the goal is merely to keep people away from the border even if this is only for a short time: something that can be analised as the time and deterrent dimension of the border.

Internal mobility restricted: a tightened grip on the transportation system

While European authorities and Member States are seeking to reinforce and tighten external borders, this toughened stance is now being felt within the EU area as well. So while borders have become virtual, the border zone (and the procedures that go on within this zone) has expanded into areas where it did not exist before. The border zone has become much more than a line: not only does this area stretch on for twenty or thirty kilometres, but there are also a number of checkpoints located along routes taken by migrants as well as throughout Europe’s transportation system. According to accounts made by a number of individuals, as well as investigations carried out in Marseilles, in the French Basque Country (in Bayonne, Toulouse and Bordeaux) and in Paris (Gare de Lyon), there has been an increase in targeted checks in railway stations and on railway lines heading to Northern Europe. In summer 2018, when migratory routes were reconfigured, the checks moved from Paris’s Gare de Lyon (trains arriving from Marseilles) to Gare d’Austerlitz (trains arriving from Briançon) where arrests were frequent. In Marseilles, there have been several reports of group arrests in the Gare Saint Charles since 2015. Although most of those arrested were identified and released,

[6] Major transit point between France and England for boats, trains and trucks alike, Calais is a small coastal town in France facing the English Channel, and now famous for its “jungle”: a refugee and migrant encampment that was settled early 2015, on their way through to England.

there were reports in 2018 of cases where people were arrested and taken to a detention centre located in Menton\(^8\) and from there sent back to Italy, to Ventimiglia, or even further south. Again, the same strategy is being used: preempting and identifying routes in advance and sending people back as far as possible from the border. Most European borders are indeed permeable and can be easily crossed, especially with the advent of new low-cost forms of travel such as Blablacar, Ouigo and Flixbus. Migrants have been quick to make use of such possibilities to facilitate their travels through Europe.

These different checks are part of an atmosphere of control that begins the moment that migrants enter Europe and continues until they get to the country they are trying to reach, intensifying their sense of uncertainty. In effect, what may seem to be just a routine identity check occurring on a train or bus route (which the police have identified as a migration route) may turn into one’s fingerprints being stored in the Eurodac database. The deliberate confusion between the different biometric databases can have an impact on the routes taken by migrants and can act as yet another deterrent. These new forms of border control are not only a reflection of migrants’ chosen routes; they are also related to the evolution of administrative practices within Member States in regards to “borderisation” and the application of the Dublin Regulation and identification processes and ensuing procedures. Borders are also being virtualised by way of legal arsenal which seeks, increasingly, to keep migrants in the place where they are arrested or registered. This represents a way to keep mobility in check and prevent any potential scheming or autonomous decisions. It is therefore not only becoming increasingly difficult to seek asylum in the country of one’s choice. It is also increasingly difficult to be registered in the region or prefecture of one’s choice in France. A., who arrived in France 2017, describes her arrival at the Marseille railway station: “At first I wanted to go to Paris, but I was arrested with several others at the Gare Saint Charles. They took me to the police station and asked me if I wanted to apply for asylum, but I told them that I wanted to go to England. So they fingerprinted me and gave me an appointment at the prefecture three days later, the process was very fast. I met a man from Sudan who told me that now that I’ve been fingerprinted here and I have an appointment here, I no longer have a choice, so I decided to stay.” Fingerprinting not only serves to identify someone but has legal and administrative implications.

Between 2015 and 2017 there was a gradual shift in the forms of control being employed by French authorities. First, these sought to prevent people reaching England (even if this meant encouraging them to seek asylum in France or “de-Dublinising” them). Now the priority seems to be to drive back any potential candidates for “Dublinisation” (sending them back to the first country in which they arrived before they get a chance to seek asylum, and very strict enforce-

\[8\] The centre is in shipping containers located behind the premises of Menton’s border police. https://www.gisti.org/IMG/pdf/libe_sur_ta_nice.pdf.
ment of the aforementioned Dublin Regulation). Migrants are being subjected to different forms of forced mobility (or immobility), endlessly reconfigured, illustrating what Mr. Tazzoli calls a kind of “containment through mobility”.

CONCLUSION
The virtual and invisible border – that which we carry around on our body, on our fingertips and which exists in databases – often has a greater impact than the actual physical border. The proliferation and diversification of borders suggests that the “hotspot approach” is not limited to Southern Italy or the islands of Greece, but involves a whole system of identification processes, different places, border control and surveillance methods and differentiated approaches to the Dublin Regulation. The methods of control and type of surveillance used vary depending on the country in which migrants arrive and the migratory route taken, resulting in a journey where migrants are shipped around, slowed down and held up. The border is becoming virtual both through biometrics systems – the border now exists on people’s bodies and follows them wherever they go – and through the proliferation of tangible and intangible checkpoints which serve to monitor movements and keep mobility in check.
Eurodac: social and political impacts of the digitization of the external European border

BRIGITTA KUSTER AND VASSILIS TSIANOS
Researchers and sociologist
Editorial editing by Caroline Weill

Often, the digital border is thought of as the duplication and multiplication of a supposedly undisputable and clearly identified territorial border. In other words, the particularity of the digital border would be in the digitization of the processes of demarcation. However, it is crucial to target the technical, political and institutional operations that are rendered invisible, but that significantly impact on the success and effectiveness of the digital border: when a machine runs efficiently, when a matter of fact is settled, one needs focus only on its inputs and outputs and not on its internal complexity. Thus, paradoxically, the more science and technology succeed, the more opaque and obscure they become. Therefore, it is crucial to bring to the table a better understanding of what the European digital border is, how it actually works, and what its social and political impacts are.

The example of Eurodac shows the current evolution of the digitization of European border controls. Eurodac is an information, communication and control technology that operates by means of a European database, in which the fingerprints of asylum seekers and irregular migrants are stored. Eurodac works as a so-called Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) and is applied within the areas where the rules of the Dublin III regulation are applicable. Dublin/Eurodac were designed in response to the crisis of the European asylum system, which was accompanied by the construction and the use of rather lax and crude terms such as “asylum shop-

ping.” The Dublin III regulation is based on the “polluter-pays” principle: it states that the Member State which has “caused” the entry of an asylum applicant (for instance by granting a visa or for lack of border security) should perform the asylum procedure. By using the Eurodac database to reconstruct the one and only responsible Member State per asylum application, Dublin III regulates the mobility of non-EU-citizens without a valid visa within the EU.

These are the basic inputs for the far-reaching Eurodac categorization of individuals: Category 1 stands for asylum seekers, Category 2 for foreigners who have illegally crossed the EU external border, and Category 3 denotes illegal migrants within the Schengen area. As Irma van der Ploeg has shown incisively, such categorizing does not increase the knowledge of third-country nationals, but results in an “informatization of the body” that aims to capture the volatility of moving bodies in making them machine readable (Van der Ploeg and Sprenkels 2011).

**Numbers and their Interpretation in the Making of the Digital Border**

When beginning to deal with Eurodac, we noticed that the crisis, which European political institutions had proclaimed in 2011, was already visible and readable from the numbers and interpretations published in the 2009 Eurodac activity report (European Commission 2010). Back then, a marked drop in the data curve concerning those persons who were deemed to have illegally crossed the EU external border had been registered:

The trend regarding the number of persons who were apprehended in connection with an irregular crossing of an external border (“category 2”) changed dramatically in 2009. After a rise of 62.3% between 2007 and 2008 (to 61,945), the number of transactions fell by 50% in 2009 (to 31,071). Italy, Greece and Spain continue to be the countries, which enter the vast majority of such data. However, Greece is now the one with most transactions—it sent 60% of all ‘category 2’ in 2009 (18,714 compared to 20,012 in 2008). (European Commission 2010: 5)

Already for the year 2009 the EURODAC protocol inscribed a (statistically underlined) record of an anomaly on the Greek Schengen border. Its activity (in the form of Rabbits[2]) stepped out of the transcript in 2011. Obviously the numbers—and this is a crucial point—shifted on the Greek Schengen border in 2011, where as a result of their status change, they began to perform a new life as signifier, as bearers of meaning and of legitimacy for the ongoing Rabbit-intervention: the rearrangement of these numbers serves the purpose of bringing justification to the military intervention in the Mediterranean.

[2] Rabbit is the acronym for « Rapid Border Intervention Teams ».
Our investigation, especially interviews with officers of different countries’ Eurodac Central Office, have shown the strategic and political use of different categories as officers register the presence of non-European citizens at the border. We talked to a police officer in the central national Eurodac office in Athens, who explained to us the functioning of Eurodac in an unconventional manner. While he pointed to the computerscreen showing a hit message, he declared:

For example, this person here has applied for asylum in Greece, but his fingerprints were first registered in Sweden. So it seems that this must be a case for which Sweden is responsible. The person should be sent to Sweden. But of course, this could also prove wrong, because: How could this person have reached Sweden directly? In all likelihood, he first arrived in Greece, but without being registered or being registered as a category 2 when entering. This entry has been deleted, so that his fingerprints appears for the first time in Sweden.

Beyond the fact that this police officer implicitly admits that illegal entries into Europe via Greece often happen often without registration, two other aspects of his description are remarkable.

On the one hand, this police officer provides us with an implicit report on a migration route to Europe, which by now has become targeted by the police. The route which is referred to in this officer’s speech is, however, less of a geographical nature but characterized by a time frame: since according to the rules of the Eurodac Regulation, the fingerprint data recorded under category 2 (illegal entries across the EU’s external border) will be deleted after 2 years, very probably, this person has managed to avoid controls for 2 years (the time needed for the registration of their illegal entry to disappear from EURODAC) and applied for asylum elsewhere afterwards.

On the other hand, the self-conception of Greece still remains one of a transit country for migration, so that differences between illegal forms of popping up as having entered into the Schengen area, depending on whether they feature as related to the border or to the territory, thus to category 2 or 3, are not so crucial for Greek officers. Thus, the subtlety of such a distinction is eroded by reference to Europe just like Europe refers to Greece as the European border. Yet it is still possible to achieve the objective that the BKA officer postulated: To generate numbers and inscriptions that help Greece to get rid of asylum seekers.

The Information and Control Continuum
It is also important to note that the subjectivity of the migrants who are registered in Eurodac, that is to say, the knowledge and information exchange strategies of migrants on the routes, is a crucial element to the making of the EU’s digital borders.
In the spring of 2011 we came to Igoumenitsa for the first time. It is the last Greek port town before Italy, located close to the border with Albania. During our stay we visited the local informal camp inhabited almost exclusively by male transit migrants. Shortly after our visit in Igoumenitsa, the camp—situated on the edge of town on a slope directly above the access road to the harbor and called by the inhabitants “the mountain” – was brutally demolished by the police. During the day, the transit migrants were in the streets of the town to find jobs and food. In the evening and during the night they were hanging around the harbor and trying to seize an opportunity. When Rastaman came towards us, he asked for a cigarette, and told about his journey. He got here from Sudan, via Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, and finally in November 2009 the Greek island of Lesvos. In Mytilini, he was arrested after few days and then detained in the prison of Pagani for about a week. Like all other people there he has been interviewed, photographed, and “fingered.” “Fingered” was the term in the pidgin English in which newly arrived migrants spread the words amongst them, or communicated with people like us. All the others who had been in Pagani together had been fingered on paper, too, Rastaman said. He did not know why, maybe because his prints were not clear enough. Still, he would have had to press his fingers into a rather small machine with a glass plate. He said he knows that not all fingerprints play a role. On the mountain he met two Sudanese who would have made it across the Adriatic sea and then to Germany a week ago. Obviously, there would have been no problem in Germany with their fingerprints, while he would know from many conversations and many experiences that the Greeks were not too particular in their approach to the “fingering.” Rastaman wants to go to England, where he has friends and family. His eyes are fixed on the harbor. He is waiting for the right moment. There were always people who made it.

We came repeatedly across the indication that glass is dangerous. Such information seems to be circulating among migrants and the validity of this knowledge was not necessarily invalidated in the numerous expert interviews we held. Today, allegations that Italian or Greek authorities do not fingerprint asylum seekers correctly are made in public, for instance by German police representatives. The migrant’s stories around the glass seem to be further evidence of the fact that migration constitutes a self-reflexive part of the border regime. This is what we address as the “information and control continuum” : things are happening very fast, almost each day the border seems to shift. The internal complexity of and conflicts over a digital border always address us first from the perspective of migration. Migration comes first. Movement comes before its control : the border is being reconfigured following the migrants’ moves, and shifts with the changes of people’s migration strategies.

Reconstructing the migration routes
The conflict over Eurodac and the external European borders is best expressed by the treatment of several « abnormalities ». “Missed hits” is the technical term
used amongst Eurodac experts for category 1 (asylum seekers) against 2 (illegal entering) matchings (generally used to reconstruct the routes of migrants once they have entered Schengen territory). The cases in point are for instance persons having applied for asylum in Germany and are later controlled and registered by Greek border guards, if we follow the timeline of Eurodac entries. Under the 206 cases of such “missed hits” in 2013, 202 concern Greece: that is to say, 206 people have managed to avoid controls in Europe for over two years after their fingerprints were taken in Greece, thus disappeared from the EURODAC database, and reappeared elsewhere in Europe, when their fingerprints were later on taken by another country’s authorities.

A second specialist jargon term—“wrong hit”—refers to a similar Eurodac accident due to time delays between the date of taking the fingerprints and their sending to the Eurodac Central Unit. The corresponding numbers for 2013 are 258 cases and the related cases concern category 1 against 1 hits indicating multiple asylum applications. A “wrong hit,” according to the 2013 report, is to be understood in the context of a scenario where a third-country national lodges an asylum application in Member State (A), whose authorities take his/her fingerprints. While those fingerprints are still waiting to be transmitted to the Central Unit (category 1 transaction), the same person could already present him/herself in another Member State (B) and ask again for asylum. If this Member State B sends the fingerprints first, the fingerprints sent by Member State A would be registered in the Central database later than the fingerprints sent by Member State B and would thus result in a hit from the data sent by Member State B against the data sent by the Member State A. Member State B would thus be determined as being responsible instead of the Member State A where an asylum application had been lodged first. (Annual report on the 2013 activities of Eurodac: 18)

Moreover, a wrong hit as we learn from the same Eurodac report is a hit “in wrong sense”. Wrong sense clearly refers to a territorial orientation and thus to the chronology of an immigration narrative from a European periphery (A) to a European core (B). In the architecture of Eurodac, this is also understood as a temporal trajectory “by design.” In consequence we have to recognize the immanent time dimension of Eurodac and the digital border it embodies, and the consequent conflictive dynamics as they happen to unfold between the contested mobility of migrant’s immigration projects and the advised smooth circulation of data relating to them. That is to say, an important challenge of the making of the digital border routes seems to become a race between the mobile

[3] A hit category 1 against category 1 occurs when the fingerprints of an asylum seeker have been recognized by the Central Unit as a match against the stored fingerprints of another existing asylum applicant. The report indicates that the percentage of multiple asylum applications is increasing over the last 3 years. This is interesting because Eurodac and Dublin III were originally created to prevent this.
bodies and the technologies that aim at regulating their mobility and at making migrations a disciplined and organized movement, rather than being directed by migrant’s own will and autonomy.

In contrast with the other two, category 3 (illegal migrants within the Schengen area) fingerprint scans are principally not stored. Thus, they are a kind of snapshot of the fluid and illegitimate volatility of bodies on the move within Schengen territory who are suspicious to maintain an intimate relation a fishy immigration history. A hit in category 3 against category 1 helps to reconstruct and prevent a route taken by migrants on which they tend to disappear from the screen. Such hits do not relate to the temporal ordering of irregular immigration in Europe, but rather to its spatial order: Now that you are here, your presence identifies the distance to the place at which you were once registered, crossing the border or filing an asylum claim and subsequently got lost of track. These are informative for cycles of “digital deportability” (Papadopoulos et al. 2008), understood as the extension of the risks of mobility related to the crossing of the border—money, perseverance, length of the itinerancy and, sometimes, life itself—to the whole area enclosed by the Schengen border and beyond. Just as you enter Schengen time/space via passing, fading and emerging on computer screens, digital deportability involves a potentially expanded ubiquity of the European border, as a result of the digital liquefaction of its spatiality: the border is not a line, but the entirety of the Schengen area.

However, as we have shown above, this supposedly ubiquitous border is subjected to a temporal order, in other words, a timeline of the European space. Eurodac data bodies are algorithmically converted fingerprint profiles, which visualize and project individuals and their travel routes within Schengen. Not only that they render the mobile and volatile bodies of migrants machine-readable and verifiable when enrolling their fingers and inscribing the according data, but also immutable and hypermobile.

**Conclusion**
The European border is constantly externalised and deterritorialized by control technologies, but it is also pushed by migrant movements. The migrants carry the border, because they embody the border – especially in the form of their fingers – they cannot entirely cross it. However, what they do is to transgress the border at the same time than incorporating it. Only in this way – as a contempt or by trampling Schengen under their feet – they re-territorialize the border and they push it deeper into the European territory as we can actually see today. In this way they challenge the limits of Europe.
C. FOCUS ON BORDER ZONES
The Prism of Gender on the Morocco-Spain Border

ELSA TYSZLER
PhD student in Sociology

The only land borders that exist between Africa and Europe are located in Ceuta and Melilla, remnants of the Spanish Colonial Empire. Attempts made by “sub-Saharan migrants” to cross into these enclaves so as to get to Europe were first recorded in the 1990s. This came at a time when Spain was being integrated into the Schengen Area and visas were systematically required, making it increasingly difficult to legally cross the border into Europe. In an attempt to crack down on migrants’ attempts to get to Europe, Spain introduced fences that grew progressively higher as well as an increased military presence and tighter border controls. At the same time, Morocco, which has taken on a law enforcement role on the European border, is actively fighting so-called illegal immigration, calling on the army and erecting its own fences to prevent migrants reaching the Spanish fences that surround these enclaves. In 2005, a first tragic incident on the border was reported: at least eleven people were shot dead and hundreds more wounded in an attempt to cross the borders of Ceuta and Melilla. Thirteen years later, these borders continue to be the backdrop for ongoing human rights violations, particularly of so-called “sub-Saharan migrants”, those from Central and West Africa. Under the guise of “protecting European borders”, it seems that law enforcement agencies on both the Spanish and Moroccan borders act with a certain impunity in how they choose to implement anti-immigration policies. In Nador, which sits alongside Melilla, chasing

[1] NB: This article was adapted from “Boza ! Disent aussi les femmes”, published in Vacarme in Spring 2018.
potential migrants trying to get to Europe has become a full-blown “hunt for the black man”\textsuperscript{4}. This racist tactic has resulted in a situation where these people are forced to hide in the surrounding forests while they wait for an opportunity to cross the border; in other words, they are confined to a wallless prison – essentially a radical “othering” of black people trying to assert their right to freedom of movement\textsuperscript{5}. Looking at the situation through the prism of gender\textsuperscript{6} may enable us to further develop our analysis of what is happening on the border and to consider the profound consequences of externalising European migration policies in Africa, looking at the case of Morocco.

**Crossing the border (or not): navigating the interlocking systems of power and domination**

Three main tactics are used by migrants from Central or West Africa wishing to assert their freedom of movement and cross the Moroccan border, despite the closed border. There is, first of all, the land tactic, which is the most popular approach and consists of attempting to jump the fence on the border of Ceuta or Melilla. “\textit{To go Boza}”\textsuperscript{7} is physically extremely challenging and involves running for several hours from the campsite, climbing the barbed-wire fence on the Moroccan border, traversing a ditch and then climbing the three fences on the Spanish border, the tallest of which is seven metres high. They then have to run to the CETI (Temporary Centre for Immigrants and Asylum Seekers) located in the enclave, and this all has to be done without being spotted by the Moroccan and Spanish authorities or caught by the various surveillance systems (helicopters, radars, cameras, infrared sensors). If a migrant is caught by soldiers before, on, or after reaching the border, they risk being brutally beaten and being sent back to Morocco. Another tactic is hiding in a concealed chamber of a car and crossing the border checkpoint into an enclave. Attempting to cross the border by boat is another fairly dangerous tactic, either towards one of the enclaves or directly towards the Spanish peninsula. Social relations of gender, race and class (partly rearranged in response to the specificities of this local space) have a direct impact on the chosen tactic as well as the border experience itself.

Although refugees from Algeria and Syria can cross into Melilla through the border checkpoint, it is impossible for a black person to do the same thing. This is why there are makeshift campsites in the forest and why they choose to jump the fence or cross the sea despite the difficult living conditions and the risk of brutal violence (at the fence) or even death (at the fence or at sea). Non-black

\[4\] The words used by several migrant men interviewed in Nador.

\[5\] For a broader overview of the harsh conditions on the border, see: \textit{Ceuta et Melilla : centres de tri à ciel ouvert aux portes de l’Afrique}, joint report GADEM/Migreurop/APDHA/La Cimade, 2015.

\[6\] Gender is a social, historical and hierarchical construction based on the sex of males and females and symbolises gender-based social relations. See SCOTT, Joan W., \textit{De l’utilité du genre}, Paris : Éd. Fayard, 2012, p. 219.

\[7\] The word “boza” comes from Wolof or Bambara (there are several different definitions) and means “victory” in crossing the border.
refugees can (with varying degrees of ease) take the same route as Moroccans from the region who have daily right of entry into the enclaves. A decisive factor, therefore, in getting through the Ceuta and Melilla border checkpoints, is the colour of one’s skin. This was outrightly acknowledged by a colonel from the Spanish Civil Guard in Melilla interviewed in 2015: “There are different ways to cross the border: sub-Saharan jump the fence, try to get through by boat, and hide in cars. Syrians, however, go through the checkpoint, usually with fake or stolen passports. Here, there are Whites and there are Blacks. Sub-Saharan can’t just walk through.” This is indeed an accurate reflection of the situation, as confirmed by migrants from Central and West Africa who, when asked in 2015 if they had ever tried to access the asylum centre located at the entrance of the Melilla enclave, replied: “What asylum centre? An asylum centre in Beni-Ansar? That’s out of the question – there’s no way we can even get close to the border! That’s for the Syrians,” replied a migrant from Guinea. “The asylum centre is a racist system. If you get close to the border and you’re black you’ll get beaten, you can’t go there,” commented a Nigerian man.

Gender, however, also plays a key role in the route that is chosen. The “warriors” that “attack” the borders of Ceuta and Melilla are predominantly male. In ten years of boza, only two females have jumped the fence. And one of the women was able to get through a broken fence – an “easy boza” apparently. “The fences are too hard for women,” said the men. “It’s too physically demanding and it’s too dangerous.” Women are systematically out of the picture when it comes to the war on the border. Only men (even minors) go to the front. Women are usually relegated to boat crossings, and pay to try their luck crossing the border in an inflatable boat. Pregnancy is another tactic used to increase one’s chances of crossing the border into Spain: “The Salvamento (Spanish sea rescue organisation) will be more sympathetic towards pregnant women or those with babies in the boat,” explained a Nigerian camp chief based in Nador. So women either turn up pregnant or are pressured into pregnancy in order to increase their chances of getting on a boat. Menstruating women, however, are not favoured. “If you are menstruating, you won’t be allowed on a boat because apparently it attracts sharks,” explained several women waiting to cross by boat. “We can’t let women who have their period on the boats; it’s bad luck,” added a man. The women interviewed explained that women are sometimes checked to make sure they are not menstruating before being allowed to board.

“Getting to Europe without a visa isn’t free”: the route chosen by those trying to get to Europe also reflects their economic power. Jumping the fence is the route taken by the poorest migrants because it is free (even if there is a charge for “ghetto rights”, which one pays to stay in the camps). If a migrant has mon-

---

[8] Expressions used by those concerned.
[9] This expression signifies the heavy financial and human cost of getting to Europe without a visa.

Excerpt from an interview with a Cameroonian woman, Nador, 2017.
they will pay for a boat crossing, or even better, to hide in the concealed chamber of a car. Overall, a person that can pay a large sum of money will spend a lot less time waiting in the forest for a chance to cross the border, they will get out faster, and will consequently experience less violence (or none at all).

A person chosen’s route into Spain is therefore based on a number of different factors, including local versions of social relations of gender, race and financial power. It is, to some extent, possible to resist the consubstantial effects of power relations and domination[11], as illustrated by those women who make themselves look pregnant so as to increase their chances of getting on a boat, or those who defy gender categorisations and attempt jumping the fence. From the different stories told, it appears that, in addition to the discriminatory policies that all black people on the border are subjected to, the violence they experience is intricately connected to economic power: the more money you have, the better you are treated (because you’re helping the business of border crossings). Yet this is not necessarily the case if you happen to be a woman. An interlocking of different power systems also defines life in the forest, where migrants live while they wait to cross the border. It appears that the gender-based and sexual order is resistant to change, and that a closed and militarised border perpetuates a continuum of male domination.

[10] In June 2012, the cost of a place in an inflatable boat ranged from 1,200 to 3,500 euros depending on the conditions and destination (Melilla or the peninsula). The cost of getting to an enclave by hiding in a vehicle can cost twice or even three times as much because this option is significantly less risky (for the passenger(s)) and the trip is not nearly as long.

[11] The intertwining of social relations of gender, race and class was first theorised in the USA with the concept of interlocking (Combahee River Collective, 1977), and then intersectionality (Kimberley Crenshaw 1989). French researcher Danièle Kergoat introduced the concept of consubstantiality of social relations (1978), which puts more emphasis on the way in which social relations are mutually constructed rather than just add up.
The “soldier-hero” and “female-victim”: performative effects of the anti-migrant war

While they wait for an opportunity to cross the border by land or sea, migrants have to live in makeshift camps located in the surrounding forests for a period of time that can range from several days to several years. Here, again, we may analyse the extent to which the systems of oppression governing the border space are entangled.

The “warriors” often claim that “life in the forest is not for women.” Apparently “it’s too hard for them.” Camps in the forest are generally patriarchal. Men (“Chairmen”\(^{12}\)) are those in charge; they decide on the rules and the hierarchal system that govern the camps. Even the lay-out of the camps reflects women’s subservience to men, as the tents allocated to women are often located close to the the “Chairman’s” tent. Women never hold a position of responsibility in the “camp government”. Although they are seen as being “too vulnerable” and “too weak” to cope with life in the forest, they are in fact very useful to men living in the camps: “At least they can go down to town to beg and bring back food because no one stops them. They hunt us men down,” one man said. Women living in the camps also often provide sexual services. Some women who need money to pay for a place on a boat, or who need food for themselves or their children resort to sex work as a way to survive and achieve their goal of getting to Europe. Other women are compelled to have a sexual relationship with one man so that he will protect them from abuse from other men. Others are prevented from obtaining a place on a boat unless they agree to provide sexual services to the Chairman:

“I’m going to Nador; I’m a girl. When I get to the forest everyone wants me. If it’s a chairman, he might take my money for the boat. He might not take me on board because he likes me. He likes me so he does everything he can to keep me there. He won’t let me on a boat even when there is room because he wants to touch me first. You see?”

(Interview with D.T, Rabat, 2017)

This young Senegalese woman’s description of the situation says a lot about the way in which men control women’s attempts to cross the border. So even if a woman has the money to pay for her place on a boat, she may still be prevented if a chairman happens to have sexual feelings for her. It seems that in the forest, being a woman eclipses economic power. Women are therefore dependent on the good will of the men that control who gets a chance at trying to cross the border. And the chairmen are just one link in the chain. Some woman find that

\(^{12}\) The “chairman” or “thiaman” refers to the leader of the camp where all those seeking to cross the border are living, often grouped according to their nationality. The “chairmen” are generally those that have been in the camps the longest, often over several years. They play a key role in organising boat crossings.
their time in the forest is prolonged, which means that they are more likely to fall victim to sexual blackmail, sex work that they are basically forced into, sexual assault and rape (either by Moroccan soldiers or civilians that enter the camps or men actually living in the camp). Other women, given the conditions they are faced with, give up trying to cross the border altogether.

Confronted with the cruel violence that awaits them, migrant men seem to cope by imagining themselves as the “brave soldier” risking their lives on the front, on a border space that has become an anti-migrant war zone. Men living in the camps see themselves as “warriors”, “soldiers”, “commandos” and “fence-slammers”. “I’m ready to risk my life. I know it’s a war out there, but I’m determined,” states a young man on his way to the forests of North Morocco in 2015. On the border, it is black men that bear the brunt of the violence dealt out by Moroccan and Spanish soldiers. The majority of those killed are black. It seems that the bodies of black men bear the traces of the militarised violence which seeks to prevent their freedom of movement, as well as the obligation they feel to become “elite commandos”\[13\] in order to fight back and survive. The bodies of women, on the other hand, bear the traces of sexual violence and forced pregnancies, violence which may be less visible but which occurs on a massive scale. The harshness of life in the forest and the militarised approach to law enforcement therefore exacerbate the migrant woman’s vulnerability as well as migrant man’s macho masculinity. The soldiers fighting on the other side also seem to have glorified their roles in the war on the border.

The Spanish soldiers present in the enclaves also identify to the figure of the male hero. The imaginary world of the Mafia and the alibi of human trafficking seem to be useful concepts to the Spanish Civil Guard in charge of “defending the integrity of the Spanish and European border”, particularly when it comes to justifying the violence that takes place there. The Civil Guard claims that it is protecting Europe from “mafia organisations” and maintains that “the mafia provides ample preparation for those who come to the border. They are well fed, they are very strong, they are real olympic athletes. They don’t turn up with empty stomachs.” Yet the exact opposite is true: migrants are extremely weak due to lack of food and sleep as well as the constant stress that goes with life in the forest and the brutal security operations they are subjected to. In addition, according to authorities in the enclaves, “99% of sub-Saharan women are victim to human trafficking,” yet nothing is done to protect them out fear that it would “encourage them”\[14\]. Since 2015, the excuse given by Moroccan authorities for the brutality on the border is that they are “freeing women and children from trafficking networks.” However, like their Spanish counterparts, nothing is done to identify potential victims of human trafficking, and even less to protect them. This one-track approach to the trafficking issue is a way of depoliticis-

---

[14] Excerpts from an interview with the Spanish Civil Guard of Ceuta and Melilla in May and June 2015.
ing gender-based violence and making it invisible, particularly sexual violence against women, which is exacerbated by policies that prevent their freedom of movement. According to this discourse, violence against women comes from them (black men), not from us, the Spanish and Moroccan states and our policies which amount to saving them through “sexual humanitarianism”15 (Nicola Mai) – a paternalistic and racist notion that denies the migrant woman’s ability to fight and take action.

Gender issues integral to understanding the situation on the border

In order for academics, aid workers and activists to analyse and record the effects of migration and security policies, gender relations need to be taken into account. These are inseparable from relations of race and class, and are fuelling the violence that is taking place on the border. How can we possibly have a relevant and comprehensive discussion of the consequences of externalising European borders in Africa or elsewhere if we don’t give migrant women a voice, as active agents that are constantly interacting with all other groups at the border? Without their point of view, how can we deconstruct the simplified categories that use gender-based violence as an excuse, especially the sexual violence that is precisely exacerbated by a military approach to migration and security policies? Far from the passive victims they are depicted as, women navigating the border are constantly seeking tactics to defend themselves and claim their right to freedom of movement.

Border Zones, Detainment and the Rule of Law

LAURE BLONDEL
Co-Director of Anafé

Under international law, everyone is entitled to leave any country, including one’s own, and return to that country. The same law protects migrants from abuse and violation of their fundamental rights. However, so-called freedom of movement within the Schengen Area now involves heightened surveillance of its external borders. This may take the form of walls and barbed wire fences, militarised surveillance, a “hotspot” approach, refusals to issue visas, mandatory Schengen airport transit visas, countless travellers’ and migrants’ databases, deportations and detainment, to name just a few. Border control is increasingly based on a logic of shirking responsibility for the violations of fundamental rights that are taking place in border zones. The more rules there are, the more opportunities there are to violate them. And several decades of reforms have done nothing to end violations of these rights, regularly documented and denounced by human rights organisations and authorities. In fact, they have done quite the opposite.

The need to protect oneself from the so-called “migrant threat” and a “massive influx”… Migrants and refugees are often depicted as a crisis that must be addressed by amping up the legislative and political machinery to a drastic degree. This approach, which has been the norm since the 2000s, involves allocating more resources (including military resources) to border guards, increasing the number of cooperation and readmission agreements, increasing the number of confinement centres, refusing access to help or protection, disregarding human trafficking and violence (including sexual violence) and turning a blind eye to the thousands of dead. The “migration crisis”, depicted as such since 2015, is in fact a crisis of European migration policies. This is highlighted by the systematic security-focussed measures, such as confinement, which have become increasingly repressive and dangerous.
Detention: Europe’s answer to border control

In order to meet its objectives in regards to border closures and deportations, detention has become, since the nineties, the normalised strategy for managing migrant populations both in and outside the European Union (EU), as it exports and outsources this “model” to neighbouring countries.

From 2011 to 2016, the total known capacity of camps within the EU and its neighbouring states increased from 32,000 to 47,000. In addition to these ever-increasing detention camps, there are other less obvious, less institutional forms of confinement which are also increasing in number. These changes point to a process of rationalisation, also at work in the screening systems established since 2015 as part of the “hotspot approach”.

A person may be deprived of liberty solely for failing to comply (with or without justification) with border crossing regulations and/or residence regulations. Confinement in its various forms, whether this be formal or informal, is primarily used for punitive purposes, with the aim of deterring migrants from coming to Europe. The dynamics at play are generally the same: rejection and marginalisation, invisibilisation, lack of transparency in regards to procedures, racial profiling and screening, violations of fundamental rights. And confinement is another way to “screen” migrants, in the same way that delinquents are put in prison to “prevent” them committing further crimes. In this way, over and over again, migrants are being painted as criminals. It would appear, then, that state sovereignty, in its traditional forms, is being challenged: the rationale behind border control procedures and confinement is suggestive of attempts to regain control of one’s own land.

The idea that people can be confined and have their freedom taken away from them while retaining their dignity and their rights is a fiction. All investigations and field observations have concluded that illegal practices, abuse of process, and violations of fundamental rights are a result the deprivation of liberty itself (freedom to come and go, right to asylum, right to private and family life, child protection, freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment, to name a few).

Individuals who may have been in the EU for a long period of time, are detained (often without being informed of their rights) for periods of up to eighteen months in certain countries, sometimes in substandard conditions. They do not go through any official process nor do they have any access to legal advice or healthcare. There is no legal process overseeing the decision to confine an individual. Without any legal assistance, facing the arbitrariness of their situation, the silence of authorities, and deprived of any contact with the outside world,

---

often the only form of communication available to those locked up is hunger strikes, self-harm and suicide attempts. The violence that individuals are exposed to in any centre of confinement is therefore primarily institutional and comes from individual law enforcement officers.

Detention systems, legislative processes, administrative procedures and the conditions in these centres all vary from one country to another, and even from one centre to another. The same is true when it comes to civil society and how much or how little access they have to these centres in order to produce independent information, which is limited if not inexistent. And when there is access, it is usually inadequate, making it difficult to get a full picture of the situation. There are concerns, given the lack of transparency and information, that the situation in regards to violations of fundamental rights is even worse than we think.

Condemning the idea of confining foreigners on the border means objecting to the harmful and repressive measures that States are using to control their borders. We need to refuse to accept the idea that places of confinement are a “necessary evil”.

In France, legalised exceptions established in “waiting zones”

In France, the legislation on border confinement was established in 1992: there is effectively a specific legal system uniquely for these “border zones”. Regulations pertaining to whether a person is refused entry, designated to a “waiting zone” or deported (usually back to the last city of transit) give officials extensive room for manoeuvre. The law revolves around screening, detaining and deporting people as fast as possible, through decisions made by public officials and without any real legal process. This is in violation of established legal precedent and of European and international legal provisions. Both the administrative and police procedures in these waiting zones are typically opaque, as they are in other areas of confinement. Not only are the people detained in these areas deprived of liberty, but their rights are regularly violated. Indeed, establishing a legal framework has done nothing to end human rights violations, despite regular recommendations made by human rights organisations. The reality is that they have become even more systematic. Human rights violations are not one-off issues but a chronic, structural problem due to the absence of an adequate legal framework to regulate the waiting zones.

[4] See Anafé reports including:

[5] These include the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Committee Against Torture and the Council of Europe. French organisations include the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights, the “Défenseur des Droits” (constitutional independent authority on rights protection) and the Controller General of Places of Deprivation of Liberty.
The people that are detained in these waiting zones, which are located in airports and ports, reach French borders by so-called regular routes. They are refused entry into the Schengen Area because the border police decide that they don’t meet entry requirements and/or fall into the category of “high immigration risk”. Individuals seeking asylum at the border are also detained in these areas. The maximum period of time that a person may stay in these waiting zones is (in theory) 20 days.

As these waiting zones are a bridge between the world outside the border and the world within, and as the law is different here to what it is in the rest of the country, the randomness and arbitrariness of what goes on within them, and the absence of the rule of law, are typical of the governance of European borders. However, the legal rules governing borders should provide legal certainty to anyone confronted with state procedures and protect their fundamental rights. For example, in waiting zones it is possible to detain and then deport an unaccompanied minor, something that is against the law outside these zones. This also directly contradicts international and national recommendations on this issue and the jurisprudence of the ECHR. Not only does the law neglect the rights of migrants, but it is all too easy for administrative agents to disregard the law, and without any protection, migrants are virtually condemned to silence.

In this particular legal framework, outside of the normal rule of law, individuals deprived of liberty are not given even minimal protection in regards to their basic rights. They are given no information on complex procedures or their rights, or the information they are given is inadequate. They are not given information in their native language and often they don’t know the language used well enough to understand the details and consequences of procedures and processes. There is no guaranteed access to justice. The law doesn’t provide for any systematic examination of decisions and actions undertaken by the administration or consider individual circumstances. In addition, there is no guaranteed access to healthcare. In waiting zones, individuals that manage to apply for asylum are not entitled to any protection but can only request entry into the territory as asylum-seekers.

The purpose of these waiting zones is to keep people there until they can be sent back, which can happen at any time and may involve dangers in the home country for those concerned: they may be sent back without identity papers or travel documents, imprisoned, or there may be cases of successive deportations all the way to their home country where their lives may be endangered, etc.

---

[6] In France, there are 98 waiting zones in international airports, ports and railway stations (external borders) (information compiled by the French Ministry of the Interior, October 2018). In 2017, 16,879 people were denied entry into France, 9,672 people were relegated to “waiting zones” including 218 unaccompanied minors (“confirmed” cases); 1,270 asylum applications were lodged; the percentage of deportations was 72% in France and 96% in French Overseas Territories.
Legalised exception, spaces that exist outside the law, and illegal practices in border zones: the situation in Morocco, Mayotte and the French-Italian border

Waiting zones in France and Morocco are indicative of the mirror effect that occurs on both sides of EU border as well as the effects of externalising migration policies. Moroccan law is effectively modelled on French law. The imbalance of power between public officials and migrants, that already exists in French waiting zones, is exacerbated in Morocco where there are no officially-recognised waiting zones, meaning that these transit areas effectively exist outside the law.

In Morocco, they serve a dual purpose: people that are refused entry into Morocco are detained here, and they also serve as a transit zone for people sent back from the borders of other countries (usually European) or intercepted. As with French law, Moroccan law provides that those concerned must be given written notice of the decision to detain an individual in a waiting zone, citing the reasons for this decision. The reality is that this never happens. The fact that people are given no notification of these decisions means their detainment in a waiting zone is essentially illegal and arbitrary, and makes legal recourse impossible. While people are deprived of their liberty and relegated to spaces outside the workings of the law, there is no way they can claim their human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The situation in French Overseas Territories offers a new slant on France’s regime of legalised exception, and this tendency to disregard the rule of law when it comes to border control. For example, since 2014 the French Code of Entry and Residence of Foreigners and of the Right to Asylum (CESEDA) has been applied in Mayotte, but with exceptions, violating France’s principle of equality that is upheld on all French territory. Although we can’t take Mayotte out of its context, this distinction – which is still called the “Mayotte exception” – is too often used by local and national officials to justify rights violations, particularly the rights of foreigners.

The “massive influx of migrants” and “considerable migration pressures” are being used as an excuse for exceptions to common law applied to migrants in Mayotte that don’t exist in other French departments (violations of asylum-seekers’ rights, best interests of the child disregarded, violations of the right to access justice, special procedures that facilitate confinement and deportation, fast-tracked procedures and processes, etc.). This is also the excuse given by authorities to justify the increasingly tight border controls which now involve a quasi-military presence in order to “limit the swarms” of migrants from Comoros.

This involves increased police presence, military ships and helicopters patrolling the Mayotte Lagoon and the use of radars and interceptors. The police force, customs officers and the army take turns patrolling the area and intercepting kwassas (migrants’ boats). The traditional routes for moving between the islands of the archipelago are now riddled with obstacles, making it extremely risky to attempt reaching Mayotte. In 20 years, over 10,000 people have died trying to reach the islands.

The Schengen Area itself is now also ridden with militarised borders and rights violations. No longer do countries rely solely on the collective system of border controls on the external border. Member States have kept these external border controls while also reinstating border checks at national borders, adding another layer of control. This system, which was established in certain areas of Europe (France in particular) in 2014, and was reinforced in 2015, represents a threat to one of Europe’s fundamental pillars: freedom of movement in the Schengen Area. It is of particular concern given that internal border controls (in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code) are primarily an excuse to keep a tight control on migrants, as illustrated by the situation on the French-Italian border.

The decision to reintroduce internal border checks is essentially political. They were initially reintroduced in France from 13 November to 13 December 2015 for COP21 (United Nations Climate Conference). They were then extended following the Paris attacks on 13 November 2015. And internal border checks have been continuously extended⁹ since 2015 up until the present day (France’s

twelfth extension is valid through to April 2019). The cited reason is the signifi-
cant terrorist threat, although this threat is now recognised as being of a more
home-grown nature\textsuperscript{10}. This inaccurate excuse for reintroducing internal border
checks in Europe illustrates to what extent the rule of law is being fundamentally
disregarded.

On the French-Italian border\textsuperscript{11}, internal border checks are being used as a form
of immigration control. Every day, migrants and refugees are subjected to illegal
practices by the French administration who brush over procedures and disregard
the law. Procedures are followed only perfunctorily; they violate human rights
and international agreements ratified by France (including the Geneva Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees and the International Convention on the
Rights of a Child). There are systematic discriminatory practices, failure to take
unaccompanied minors into care, illegal expulsions, interferences with individu-
als’ right to asylum, to name a few. Often these people are also illegally detained
and subjected to inhumane conditions. They are hunted down in mountains and
tramping tracks or singled out on trains or buses. And it is not only the police
that pursue them but also far-right groups. Such practices have resulted in the
deaths of people on both sides of the border. French authorities have only one
goal: to prevent migrants from reaching French soil at any cost. The result is
that border zones, even those inside the Schengen Area, have become veritable
grey areas when it comes to the rule of law.

Conclusion
The border represents the place where a State, which claims to be democratic
and to uphold the rule of law, asserts its power, and yet it is, ironically, where
its laws and human rights are not actually applied or complied with.

Confronted with this reality, individuals and organisations are working on both
sides of the border to bring back a sense of solidarity and fellow feeling, de-
manding that the rule of law and fundamental rights be respected. Some of those
fighting for rights are increasingly subjected to pressures on a daily basis as well
as lawsuits and convictions. All over Europe an increasing number of activists
are being monitored, pressured, summoned to court, detained, prosecuted and
convicted for so-called “solidarity crimes”.

Both politicians and the media are using border crossings by “outsiders” as a
“tool” to force people to make exceptions (for the sake of fighting terrorism

\textsuperscript{10} There are indeed less terrorist cells outside France as the “Islamic State weakens, but more isolated
individuals in France that are being radicalised by listening to these small groups.” Statement made
by the Paris Public Prosecutor François Molins in an interview on FranceInter public radio, 30
October 2018.

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Persona non grata – Etat des lieux des politiques sécuritaires et d’exclusion à la frontière franco-
for example) and accept any kind of measures even when they take away civil liberties. “Security” is now the standard excuse, and while racial profiling is used to prevent people from continuing their migratory journey, it is also being increasingly used to curtail journeys within the EU and rein in European activists offering support to migrants and refugees. By stigmatising refugees as unwanted, we are fuelling racism and xenophobia. Europe has launched a full-blown attack against an enemy it has invented. And the attack has extended to those offering solidarity.

If we don’t break out of the current mentality that condones bending the rules for the sake of “security”, we will only sink deeper into the moral and political crisis that will ensue, taking with us the rule of law and Europe’s democracy.
A Labyrinth of Border Towns

BEATRIZ PLAZA ESCRIVÀ
Social researcher specialising in international affairs and feminism

The North American Free Trade Agreement was signed in Washington D.C. in 1994; although today it is more frequently known as NAFTA (TLCAN after its Spanish acronym or ALÉNA after its French one). This treaty between Mexico, the United States and Canada boosted the manufacturing industry, mainly across Mexican border towns. That very same year, a sharp increase in the number of femicides was noted in Ciudad Juarez; which to date, continue to skyrocket. This text will analyze the link between economic and gender violence, as well as the cross-border dynamics at play in urban areas along the U.S.-Mexico border.

According to the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB or IDB), Latin America has signed the highest number of free trade agreements (FTAs) to date. These agreements purportedly seek to foster product diversification among Latin American countries and boost specialization within different sectors of the regional economy. As such, they have become a strategic tool for the region’s governments, who aim to establish a stronger presence across the international economic landscape; which in turn transforms transnational companies into key actors within the globalization process. Given that transnational companies are laying down the rules, governments are driven to set favorable conditions in which these can thrive; doing so at the expense of the working class who bear the brunt of the globalization game.

Over the years as globalization took over, FTAs have broadened their objectives and now include goals such as opening new opportunities for investment, creating conditions for fair competition, the elimination of trade barriers, the establishment of dispute-resolution processes, implementing effective procedures to boost domestic production and even the protection of intellectual property
rights. It would appear that despite all these favorable developments, social or cultural issues still do not have a place at the negotiation table; although it is well known that any issue that calls for economic restructuring by way of modifying the production matrix, will invariably exert a direct impact on the rights of the population. This is what has ultimately occurred across all societies when FTAs were implemented in their countries. The impact is not merely of a social nature, but also spatial and above all, cultural.

The way in which the specific dynamics of borders towns are or are not regulated tends to give way to certain realities which, in one way or another, feed into the most successful version of the capitalist model within the context of neoliberal globalization. A geographical area that can serve to illustrate the aforementioned considerations, is the U.S.–Mexico border. There are 37 Mexican municipalities sitting along this geographical boundary, in which 11 large urban centers are found. Each of these has their very own counterpart across the border, in the United States.

The U.S.–Mexico Border: A Playground Ripe with Economic Exploitation
As a result of the NAFTA, cross-border urban centers were declared free-trade areas. These areas became a fertile breeding ground for ultra-liberalist policies that have restructured urban centers to suit their needs, serving themselves of the FTAs’ resolutions to accomplish their aims. For Mexican border towns, this implied a re-vitalization of both the formal and informal economies. The formal economy would come to be fueled by the manufacturing industries, in particular the maquiladora sector; whereas the informal economy would come to profit from underground criminal networks, boosting drug-trafficking. Both economic dynamics...
ultimately had an impact on the societies populating these areas and became one of the leading pull factors behind the concentration of the population around commercial activities. The growth of Mexican border towns came hand in hand with the arrival of—primarily—rural Mexican migrants, who ventured to these urban centers heeding the call for a labor force issued by the manufacturing industry. With time, entire families followed the first migrants, as did migrants from Central America. They all moved to these towns in search of employment or merely chased after the so-called American dream; that is, until labor supply exceeded demand.

Due to that deadlock, many people’s dreams of one day settling in the United States were shattered. What’s more, on the same year in which the NAFTA was enacted, the United States announced a project to build a wall along the border, known as “Operation Gatekeeper”. As time passed, more projects to continue building and reinforcing the wall followed. Today, Donald Trump’s threat to continue the expansion of the wall are still the subject of an ongoing negotiation (and dispute) between the two countries. However, the interest behind this new project is not just reinforcing the wall, it is about controlling both migration and trade.

The maquiladora industry arrived in Mexico in 1960 via the implementation of the National Border Program. The establishment of maquilas along the Mexican border, mainly towards the north, boosted the economy and the created employment opportunities; a growth that was further bolstered in 1994 when the NAFTA came into force. The market dynamics of the maquiladora industry along the Mexican border are rather straightforward: raw materials are imported primarily from the United States, these are assembled into finished products and then imported back into the United States without paying any customs duties, guaranteeing that these will be exported back once more by paying Mexican customs officials a small fee. The logic behind this is to minimize the production costs by reducing the cost of labor, which for workers themselves means the violation of their basic labor rights; particularly when it comes to wages and working hours. A large percentage of maquiladora workers are women between 15 and 25 years old. A manifest preference for hiring women within this industry denotes a clear link between women’s increased participation in the labor force and the transnationalization of production processes.

“Neo-liberal globalization is here to stay,” goes the slogan, which much like a mantra, is repeated over and over by female workers in maquilas; be it in El Salvador, Mexico or Bangladesh. That is because the concept of a capitalist economy has been firmly embedded into our collective vision, reducing our ability to lead our lives beyond the borders delimited by our very mode of production. That is why the manufacturing industry has become a lucrative business for people residing in border towns. And that is also why free trade areas have become a fertile breeding ground for ultra-liberalist policies that have restructured urban centers to suit their needs, serving themselves of the FTAs’ resolutions to accomplish their aims.
Hence today, in the midst of an ongoing ultra-liberal globalization process, we must direct our attention towards analyzing how the resolutions compiled within FTAs are shaping our lives, as denoted by our own consumption and behavior patterns. Our social dynamics are determined more by market forces than by our own free will. What we produce and consume, the manner in which we do so – all is subject to previously negotiated agreements that determine our function on the basis of which country we reside in. This is a globalized world in which FTAs are binding; while respect for human rights is mentioned in passing, in the margins of non-binding agreements.

Urbanization and the Border-Town Lifestyle: The Ultimate Expression of Global Capitalism
The ways in which societies organize themselves, as well as the manner in which they settle across different territories, is typically done in response to procuring basic life necessities, as well as in response to economic needs. In border towns, free trade areas permeate the landscape, and demand-driven production determines factors such as territorial expansion, population concentration and the layout of the public space. Workers’ settlements that crop up or disappear on the basis of a surrounding factory’s –or a maquiladora’s– labor demand are a good example of this; although in some cases, such settlements remain untouched and generations of workers grow accustomed to residing in these “non-places”. This phenomenon denotes a complete lack of urban planning on behalf of public authorities and shows how the urban centers mold themselves to the whims of capitalist investments.

Concerning urbanization, Mexican border towns share three common elements: the delineation of an international boundary, the railway and a checkpoint granting access into the United States. These characterizing factors also follow staple patterns for what is known as “defensive or preventive architecture”. Defensive architecture encompasses all the architectural features found within a public area (parks, streets, public buildings), which are modified so they may be used in a manner that is different than intended. For example, the benches found in public parks that are neither long nor broad, prevent unsheltered poverty survivors (be they migrants or not) from using them to sleep at night. Or the existence of hidden cameras across public spaces, camouflaged as street lights, exerts a stricter control on the population. Such elements and many others are easily identifiable across the main Mexican border towns and have two specific aims: on the one hand, to contain the Mexican population by constantly reminding them on which side of the border they belong, and on the other, to ensure that the displaced migrant population does not linger for too long in these urban centers by deliberately avoiding the creation of public spaces for them to settle in.

On the other hand, the fact that Mexican border towns have a counterpart across the U.S. border does not by any means imply that there is a homogenization urban
planning or lifestyle present. The main pattern that underlies the dynamics for cities on both sides of the border is the unabated consumption of goods and recreational activities: once more, this shows how cross-border towns have become the highest form of expression for neoliberalism, which is seeping into locales all around the world. The presence of big shopping centers open 24/7 with a wide range of items for sale can, at times, make shoppers forget their condition as border-town residents. Bright lights, large billboards and fast-food restaurants dot the landscape, normalizing a lifestyle centered around consumption; one that is seamlessly meshed into (Western) global capitalist culture. At first sight it would appear that the lives of people on both sides of the border run in parallel, seeing how they consume the same supermarket brands, eat the same hamburgers and spend their free time at bowling alleys.

But when taking a second glance at the suburbs of Mexican border towns, one may discover that the manner in which the products consumed are manufactured is vastly different from that of their U.S. counterparts. The presence of gated industrial buildings with a never-ending array of Mexican food (tacos, tortillas, juices) trucks parked at their gates, denote the presence of around-the-clock human activity within the premises. Nearby, the so-called “belts of misery” where the factory workers live, show a very different reality: urban settlements with unpaved roads and shacks built out of wood or metal scraps or even cardboard, without a single dignified public space in sight and a worrying lack of access to basic services. Here, consumption is reduced to the basics in the measure of what the residents’ purchasing power allows. The overarching lifestyle that reigns in these areas can be summarized in one word: survival. This reality is a stark contrast from the living conditions on the U.S. side of the border, where consumption level is effectively intertwined with the residents’ purchasing power.

**Border Towns as an Intersection for Violence**

Mexican border towns are unfortunately the setting of many tragic events. Many people have a hard time decoupling images of the ongoing litany of femicides, the constant disappearance of migrants as they attempt to cross the Rio Bravo or the incessant shootouts between rival drug trafficking gangs, from their perception of Ciudad Juarez. When analyzing the 24-year lifespan of the NAFTA, it becomes evident that the violence and ensuing body count has been steadily on the rise as free trade zones expanded along the border.

The form of violence that stands out the most is gender-based violence, which has increased exponentially to reach appalling levels. The initial demand for female maquiladora workers was clear and fell in line with traditional views towards a gendertyped division of labor: young women unencumbered by “family duties” were sought (to perform labor that represents an extension of domestic work typically attributed to women: sewing). Working conditions were also clear: they solely served to line the companies’ pockets. So, workers were hurried into a
slew of industrial warehouses dotting the suburbs of urban centers across the border. Nobody knew what took place within these facilities where the law of maximum returns was king – always at the expense of the female workers’ lives. At the heart of it all, are women, the key peg pushing forward the economic dynamics at stake; women whose bodies bear the trace of the violence perpetrated by rampant capitalism.

Applying a feminist perspective to assess violence against women and girls across the northern border necessarily refers us back to the theoretical construct of femicide. For starters, it focuses primarily on why women are murdered and who are the perpetrators. In line with the research performed by Julia E. Monárrez Fragoso, there are different motives behind gender-based murders – and all of them are based on a gendertyped division of labor, the division between the public and private sphere, and a schism between feelings and attitudes.

Within the framework of the NAFTA, transnational companies have established themselves along the border in a space characterized by lawlessness: social and territorial organization is left completely in the hands of rich corporations, which naturally translates into rampant impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes. The State no longer has any power, but rather it has allied itself with the economic power brandished by prominent businessmen. This is how the great masters of the maquiladoras and those who manage them, profit from an impunity that safeguards their every action, even the most violent ones, regardless of whether these are committed on a personal level or within the workplace. Hence, femicide is permeated by the aforementioned dynamics; from the manner in which these murders are committed and the subordinating conditions women are subject to in the workplace, to the complete lack of a social safety net and the haphazard urbanization process that concentrated the few public resources available into the commercial areas. Combined, they result in a dangerous brew and these heinous crimes continue to be committed with complete impunity.

As for the Ciudad Juarez femicides, the one single common link among all the victims has been their either direct or indirect relationship to the maquiladora industry. This can be interpreted in two ways; on the one hand, there is a climate of terror which reigns among the female population, who live in fear of being raped and/or murdered if they were to bring to light the atrocious working conditions they are subject to. On the other hand, the establishment and perpetuation of the system of heteropatriarchal domination continues to be consolidated via acts of violence.

[1] Julia E. Monárrez Fragoso, PhD, is a professor and researcher with El Colegio de la Frontera Norte.
Final Remarks

In August 2017, an initial round of negotiations took place in Washington D.C. —the very same city where the NAFTA was signed— called by the United States, with the aim of reducing the trade deficit. On 1 April 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened Mexico by demanding it halt the flow of illegal drugs and persons, or else he would put an end to the NAFTA. In August of that very same year, following the implementation of stricter migration policies across Mexico and an all-out war against drug traffickers that claimed the lives of thousands of people who either disappeared or were murdered, Mexico and the United States reached an agreement on the renegotiation of the NAFTA; although Canada was notably absent.

“Poor Mexico, so far away from God and so close to the United States” goes a quote by Nemesio García Naranjo, a prominent Mexican lawyer and intellectual. Today, this phrase continues to be relevant within the current context, because the tightening of immigration controls across the Mexican border continues to determine a good part of the policies that are adopted; affecting our lives both as communities and as individuals.

But despite all the contradictions and the fact that border towns continue to be at the crossroads of violence, there are still places where the fall of the walls continues to be hoped for, where communal and ethical principles continue to reign, and where feminism has become the most powerful tool in the development of alternatives to violence and cruelty. This new path takes us to broaden our world view in order to observe what is rising from the margins of society; there is feminist hip hop from the youth who profess to be sick and tired of so many murders, halfway houses for immigrants, institutions heralding gender studies programs in order to highlight the heteropatriarchal violence that runs rampant along the border, as well as grassroots organizations run by the mothers and family members of missing women who do not cease nor will ever cease to search for their loved ones and call for justice. These initiatives and many others transform this hostile territory in a place of hope, showing us how we can put an end to atrocious violence by simply using our ingenuity. It continues to serve as an example of people who never cease to raise their voices, and in their diversity they find the tools to feel, think and act in order to change their own reality. The very same reality that is intertwined with globalization, which continues to reveal its dark side through the impact it has on communities, yet also reveals its bright side when it comes to the development of new alternatives. Finally, this shows us how both feminism and internationalism continue to be essential as we strive for “another possible world”.
THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STAKES OF CLOSED BORDERS
A. POLITICAL STAKES
Borders as Symbols of National Sovereignty

CATHARINE WITHOL DE WENDEN
Research Director at CNRS

Border demarcation lines have strengthened the sovereignty theses of the Nation State. National identity is used, along with geographical boundaries, to build a different history on each side of the border, and to introduce differentiated treatment of the men and women who are not considered part of the same nation. European States are reintroducing border controls with the object of reinforcing their identities.

Nationalism seeks to invent symbols around something that represents the State’s sovereignty, and borders are part of this. For the most part, border areas are places with strong identities that are often contested, but they’re also spaces of diffuse linguistic and cultural proximity with their neighbours on the other side of the border. Examples of this can be found in Savoie and its relationship with Piedmont, in Alsace and Germany and in other regional identities that have been built on two sides of a border (the Basque Country, Catalonia) with reference to areas that are close by and rich in shared identification (Corsica with Italy, Brittany or Galicia with the Celtic world, the Baltic Arc) or even some cases where the people’s unity has been shattered by national borders (the Kurds). Indeed, there are strong borders and weak borders, borders that are built and others that disappear, long-lasting borders and others that now seem ludicrous but that played a major role in both geopolitics and the daily lives of people in the past, such as the Berlin Wall. Border rectifications after treaties have changed the fate and nationality of those living around them, such as between the Piedmont and the Maurienne, a border that is marked by Italian fortresses that have lost their meaning to the local inhabitants. The geographical border is generally less important than the identity claimed on either side: border inhabitants and lands often present a

[1] This text was adapted from the article “Frontière, nationalismes et identité politique” published in the French review Pouvoirs 2018/2 (N° 165), p. 39-49.
diversity and a defiance in regards to States – customs officers, peddlers and smugglers were all once neighbours, and nowadays some of them wear uniforms.

However, political power runs along both sides of the border. This is another story altogether: the story of the nation, sometimes dreamed up in order to build a political community. For what does a Sicilian and a Piedmont inhabitant have in common, if not the State’s desire to bring them together through a common language (belatedly done, for that matter) and a national history as taught in Italian schools, or indeed between a native of Savoie and one from Lille, other than the Republican schools with their maps of hexagonal France displayed on the classroom walls, the French language they are taught and the history of France written by Ernest Lavisse? […]

But borders today are double-faced spaces which, for some, are fading away under the impact of mobility and globalisation, facilitated by the new technologies of communication, transport and various transnational exchanges, while at the same time for others they are being strengthened: those who wish to enter and cross the borders without the requisite visa, who cross illegally, symbolizing thus their inequity. A border then is an artificially created tool to build and strengthen the power of States. And although borders are losing their relevance in many cases, specifically where mobility has become a sign of modernity, they have become instrumentalised to feed the political identity of nationalist currents that are trying to regress to the Nation State, the big loser in the world of increased mobility. New values, such as diversity, the fight against discrimination, and minority rights, now counteract the world of States and their
borders. Migrants’ rights have progressed for those in legal situations, but the borders are closed for entry, with States often perceiving migration as a threat to their border sovereignty, and illegal migration as a form of criminality. […] For nationalists, borders lie at the heart of the transgression, that is to say the crossing of a line, the failure to respect a principle. […] What nationalism wishes to highlight is the border threatened in the very legitimacy of its existence due to migratory flows. Their claim is that host nations will lose control of their borders, as a consequence of a crisis linked to global migration. The host nations in the exercise of the State’s powers are, generally speaking, the big losers of these movements, as sovereignty is often defied by these new actors who illegally cross their borders. Illegal border crossings lie at the heart of a conflict of values that is part of the very ethics of law. We are currently witnessing a re-evaluation of borders by individuals and groups that are capable of defying States’ legitimacy to border control. These States themselves are in the grip of a series of contradictory obligations: migration control and economic liberalism, security and the respect of fundamental rights, borders and the preservation of transnational exchange networks, dialogue and economic activities. […] The theme of threats, defiance, invasion, or even the “great demographic and cultural replacement” is very present in the nationalist discourse on borders. Migration challenges the Weberian conception of State sovereignty, as it questions the relationship between population, territory and monopoly of power to control borders. It weakens the two pillars of the state system: sovereignty and citizenship. In the classical international order, States are exclusive, sovereign actors, and they control their people and territory through their political regimes. If people decide to leave one State and enter another to take refuge there and find a better life, the role of the State of their departure and the host nation in their capacity to treat and control migration, and measure its impacts on their sovereignty, including both internal and external security, is tested. Migration introduces disorder, as territory and population no longer coincide. They provoke the deterritorialisation of the population, fluidity of passage, hybridisation of allegiances and multiple identities. In the nationalist discourse, the top-down migration management autonomy of many Nation States is thus under threat. This is due to regional management systems as in Europe, as well as the idea of a global migration governance, whose norms would be imposed on all States in order to secure the migration process. But this is also true bottom-up, as multiculturalism changes national identities by introducing values based on cosmopolitanism. Finally, these Nation States denounce the interference of countries of departure which are becoming increas-
ingly present as international actors with the help of the migrated populations\(^2\), for whom they develop diaspora policies through various instruments: dual nationality, support for cultural and religious associations, the right to vote in their national elections for those who are eligible to vote in their host countries. […]

But borders also exist within States, and identity-based nationalism maintains in this way the idea that some nationals are less so than others, as they are Muslims, poor, people of colour – they are “outsiders”; this defines differential racism as analysed by Michel Wieviorka\(^3\). It can also be supra-national: in the case of the European Union, the notion of borders are less important between nations and foreigners than between Europeans and non-Europeans. For non-EU citizens, the failure to have their papers in order constitutes a border, and one that carries heavy consequences for work, daily life or mobility. At a national level, once the legal borders have been overcome through regularisation, marriage, legal entry, access to nationality, another border remains: that of physical visibility, that of the cultural, religious and social imaginary. The new nationals continue to be considered as foreigners and discriminated against in all sorts of ways: they can be assigned to live in certain neighbourhoods, suffer institutional racism by the forces of law and order, or they can find it difficult to be considered and treated like any ordinary citizen in terms of access to housing, work, the most prestigious schools, and even night-clubs.

The connection created by nationalism between borders and political identities has been revived since 2015 by the balance of power maintained between the European Union and the Central and Eastern European countries, when they refused to allow refugees to enter in spite of the principle of solidarity between European States regarding the resettlement of asylum seekers from Syria. Hungary argued that hosting these refugees from the Near or Middle East was liable to affect their cultural identity, which had been built on a project of a homogeneous nation around their language, their culture and their religion. The Czech Republic declared that they would only welcome Christian Syrians, and Poland used cultural and religious themes to the same effect. Borders are therefore shifting towards a field that we believed to be relegated to Europe’s past, under the pressure of nationalist ideas that are setting the tone for immigration and asylum policies.

---


Inside the Political Machine of the Israeli Wall

DAMIEN SIMONNEAU
Post-doctoral researcher at Université Saint Louis Bruxelles

The beginning of 2019 is marked by the standoff between Donald Trump and the Democrats on the former’s project of the “Wall” along the Mexican border, even though many existing “barriers” are already in place. In 2015, long after the fall of the Iron Curtain, Europe rediscovered the concept of “walls” at the Slovenian, Austrian, Hungarian and Bulgarian borders, preceded by those with Greece and Spain (in Ceuta and Melilla), not to mention the Franco-British one in Calais. In the post-Cold War period there are approximately 70 such walls in place. An increasing number of States have been militarising their border areas, deploying surveillance technologies, military infrastructure and a legal arsenal that enables them to control the movement of those considered “undesirable”. Focusing on the wall alone helps to forget the fact that it goes hand-in-hand with the checkpoint, and that it’s part of a broader individual control and screening mechanism, and not just an anti-terrorist or anti-illegal migrant strategy. If we are to understand why States resort to using walls, it will be equally necessary to enter its political machinery as a security response to a whole array of social, political and economic issues, specific to societies that decide to wall themselves in. This security-based response is widely overdramatised by actors that have a vested interest. This was precisely what occurred with the Israeli wall, built on the border with the West Bank as of 2002.

The diversity of walls
Walls differ according to the status of the territories upon which they are built. The U.S. decision to build a wall along the recognised border with Mexico does not have the same status as that of the Israeli government to build a wall along the occupied West Bank, deemed to be “illegal” according to
international law, for example. Walls also differ in terms of their costs and level of sophistication. Donald Trump demands approximately six billion dollars for his high tech project. Not remotely comparable to the barbed wire border erected between Botswana and Zimbabwe in 2005. The official reasons for building walls also vary: here it’s the fight against terrorism (in Israel but also in India), there it’s the war on drugs (USA), over there it’s against animal herds spreading epidemics (Botswana) and down there it’s against a kind of immigration which is considered “illegal” (Hungary). In this way, contemporary walls are different than the emblematic Berlin Wall that was built to stop the East Berliners from leaving, or even walls built in situations of territorial conflict (Cyprus, Korea, Western Sahara and Kashmir) that were built along the ceasefire line.

In spite of this diversity, contemporary walls have much in common. They are the result of unilateral decisions and organise asymmetrical spaces. The stories that justify them all resort to the same metaphor of “the anti-flow barrier” to consecrate a protectionist, reactive State that militarises its borders against a “massive and exceptional influx” by establishing an atmosphere of emergency. The foreign “threat” is the incarnation of the “transnational, clandestine actor” combining situations of migratory movements, terrorist violence and contraband. There is obviously no originality to these stories. They repeat themselves from one wall to the next, regardless of the specific geopolitical or migratory contexts where they occur.

Indeed, one of the key purposes of modern day walls is movement control and people screening at checkpoints, that is to say directly at the border, in accordance with the established authorisation/visa systems. However, this does not
guarantee that territories are completely impervious to illegal movements and smuggling. In other words, walls breed the tactics for getting around them, including the risks taken and the migrant deaths of those willing to cross them at whatever price, i.e. the very thing they intend to contain.

Beyond territorial defence, resorting to the construction of walls in a democracy also performs the function of political theatricality needed to reassure citizens supposedly feeling “anxious” about migration. In this spectacle, walls would allegedly reintroduce order into a world considered to be full of dangers, and establish the idea that the space of the State is a limited, exclusive unity. Walls therefore act as a material means to reaffirm the sovereign order of States and their efficiency in a globalised world, where it is difficult to control flows.

Elected officials, decision makers, civil servants, civil society organisations and companies working in the field of security all contribute to staging this story. In their discourse and practices, they manipulate a vast array of national cultural themes, such as territorial attachment, demography, national sovereignty, security or identity, by associating them to the project of the wall. They follow in this way their electoral, political, and often xenophobic agenda. These diverse protagonists play the border game as a line of exclusion and control. What lies behind the stage is the significance of territorial limits and the relationship with everything and everybody foreign.

According to our research, this show plays out in three acts that can be clearly identified in different cases. First act: both the porosity of the territory and mobility are presented by pro-wall partisans as political issues. Second act: in order to solve these problems, public powers need to intervene with active security measures. Third act: the State is called upon to take action by the pro-wall factions who take legal action or attack them through the media. And, incidentally, those opposed to the wall are delegitimised. Based on the case of the Israeli wall, which in many ways provides the pattern for the other cases where border walls exist, we shall now describe these three acts in detail.

The Made in Israel Wall Show
Since Summer 2002, the Israeli government has built the wall which in Hebrew means “security barrier”. In rural areas, the wall consists of wire fencing equipped with electronic surveillance and detection systems alongside a patrol road. In densely populated areas, the wire fencing is replaced by a concrete wall. This infrastructure was built at the same time as tunnels, roads, agricultural crossings and checkpoints in order to control the movements of Palestinians towards Israeli settlements. The location of the wall is highly controversial. At six different points it veers away from the Green Line (the demarcation line between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories according to international law) and de facto sequesters important tracts
of land of the West Bank for the side of the Israeli colonies. For the Palestinians, the wall represents an additional aspect of the military occupation. From an Israeli point of view, it’s the extension of a policy of separation from the Palestinians, that was set during the 1990s for both security reasons against terrorism (the Ministry for Defence explained in 2003, that the wall aimed to control Palestinian terrorist attacks, including suicide attacks, and both arms’ and explosives’ smuggling into Israel), and for political reasons, with the objective of establishing an autonomous Palestinian entity. The post-Oslo period saw the security stance prevail for Israelis, as they faced the violence of armed Palestinian groups and the collective trauma of the particularly brutal suicide attacks of Spring 2002.

The interactions between the two peoples are more limited today than before, in spite of the fact their lives are more intermingled in the field, due to the escalation of Israeli colonisation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. This separation entails a distance they seek to maintain from “the other” which is perceived as dangerous, a mechanism for managing frictions in the context of living in close proximity. The wall lies at the heart of a system of exclusion of a population living inside a space still controlled by Israel. It is in this context of transition from a negotiated separation to a unilaterally imposed military separation that Israeli pro-wall associations, initiatives and positions multiplied as of 2001. Some of them came together in a coalition under the authority of a general. Together, they attempted until 2004 to pressure the Sharon government into ordering the wall to be built and then fully completed. This coalition coordinated the actions of local pro-wall pressure groups by the mayors and regions along the Green Line, but also by security professionals and elected members of the Knesset (the Israeli parliament).

**Act 1: Movements presented as “problematic”**

During the Second Intifada (2005-2008), Israelis thought the Palestinian movements between the West Bank and Israel were becoming problematic, to the point of constituting their main argument for the construction of the wall. As an example of this situation, the pro-wall elected officials along the Green Line testified to feelings of insecurity, which were not merely limited to the subject of bomb attacks (the multiplication of attacks starting in autumn 2000 in urban centres was considered a threat that might reach the whole population) but were also part of a feeling against everyday delinquency, particularly expressed by the problem of car thefts. Palestinian movements across the Green Line, whether authorised by permits or clandestine, became associated to the figure of the enemy “infiltration”, a classic figure of Israeli militarism. For the pro-wall propaganda faction, this unease was not merely linked to a “dangerous” or “violent” experience in regards to the movements, but to their perception of them as an “invasion”. Workers’ movements or Palestinian weddings are then perceived as problematic according to a security rhetoric, and become a matter of citizen protection from intrusions that might pose a physical threat, but it is also a matter of survival in a new test for Israeli security. The wall is therefore part of a rhetoric for restoring public order.
National identity is as much under threat as public order in the eyes of the supporters of the wall. The identity issue translates into a concern linked to the demographic evolution among Israeli and Palestinian ethnic groups. Demography in this case is used as a tool to objectify the threat. In Israel, the demographic issue is all the more strategic, as the Zionist project consists of creating a predominantly Jewish-based State. For some parts of Israeli society, the wall transforms the feeling of threat to that of permanence of the Jewish majority project. In this manner, a pro-wall association in Tel Aviv quantified the number of Palestinians living in Israel to 100,000 people, threatening the demographic balance between Jews and Arabs.

The petition for a wall is also linked to internal politics issues. It is a defining element in terms of the political balance of power. Those in favour of the wall consider the questioning of the defence strategy of Sharon’s government as a fundamental element of their commitment, reinvindicating a defensive tactic with the building of the wall versus the offensive tactics favoured by the former government. The wall is presented as a project anchored in “popular” common sense against the initially reticent decision-making elite.

**Act 2: Building a security response**

Contemporary virtual technologies and the preferred tactics for managing movements tend to disconnect the control from the territorial limits. Nevertheless, for the professionals in charge of border security, the material and virtual aspects used for controlling “undesirables” are complementary: “barriers” or checkpoints channel the flows on land; radars, cameras and drones identify them;
databases and agencies create networks and collect the information from these flows. The Israeli army has solid expertise in matters of military roadblocks and defensive fortifications.

The call for a wall is based on military precedents and on the belief in the efficiency of such obstacles in controlling movements. The precedents of Gaza and the Lebanon are considered as successes, even though some parts have been removed by the Palestinians, and that their installation has not protected the Israeli populations living in the south, subjected from then on to rocket fire and the threat of “infiltration” via tunnels. Parameters such as the financial and human costs of construction, the maintenance and patrolling of these defence technologies cast doubts in regards to the tactical advantage of such “barriers” compared to other technologies, as was expressed in military forums within the debate comparing offensive versus defensive tactics to counter Palestinian terrorism between 2000 and 2002. Plans for the wall in the West Bank were circulating in the military throughout the 1990s. In April 2002, these plans materialised without the support of the military, who considered it a political mechanism to establish a border line with the Palestinians, and who questioned its effectiveness in terms of security. The wall indeed was not the best defensive solution according to military headquarters. It is merely complementary to other police tactics for countering terrorist activities (imprisonment, intelligence and curfews).

Nevertheless, the pro-barrier mobilisations in Israel place significant emphasis on military and police expertise. Security professionals are an integral part of the movement and consider their investment as part of a personal political agenda. For example, General Uzi Dayan was successively an assistant in the Israeli military staff (1998-2000), and later became President of the National Security Council (2000-2002). In June 2002, he left this position to join the pro-wall associations and coordinate a national coalition on the subject. Disappointed by the Sharon government, he understood the only way to overcome the reticence of the army and the government in regards to the wall was to mobilise public opinion. His arguments were grounded in the complementarity of defensive and offensive tactics in fighting terrorism. Furthermore, he considered the wall would establish a “line of responsibility” for any “infiltrations”, supported in this by officers in the field.

Act 3: Publicly attack the State due to lack of protection
The mobilisation of military and police expertise contributes to redefine the movement problem as a security issue that can be dealt with by the military. Spreading this pro-wall story is organised in three separate arenas: the parliament, the judiciary and the media, targetting the State and those who oppose the wall. In Israel, the pro-wall cause initially had militant resources at their disposal in 2001-2002, with only little material means, used in isolated actions following the associations’ strategies. They then acquired political and economic relays
through the coalition formed under Uzi Dayan’s authority along with elected representatives of the Knesset – renewed in 2003 – and local elected officials who wanted to see the wall built in their area in 2003-2004.

This coalition implemented lobbying actions to establish direct contact with the decision-makers, as well as legal actions to pressure them. They requested meetings with ministers, members of the Knesset and the Minister of Defence to ensure the work would continue. Through the creation of a lobby in the Knesset, an organised series of pressures during government question time managed to obtain their commitment on a schedule, during discussions at committee stage on funding allocation against right and extreme right opposers. Lawyers mobilised legal resources to attack the Minister of Defence in 2002-2003 in the Supreme Court, to force him to commit to the construction of the wall. Then, as of 2004, along with the Prime Ministers’ lawyers and the Ministry of Defence, they jointly defended the wall at a time when its layout and role in security issues were progressively being contested, especially by the International Court of Justice.

The materiality of the wall speaks to peoples’ representations. Those in favour know this and play on it during mediatised events. First, they created web sites that promote knowledge and documents about the wall. They then organised visits to the construction site in the West Bank to denounce the slow pace of construction, always resorting to the media echo chamber. They built fake wooden walls in front of the Prime Minister’s home in Jerusalem in 2001. These actions aimed at generating images and banalising the idea of the wall. They further sought broad media attention for their public speeches. The pro-wall faction started organising conferences where they invited political figures and demographers. They even won the support of the President of the Israeli State, Moshe Katsav, in November 2001. The media followed their activities to the point of creating a series of pro-wall public events. This important media coverage relies on the complicity between Yedioth Aharonoth’s anti-Sharon editorial lines and the pro-wall activist discourse, amplifying criticisms against the government. In Israel, the media address the subject of the wall supporting this “popular” initiative to overcome the government’s hesitations and lack of strategy to counter terrorism. The strength of the message lied in the repeated accusations of the governments’ failure to protect those they govern.

Leaving the show?
Ultimately, the spectacle of the wall tends to overshadow any disagreement or controversy, as well as the cooperation and negotiations between social and State actors in the implementation of border security policies. It would then be wrong to consider the debate on circulation and migratory issues solely from the angle the spectacle of the wall wants us to believe: that the closure of a territory is the only possible solution to the migratory problem. This sort of setting would
make us believe that migratory issues can be solved through military action and exclusion. We should always bear in mind that contemporary democracies are caught up in many dilemmas to conciliate the different dynamics that lie behind migrations: human rights and refugees’ rights protection, free trade and worker mobility, sovereign control of borders, xenophobic rejection of migrants and the positive contribution of migrants to aging societies… In Israel-Palestine, the fight against the wall has been, for example, at the same time popular through regular demonstrations in the affected Palestinian villages, and legal at the Israeli Supreme Court and in international tribunals to contest its role in security management and act on its layout. Nevertheless, this opposition has not been able to refocus the conversation on the on-going Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories. Those opposing the walls can then engage in public debates to highlight other aspects of migration, they can lobby with decision-makers and advocate for other ways of welcoming migrants, or they can take it to the legal arena to provide a legal framework on security measures and remind States of their obligations in terms of the protection of rights. But is this enough to leave the security spectacle behind?
Venezuelans Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place

FRÉDÉRIQUE LÉVÈQUE
CNCD-11.11.11 and coordinator of Barril.info

With a 50% decline in GDP over the past five years, a collapse in public services, food and medicine shortages, Venezuela seems to bear the scars of a country at war. Although this is not (yet) the case, more than 2.4 million people have already left the country since 2015, bringing the total number of Venezuelans living abroad to 3 million. Worse, the OIM and the UNHCR predict that if, by 2019 “the dynamics and the current conditions remain unchanged”, that the number of Venezuelans scattered through Latin America and the Caribbean could reach 5.4 million. Alarm bells are already sounding in the countries to which 80% of these migrants have fled, the top destinations being Colombia (1.1 million), Peru (635,000) and Ecuador (250,000). For most of the countries that have been directly affected by Venezuela’s economic crisis, Nicolas Maduro’s government is the main culprit, and is responsible for increased regional instability. To the extent that they now seem ready, as the events of early 2019 suggest, to pick a fight with Hugo Chávez’s successor, and refuse to recognise him as the country’s new president.

Just because a continent has institutions and collective regulations, doesn’t mean that it has a cohesive approach to migration issues – Europe and its handling of the Syrian refugee crisis is a case in point. And South America has even further to go in this respect. Some countries have adopted tailored migration policies such as Peru with its temporary residence permit. But a surge in Venezuelans arriving at the border has driven them to tighten the screws. In 2018, Colombia, followed by Peru and Ecuador, established a new regulation which made passports obligatory. This regulation constitutes a serious obstacle for Venezuelans, as passports have become a rare commodity in a country besieged by administrative and economic chaos. In Chile, Sebastián Piñera’s government, which refused to sign the UN Global Compact on Migration in December 2018, introduced the “Democratic Responsibility Visa”: Venezuelans wishing to obtain the visa must apply with their passport at the consulate of Chile in Caracas.
Last September thirteen countries met in Quito for the first time to tackle the issue together. The meeting did not, unfortunately, have the expected results as the signatories (which don’t include Bolivia and Venezuela) will “continue to work individually” (sic) but to cooperate when “each country sees it appropriate and fitting.” They did, however, agree to allow Venezuelans to enter these countries without a passport.

After the progressive hegemony that marked the beginning of the century, South America’s right-wing political parties are again on the rise and are capitalising on the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, an issue that has been in the spotlight for some time. But Venezuelans now feature in the headlines of local newspapers, along with their high unemployment rate and what they are costing countries to which they flee, in terms of GDP. There is an increasing number of Venezuelans in jobs that range from hospitality and street sales to prostitution. In many respects, South America is not so different to Europe when it comes to how migrants are being portrayed, with crimes, disputes or even just rumours blown out of proportion by certain media outlets and opportunist politicians, fuelling xenophobic behaviour. Some border regions are under particular pressure, their infrastructure at saturation point. In the state of Roraima in Northern Brazil, which is one of the poorest regions in the country, public health service demands have increased 3,500% since 2015. In Pacaraima, in the same State, last August approximately 2,000 Brazilians destroyed a Venezuelan migrant camp where 1,200 Venezuelans were living after a group of Venezuelans allegedly attacked a shopkeeper. In late January, in the Ecuadorian town of Ibarra, pogrom-like xenophobic marches erupted after a pregnant woman was murdered by her Venezuelan boyfriend, prompting President Lenin Moreno to tweet: “We have opened our doors, but we will not sacrifice the security of anyone”. He added that his government would carry out legal checks on any Venezuelan wishing to remain in Ecuador.

As the target of the region’s hostility, the Maduro government appears to be shut away in its besieged fortress, and has condemned the way in which its rivals are deliberately exploiting the crisis for their own gain. How else can one interpret the choice made by OAS (Organization of American States) Secretary General Luis Almagro, who has made it his personal mission to overthrow “Maduro’s dictatorship”, to appoint an opposition politician that has fled Caracas as the head of a working group on Venezuelan migration? The Venezuelan government refuses to take any lessons from countries like Colombia, with its thousands of internally displaced persons, or the USA, whose president is obsessed with building a wall on the Mexican border. And it accuses Europe of hypocrisy in expressing concern for Venezuelan emigrants when it is happy to let refugees from across the Mediterranean die on its doorstep.

According to Maduro’s government, actually only 700,00 persons have left the country. Are we to believe, then, that the media, international agencies and
foreign migration services have all conspired together to give us “fake news”? There are no official statistics or information available that can back up the figures provided by the government. In 2018, Maduro broke his silence to condemn the “world media attacks designed to construct a supposed humanitarian crisis so as to justify a military intervention”. The reactions of the government range from outright denial to downplaying the crisis, dismissing it as a phenomenon affecting only one social group. Acknowledging the huge numbers of people fleeing the country would be to admit his own role in the economic and social crisis, and his failure to ensure his people’s security. Government statements fluctuate between contempt towards fleeing Venezuelans – “Would you leave to clean toilets in Miami?” – and concerned compassion towards the many whose struggles have led them to follow the right-wing “songs of sirens” and have only found “racism, contempt, economic persecution and slavery”. The government’s response to the “media campaign” has been to retaliate with the “Return to the Homeland” plan, which saw some 20,000 Venezuelans return to the country in five months (figure as of late January), their flights paid for by the government – a rather derisory figure when one considers that, on average, 5,500 Venezuelans are leaving the country every day! The government’s good will doesn’t extend as far as the neighbouring twin-island State Trinidad and Tobago where diplomatic services seem to be inexistent. Yet many Venezuelan migrants are imprisoned and robbed on the island, violating the Geneva Convention. However, the local government is allied with Caracas for economic reasons.

Economic collapse is the main cause of the current Venezuelan exodus, impacting nearly all of South America to varying degrees. Reintegrating these people will take years and will require putting an end to – or at least abating – the political conflict that is tearing the Caribbean country apart and polarising the continent. Destination countries need to move from a makeshift approach to the crisis to a comprehensive medium-term and long-term strategy, which factors in the reality of a new influx of migrants. In early February 2019, tensions were running high when members of the Lima Group met to discuss the crisis. The Lima Group, which includes the main destination countries of Venezuelans fleeing the country, and which is aligned with USA, Canada and a wound-up Venezuelan opposition coalition, refused to recognise Nicolas Maduro’s government and drew extensively on the humanitarian situation in the country and in the surrounding region. This intervention may both provide a medium-term solution to the migration crisis or degenerate into an open, international conflict which will only exacerbate the crisis and make it even more urgent that countries provide a collaborative response to the crisis and offer refuge to Venezuelans forced to flee the country.
Externalising Borders and International Negotiations¹

THE COLLECTIVE CÉVENNES SANS FRONTIÈRES

Externalisation encompasses a wide range of practices aimed at putting the responsibility of managing migratory flows, which would normally be the responsibility of the so-called “countries of destination”, onto the “countries of transit and origin”, or to private operators.

This policy is implemented through different means. These may include imposing sanctions on transport operators (sea or air) in order to encourage them to reinforce border controls. Or, under the Dublin regulation, an asylum seeker may be transferred to another Member State deemed responsible for the application. Frontex, the well-resourced European Border and Coast Guard Agency, which has military equipment at its disposal, was set up to intercept boats before they get to European waters and escort them back to their home countries and to train coast guards in third countries.

Provisions and cooperation agreements exist between different EU countries, such as those between France and England which aim to increase security in the Calais port area and around the Eurotunnel. But most of these agreements are with third countries and are negotiated (sometimes informally) in accordance with each country’s foreign policy interests. Some measures focus on prevention and are therefore long-term, concentrating on the cause of migratory flows. Others are much more focussed on short-term answers to managing and limiting migration. These include police assistance and surveillance, military intervention and use of advanced technologies, detention camps... to name just a few. Return and readmission agreements aim to facilitate repatriating illegal immigrants.

The EU is keen on externalisation for several reasons. By resolving the issue upstream, it can keep the “problem” at bay, thereby invisibilising the migration issue and avoiding the development of camps that would prove difficult to manage and control. It also avoids any potentially troublesome issues of solidarity.

¹ This article is an excerpt from “Sur la politique d’externalisation de la gestion et du contrôle des flux migratoires, ou comment enfermer et refouler au plus loin les exilé·es”, published on the blog of Cévennes Sans Frontières, 30 June 2016.
that might be expressed by the European people. It is also easier to send people back that have not yet made it onto European soil. And the screening procedures in camps and detention centres is a way to keep only those who would prove useful to the economy. Externalisng borders also means there is extra pressure on those who have slipped through the cracks. Those that have failed to go through the so-called legal immigration process will obviously be seen as illegal immigrants and consequently suffer the consequences.

Moreover, by pushing asylum-seekers onto other countries, the EU can, without formally foregoing its commitments to protect refugees (Geneva Convention, Universal Declaration of Human Rights), disregard all its binding obligations, including its pledge to take in those seeking asylum. This remains one of the main questions concerning the handling of refugees in third countries. What will be their status? Will they be able to apply for asylum and what kind of support will be available to them? Will they have any protection and how will they be treated? The only certainty seems to be that the conditions will be even more mediocre than they are in Europe...

Externalisation is based on a logic of efficiency, and there have been many excuses for going down this road including the fight against human trafficking and terrorism, two issues that have been lumped together and crudely capitalised on since the 2001 terrorist attacks. Other excuses range from prioritising employment for nationals to contributing to the development of third countries. There are also semantic distortions at play where realities are reversed: confinement is depicted as form of “protection”, and sending people back is “rescuing” them.

Migrants used as bargaining chips

Thus embedded in the EU’s migration policy is a web of other foreign policy issues vested in wider geopolitical and commercial interests that have nothing to do with migration. In order to force third countries to cooperate with the outcome it wants, which does not appear to be in the best interests of these countries (as remittances from migrant workers are a key source of income, and the absence of these workers helps decongest their local labour markets), the EU has various forms of pressure at its fingertips and can impose whatever conditions it likes. It makes development aid to African countries conditional on agreeing to play a part in its game of migration control, basically a form of blackmail. Investment and commercial agreements are an offer for obedient countries that undertake to keep migrants under control. Those that don’t come on board, or only come halfway, are likely to see less visas issued in return.

Other collaborative schemes are more complex and require compensation agreements. This was the case with the 2004 negotiations with Libya, an oil-rich country and potentially big player on the energy market. By directing several boats
into the island of Lampedusa, Gaddafi put pressure on the Italian government, which then demanded concessions from the EU. In this way he managed to negotiate ending Europe’s arms embargo on Libya and give the country a more “respectable” image, enabling it to open up its economy.

Similarly, Turkey, the main gateway for immigrants from the Middle East, initiated negotiations with the EU; Erdogan pocketed a few billion euros, obtained a handful of visas and opened up once again the process of Turkey joining the EU. In exchange, Erdogan will have to take back the migrants that he had allowed to reach Greece, build several detention camps, which will serve as a buffer zone with Syria, and tighten its borders. Negotiating with the EU, as an upholder and protector of human rights, has effectively enabled him to get away with slaughtering the Kurdish people living in Turkey, silencing social protest.

Migrants and refugees have become therefore pawns in a game that has nothing to do with their best interests. They have become merely a form of currency [...] Everything else they are subjected to – confinement, harassment, abuse, forced gatherings, deportations, violations of their right to asylum – are the indirect results of an underhanded war whose only concern is protecting Europe’s land and its interests.
B. ECONOMIC STAKES
The border spectacle of migrant ‘victimisation’¹

NICHOLAS DE GENOVA
Anthropologist and geographer

There’s nothing self-evident about ‘illegal’ migration. When borders become a spectacle of migrant deaths, discourses of migrants’ ‘victimisation’ by ‘smugglers’ distract us from the real causes of migrant illegalisation.

We are led to believe that there is something self-evident and straightforward about migrant ‘illegality’. Some migrants are categorised as ‘illegal’ because they have presumably violated ‘the Law’. Yet in most depictions of these migrants, there is little if any account of what the law truly is, or of how it came to be so. The law, after all, has a history, and it is a deeply politicised history of deliberate and more or less calculated interventions. As such, it is impossible to contemplate the real social and political condition of migrants outside of the larger contexts that produce specific predicaments of ‘illegality’.

Migrants only become ‘illegal’ when legislative or enforcement-based measures render particular migrations or types of migration ‘illegal’—or in other words, illegalise them. From this standpoint, there are not really ‘illegal’ migrants so much as illegalised migrants. The real origins of such illegalisations are to be found in the deliberations, debates, and decisions of lawmakers. The law that illegalises migrants remains largely invisible, while the spectre of the devious and cunning migrant becomes hyper-visible through mass media representations of border policing. This is what I have described in my book Working the Boundaries as a spectacle of enforcement at ‘the’ border, whereby migrant ‘illegality’ is rendered spectacularly visible.

¹ This article was originally published on OpenDemocracy.com, on 20 May 2015.
The Border Spectacle sets a scene that appears to be all about ‘exclusion,’ where allegedly ‘unwanted’ or ‘undesirable’—and in any case, ‘unqualified’ or ‘ineligible’—migrants must be stopped, kept out, and turned around. At the same time, the border appears to demonstrate, verify, and legitimate the purported naturalness and putative necessity of such exclusion. The concrete practices of border policing interweave with this sort of language and imagery to turn migrant ‘illegality’ into a seemingly ‘real’ thing.

This scene of exclusion is nevertheless always accompanied by its shadowy, publicly unacknowledged or disavowed, obscene supplement: the large-scale recruitment of illegalised migrants as legally vulnerable, precarious, and thus tractable labour. In the face of increasingly fortified, militarised and securitised borders, those who elude detection and evade apprehension are rewarded with the protracted and indefinite social condition called ‘illegality’ and all its attendant deprivations.

Above all, migrant ‘illegality’ is accompanied by deportability: the possibility of being forcibly removed from the space of the state. It is this grim prospect of coercive expulsion that characterises their labour-power. Extraordinarily vulnerable workers living in permanent fear of the Law are, after all, very lucrative for employers. The exclusionary brashness of the Border Spectacle, then, is inseparable from its obscene underbelly: the real social relation of illegalised migrants to the state, and the public secret of their abject inclusion as ‘illegal’ labour.
Obscene inclusion

The Border Spectacle, as we have seen, conjures up the image of migrants’ transgression of borders. It works its magic trick of displacing ‘illegality’ from its point of production—the processes of lawmaking—to the so-called ‘scene of the crime.’ This, of course, doubles as the scene of ostensible crime-fighting, a key part of making the border a preeminent scene of exclusion. Human mobility nevertheless prevails. This happens despite the accumulated pressure and violence inflicted at borders, zones which are increasingly intruding into the ‘interior’ of the nation-state’s space and the everyday lives of both migrants and citizens. These dynamics that illegalise migrants and produce the conditions for the exploitation of their labour are what I call their obscene inclusion.

Obscenity is less about concealment than selective exposure. Even as the state’s lawmaking produces migrant ‘illegality’ as an enduring ‘problem,’ spectacles of border policing nonetheless reaffirm the existence of a subordinate reserve army of deportable labour ready and available within the space of the nation-state. In this way, the Border Spectacle appears to show the state’s diligent but ever-beleaguered ‘response’ to the phantom ‘crisis’ of border ‘invasion’ by desperate hordes of ‘illegal’ migrants and asylum-seekers. The nightmarish invasiveness, relentlessness, and ubiquity of ‘illegal’ migration then serves to summon forth ever more intense and expansive intrusions of state power into everyday life for everyone.

The related discourses of ‘human trafficking’ and ‘migrant smuggling’ further allow the state to fashion itself as a paternalistic (indeed, patriarchal) “protection racket,” to use Charles Tilly’s term. In these instances, the state’s ‘protection’ is benevolently extended beyond its ‘rightful’ citizens to include some migrants, particularly women purportedly rescued from the intrinsic criminal excesses of ‘illegal’ migration itself. The ‘trafficking’ discourse thus narrowly identifies the source of the migrants’ ‘exploitation’ as a ‘foreign’ one — ‘smugglers’, and the whole ‘opportunistic’ infrastructure of ‘illegal’ migration itself. In this way, illegalised migrants are deemed to be in need of ‘protection’—from one another!

Almost never do such discourses interrogate the larger border and immigration regimes creating the need for precarious and vulnerable forms of ‘illegal’ border crossing, and consequently broadening the space to exploit migrants and asylum-seekers. At the same time, the exposure of pitiful and helpless ‘victims’ of ‘migrant smuggling’ nonetheless verifies the existence of a shadowy population of docile and infinitely tractable migrant denizens. In this respect, we see again how the Border Spectacle—as a scene of exclusion—affirms the obscene fact of a kind of subordinate inclusion. The sanctimonious but fundamentally hypocritical discourses decrying ‘migrant smuggling’ and ‘human trafficking’ serve as premier examples of the Border Spectacle’s acts of obscenity, exposing its own ‘dirty secret’.
Essentialised exploitability
The representation of migrants as either ‘victims’ or opportunistic ‘criminals’ effectively erases the kind of agency that might count as self-determination. The disqualification of these illegalised migrants from the capacity for self-determination furthermore implies that they are incompetent for self-government and democratic citizenship. This framing effectively reduces the exploitation of ‘illegal’ migrations to little more than a verification of their exploitability: their subjugation merely seems to prove their essential slavishness. This transposes the politics of citizenship and the inequalities of immigration into an essentialist politics of ‘difference’ that appears to arise from the migrants’ ‘foreignness.’

The unequal politics of citizenship, which is institutionalised in immigration law, produces migrant ‘illegality’. The Border Spectacle systematically re-renders that same ‘illegality’ into a quasi-inherent deficiency of the migrants themselves. This displacement of juridical inequalities and border injustices onto the illegalised migrants themselves—including patronising discourses that present migrants as purely passive ‘victims’—inevitably contributes to the migrants’ racialisation.
PART II: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STAKES OF CLOSED BORDERS

Products of the Border

EMMANUELLE HELLIO AND JUANA MORENO NIETO
Sociologists - University of Aix Marseille, CNRS, LEST, Mucem, Labexmed

A distinction is often drawn between the freedom of movement of people and that of goods or capital, both supposed to be unhindered in a liberal world, although the first is only theoretical. Yet the situation is not quite so clear-cut; it turns out goods don’t move so freely when Europe’s economic interests are at stake. In the case of agriculture, Moroccan workers and Moroccan land are locked into a subordinate relationship with Europe and its production schedule.

In regards to migration, when one talks about freedom of movement, it is usually to bewail the fact that there is a major disparity between the freedom of movement to which goods and capital are entitled compared to that of individuals. Yet the situation is not quite so black and white. Whether it be a commodity or a human being, borders are never entirely closed nor are they entirely open; they work rather as a filter.

We may take the example of the European Union and what it deems its “privileged” relationship with Morocco, safeguarded by the “Mobility Partnership” among other agreements. Yet Moroccan produce doesn’t move any more freely than individuals on either side of the strait. The development of off-season greenhouse crops — endorsed by structural adjustment policies and the Green Morocco Plan — has resulted in a situation where a water-poor country is exporting strawberries and tomatoes. These can only be sold at certain times over the year, periods defined by the EU-Moroccan Association Agreement. Morocco only receives a fraction of the profit of the sales, the rest monopolized by foreign investors.

Moroccan seasonal workers are generally transported to France and Spain starting from March, at the exact time that Moroccan fruit and vegetable pric-

[1] This article was originally published in the french review Plein droit No. 116, March 2018 under the title “Les fruits de la frontière”
es become uncompetitive due to tariffs set by the EU. Despite views praising the prevailing system of free trade, the concrete reality is that Mediterranean borders serve as an instrument which the Global North uses to integrate the Global South into its orbit. Those wielding this instrument weave asymmetrical relationships between the two shores, which resemble more pipes and canals than anything facilitating freedom of movement. These “pipes and canals” serve a purely functional purpose: the spatial and temporal subordination of Moroccan land and society in order to meet and complete Europe’s production needs.²

This article,³ which focusses on two zones of intensive strawberry production – one in Andalusia and the other in North Morocco, seeks to highlight the links between the localisation and organisation strategies of the strawberry production industry and prevailing policies on migration and economic regulation, and the ways these links shape global markets. It will illustrate, more specifically, the way in which the process of subordinated integration mentioned above is organised on a regional scale in the context of the globalised berry production system. It will also demonstrate how this integration is taking the form of female farm-workers employed on both sides of the strait, and will explore the role that the border plays in Europe and Morocco’s comparative profitability. We will focus on the gap between liberal declarations and political realities, both in regards to migration and economic issues.

Circular migration or permission to travel?
The development of strawberry monoculture in South Andalusia over the 1980s required hiring seasonal workers. Initially these were Andalusian labourers, but during the 1990s they were replaced by foreigners that had recently arrived in Spain. In 2000 these workers were yet to change again; a new immigration law (ley de extranjería) came into force which made it possible to recruit seasonal workers in their home countries and return them there at the end of the season. This guest worker system (contratación en origen) represented an “entirely secure” solution put forward by the sector to meet seasonal labour needs and avoid any risk of strikes on farms where the typical features of the agricultural labour market⁴ are exacerbated by the increasing cost of inputs and the fact that strawberries are extremely fragile. This was the industry’s chosen form of recruitment from 2000, and was used to bring in female workers from Poland and Romania. Several key factors

³ This work was undertaken at LabexMed (Laboratory of Excellence in Humanities and Social Sciences at the core of interdisciplinary research for the Mediterranean): Reference 10-LBX-0090. It received funding from the the French State, managed by the Agence nationale de la recherche (National Research Agency), under the Avenir A * MIDEX investment project, reference number: ANR-11-IDEX-0001-02.
played a role in companies then switching to Moroccan workers: firstly, a company based in both Andalusia and Morocco\(^5\) used these contracts to hire Moroccan female workers and bring them from Moroccan farms to Andalusian farms for the strawberry season, thus prompting other companies to do the same; there was also the fact that seasonal workers from Eastern Europe were now European citizens and their movement between countries could not be controlled any more; and lastly, the fact that millions of euros worth of subsidies had been made available to finance temporary employment contracts for non European migrant workers into Europe. These subsidies, available under the Meda 2 Programme\(^6\) and through a scheme overseen by a city council located in a strawberry production zone, were a manifestation of the European Commission’s desire to prove that temporary forms of migration involving a voluntary return to one’s home country at the end of the contract were indeed possible.\(^7\)

This revamped labour import policy under the mask of new political-administrative categories such as “circular migration” was labelled a “back to the future”\(^8\) move by the academic Stephen Castles. These new programmes were a way to avoid the “flaws” of previous policies deemed failures due to the fact that many workers ended up staying permanently in the host countries. Under the banner of “circular migration”, which was presented as advantageous to all concerned (“win-win-win migration” and “mobility partnerships”), one of the most controlling migration schemes, and most detrimental to workers’ rights, was established: guest worker contracts which involve hiring Moroccan women to work in Spain over the strawberry season. As with any temporary migration programme, the scheme between Morocco and Huelva is based on the female worker’s submissiveness. Before she even leaves, the worker must sign a document substantiating her commitment to return to her home country. The Directorate General of Immigration then issues her with a “temporary residence and work permit upon which is indicated the specific geographical area and business sector in which she is authorised to work and reside as well as the duration of this permit, which is the same as that of her employment contract.”

The fact that workers need an employment contract in order to obtain a residence permit means that there is no chance of workers’ protesting or taking collective action. Those on the hiring end have also added another control mechanism: only women who are married or have been previously married and have children under thirteen years old are hired. The choice of which workers are hired

---

\(^{[5]}\) Following an offshoring strategy in the 1980s by Fredesloc, one of the main companies based in Huelva and which will be discussed in more detail below.

\(^{[6]}\) The European-Mediterranean partnership’s main instrument of financial and economic cooperation, launched in 2000, four years after Meda 1.

\(^{[7]}\) There have been few studies on the European Commission’s promotion of temporary migration programmes in the 2000s compared to those on policies relating to closing European borders. See: Emannuelle Helliou, “Faites tourner : un renouveau de la migration temporaire de travail”, in Importer des femmes pour exporter des fraises : flexibilité du travail, canalisation des flux migratoires et échappatoires dans une monoculture intensive globalisée, University Thesis, Nice Sophia Antipolis, 2014.

is effectively based on sexual discrimination (gender asymmetry) and whoever looks most vulnerable. Workers are required to not only be flexible on a day-to-day basis (strawberry-pickers living on the farm), but also flexible in regards to when the season begins and ends, as their contracts are not fixed-term and they are required to wait for their employer to contact them in Morocco. Gender norms and the reality of domestic labour are used here to control who is hired. These gender norms, which dictate how a woman should act, present an image of the scheme and its constraining aspects as ultimately suiting those who are subjected to it; social and gender relations are aligned with migrant utilitarianism, and mutually reinforce one another. The constrained mobility of female strawberry-pickers guest through worker contracts is a way of establishing a system of migrant labour based on creating a temporal, spatial and legal border that outsources the social costs of a system of production onto the households of the Global South and enables the acquisition of a workforce that is controlled, flexible and disposable. The contratación en origen is, as indeed the Californian Bracero programme was, a migrant labour system that keeps wages low, undermines workers’ rights and, in certain respects, plays a managerial role. “Without migrant workers, it would be the end of our business”, remarked one grower. In this respect, the profitability of the Huelva strawberry industry is itself a “product of the border”.

Offshoring and borders in a neoliberal world
The origins of Moroccan berry production and exports date back to the late 1980s when Andalusian companies began offshoring to Morocco. The establishment of the company Fredesloc in 1989 is considered to mark the beginnings of the country’s berry monoculture. Factors such as access to cheap labour, a warm climate that would result in fruit ripening earlier than in Europe, and the Loukkos plain’s proximity to the port of Tangier have since incited many transnational corporations to choose the North Atlantic coast of Morocco as the optimal site on which to produce berries for the European market. It is indeed an export-oriented sector, dominated by foreign companies which manage to remain competitive chiefly by maintaining control over their workforce. They rely on a generational and gender-segmented labour market, recruiting young single women from landless households in the region.

Other factors that played a key role in the sector’s development was the agriculture and trade liberalisation policies that resulted from the structural adjustment plans of the 1980s, the establishment of the World Trade Organization, and the

signing of various “free trade” agreements in the 1990s and 2000s. The free trade agreement between Morocco and the European Union, in force since 2012, has been critical for the fruit and vegetable sector\[^{12}\], although, as we shall see, it is based on asymmetrical relations which reflect European protectionism and the Moroccan economy’s dependance on the common market.\[^{13}\] So, although there had been talk of an increase of tariff-free exports of fruit and vegetables, under the agreement the entry price and production schedule remains the same for certain products that are considered sensitive for European producers. These restrictions are what determine the sector’s production processes in Morocco and its specialisation in early season crops that offer the European consumer year-round access to fruit and vegetables without Moroccan exports constituting any threat to European producers. The fact that the Moroccan sector then shifts its specialisation to frozen strawberries from the 1\(^{st}\) of April, when tariffs come into effect, designed to protect European producers and the arrival of the first fresh European-grown strawberries on the market, illustrates the structural effects of these trade barriers on Moroccan crops.

As pointed out elsewhere, the effects of trade liberalisation and specialisation in the production and export of fresh fruits and vegetables, fervently promoted by Morocco’s current agricultural policy – the Green Morocco Plan (2008) – reinforce Morocco’s peripheral position in its relation to the globalised North and redoubles structural inequalities that have historically shaped Moroccan agriculture, favouring agribusiness at the expense of peasant agriculture.\[^{14}\] Indeed, the majority of small-scale farms in Morocco dedicated to extensive agriculture in non-irrigated areas have been hard hit by the arrival of European crops like cereals, which are intensively farmed and receive substantial subsidies.\[^{15}\] In regards to Morocco’s own exports, the liberal perspective is that Morocco has a “competitive advantage”. Yet identifying the winners and losers of the 2012 free trade agreement is not quite so straightforward if we look carefully at Morocco’s relations with the Global North in the agricultural exports sector and who owns the capital. In the case of strawberries, European companies control exports and therefore most of the added value created by the sector goes to them.\[^{16}\]

They hold a dominant position vis-a-vis producers (primarily Moroccan) who

---

\[^{12}\] 65% of Morocco’s agri-food exports (as measured by value) went to the EU in 2015 (EACCE, 2016).
\[^{13}\] Approximately 70% of Moroccan exports go to the EU (and a similar percentage of imports). See: Gonzalo Escribano, “Marruecos, la UE y España : algunas asignaturas económicas pendientes”, Revista de Estudios Internacionales Mediterráneos, 14, 2013.
\[^{16}\] According to data provided by USAID, a farmer makes an average profit of 1,524 dirhams per tonne of strawberries whereas the freezing industry makes 5,050 dirhams per tonne (Chemonics International, 2006). One euro equals 11 dirhams.
are bound to them by credit-based production contracts. The fact that foreign
capital dominates the sector reinforces the idea that the Moroccan strawberry
sector is dependant on being integrated into the global strawberry market. Thus
post-harvest production and processing, which are based on over-exploiting
natural resources and the local workforce, take place in Morocco, while sec-
tors involving research, commercial distribution and developing inputs, which
monopolise most the the chain’s added value, are controlled by European and
American companies. The asymmetrical relationship between producers and
foreign exporters in the sector and the subordinated commercial integration
with the EU reveal the extent to which the border plays a central role in the pro-
cesses of capital accumulation that take place within this globalised agriculture.

Whether it concerns importing seasonal, utilitarian workers from Morocco
into Spain or offshoring production to Morocco, the agricultural export model
is ultimately unsustainable. The border is delineating a system of temporary
migration permits and asymmetric trade regulations, resulting in companies
offshoring to Morocco, and the land and its workers forced into a relationship
of subordination. It is the product of a neo-liberal paradigm that is fuelling the
profits of European and American transnational corporations situated upstream
or downstream of the production chain.

[17] This system is constraining for growers who buy Spanish-produced strawberry plants on credit
from exporting companies at the beginning of the season and are forced to sell their produce (at a price
determined by the companies) to them at the end of the season in order to pay off their debt.
The Booming Business of Borders

OLIVIER PETITJEAN (WITH RACHEL KNAEBEL AND ANNE-SOPHIE SIMPERE)
Multinationals Observatory

If there is one area that seems to fall within the exclusive authority of States, it would be that of borders. Are they not a fundamental aspect of their sovereignty? And yet the border business has been booming over the last few years, offering the private sector numerous money-making opportunities, especially the arms industry. In 2016, the global border security market represented 18 billion dollars (16.9 billion euros) annually, and it is estimated that by 2022, this figure could reach 53 billion (49.8 billion euros).

Both Europe and USA are key drivers of the border business, with walls being built, electric fences erected, a whole range of equipment required to manage checkpoints and reception centres for asylum seekers, cameras, drones, gates equipped with facial recognitions tools, centralised, biometric databases, monitoring software, robot dogs... the list goes on. This is partly due to the growing trend whereby border control, which was once the role of the government, is being “sub-contracted” out to private companies. There have been aspects of this approach since the 1980s when companies were given other migration-related responsibilities such as managing detention centres.\(^1\) At the same time, the private sector has capitalised on Europe’s toughened stance to border control (due to the terrorist threat and the apparent influx of refugees into Europe) to “sell” a whole range of technology-focussed “solutions”.

Lobbying and ever-increasing budgets
National and European public powers are willingly play along, pumping tens of millions of euros into the new border business. Over the last ten years, the funds

available to European border protection agencies have been steadily increasing. From 6.3 million euros in 2005, Frontex’s budget is now over 330 million, and the European Commission is planning on a six-fold increase, i.e., two billion euros per year over the 2021-2027 period. In addition, the EU has allocated funds to governments to assist them with border control, again to the tune of several billion euros. Most of this cash goes into contracts with businesses that supply equipment and services, primarily defence and security corporations.

The European Union is also giving these same corporations generous subsidies to develop new border management «solutions» under the pretext of security “research”. It is no coincidence that the companies lobbying at the European Parliament for increased border control happened to be those that received the funds. They have been strategically placed in the upper ranks of the working groups of European institutions working on border control and their house-lobbyists are very active in the EU capital. The obvious outcome is that companies win tenders that they helped write...

European, US and Israeli defence industrialists began to lay the foundations for such a shift in the 2000s. Their military contracts at an all-time low, they pushed a new “paradigm” for the military-industrial complex. The latest challenge would be to be prepared for “new multifaceted threats” which would require new forms of intervention, blurring the traditional line between military interventions outside

the border and police operations within different countries. It is not unrelated that the EU’s decision to award extremely lucrative border security contracts to these companies comes at a time when it also has announced plans to directly subsidise its defence industry, which up until now had been taboo due its so-called “pacifist” values.3

Arms industry winning on all counts
Not that the European defence industry is doing badly. The Transnational Institute noted that “global arms exports to the Middle East increased by 61% between 2006-2010 and 2011-2015” in its report Border Wars. “Between 2005 and 2014, EU member states granted arms exports licences to the Middle East and North Africa worth over 82 billion euros”, including 25 billion to Saudi Arabia, 16 billion to United Arab Emirates and nearly 3 billion to Egypt. And the corporations that benefit from these billion-euro arms contracts are groups like Airbus, French corporations Thales and Safran, and the Italian group Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica).

The same companies are effectively working on both fronts. Arms corporations are capitalising on instability in the Middle East and Africa in every way they can. This involves, on the one hand, increasing arms sales (facilitated by exporting countries) to conflict zones (wars in Syria, with the murky role of Qatar and Saudi Arabia in funding and supporting these wars, the Yemen war, the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen resulting in the Yemeni civil war, various repressive regimes, to name a few). And on the other hand, these corporations are also behind the move to militarise European borders. The irony is that it is the refugees that are fleeing these conflicts that are arriving in unprecedented numbers at Europe’s borders. These companies are therefore cashing in on the conflicts that are causing these refugees to flee in such large numbers as well as on Europe’s closed border policy, which is pushing people to risk their lives to get to Europe.

And these same companies are now benefiting from an additional source of profit: the European Union’s border externalisation policy. The EU’s cooperation agreements with neighbouring countries and the home countries of refugees reflect its increasing fixation on migration control. By training their security forces or providing them with military equipment, Europe is effectively collaborating with authoritarian regimes that are violating human rights. Some development aid is also being misused as a result of these policies. Prominent players in the border security market outside of Europe include Thales, Airbus and Leonardo (which also export arms to these war-torn areas), the biometrics companies

Veridos, OT Morpho and Gemalto, and Turkish defence companies. Other big winners include the French Ministry of the Interior’s consulting and service company Civipol and the French technical assistance agency Expertise France.

The Calais “laboratory”
Arms companies are not the only ones to benefit from the EU and its Member State’s “security investments”. The situation in Calais⁴ is a prime example. As part of the Le Touquet agreement, Britain pours tens of millions of euros into border security. And who are the beneficiaries of this money? The Calais Research Network⁵ has identified 40 companies that reap the benefits of the border regime in areas that include transport, fence construction, storage unit suppliers and tear gas cartridge manufacturers.

It is no surprise that among the happy recipients is the company Thales, one of the top European arms traders selling to the Middle East and North Africa, and one of the main beneficiaries of European funds allocated to research into tackling illegal immigration. It is Thales that has installed a range of security equipment in the port of Calais. These include security gates, card readers, surveillance cameras, and vital infrastructure protection. In addition, although the company responsible for the two drones monitoring the Eurotunnel area has not been publicly disclosed, according to the Calais Research Group, these look very much like Thales’ Spycopters.

Other companies involved may come as a surprise: Vinci for one, with its subsidiary Sogea, which was contracted to demolish the so-called “jungle” camp in February/March 2016 when the entire camp was evicted. Vinci’s trade union (CGT) disputed the contract, which it said required its employees to work in appalling hygiene and security conditions. It accused the State of offloading its “dirty work” onto private companies despite the fact that it has the resources and expertise to do this work. This represents yet another disturbing example of the State dumping what used to be its role and responsibilities onto the private sector.

It was also Vinci’s subsidiary Eurovia that built the so-called Calais “anti-intrusion” wall, which was estimated to cost 2.7 million euros and was funded by Britain. The kilometre-long, four-metre high wall, which is an addition to the fences erected along the port, aims to prevent migrants getting into trucks heading to the UK. Yet this doesn’t stop them from trying their luck before trucks get close to the wall.

Another lesser-known but equally prominent player on the Calais scene is Eamus

---

[4] Major transit point between France and England for boats, trains and trucks alike, Calais is a small coastal town in France facing the English Channel, and now famous for its “jungle”: a refugee and migrant encampment that was settled early 2015, on their way through to England.

Cork Solutions. The French company, based in Dunkirk, was created by a former Calais policeman. The company won an £80 million-contract offered by the Home Office for services such as conducting searches of vehicles and individuals, detention and police escorts. It constitutes one of the biggest private security contracts in Calais, and is indicative of a trend towards privatising border security. Paying private companies to “manage migrants” is already the norm in the UK. Although in France it is still by and large the State that takes responsibility for this role, the situation in Calais illustrates that private security companies are more than happy to take the reins.

Borders that aren’t so “smart”

Another thriving sector is airport security. Popular technological solutions, which fall under the all-encompassing term “smart borders” include automatic gates, facial recognition tools and centralised, biometric databases which keep track of travellers entering and exiting the EU, all of which are supplied by companies at an astronomical price. The plan to establish the PNR system (Passenger Name Record) was initially rejected by the European Parliament due to its cost, but under pressure from France, was adopted in 2016 under the pretext of terrorist threats. It should be highlighted that the main companies behind these technologies happen to be French: OT-Morpho (now Idemia), Safran and Thales.

How effective these devices really are, and whether they justify the costs involved, is questionable. Their use also entails risks in terms of personal data protection, including the potential for governments to exploit this data. There are concerns such as that voiced by British NGO StateWatch that this symbolises the emergence of a “pan-European surveillance system”.

It is not only the lobbying activities of a few private companies with vested interests that are fuelling the tensions around EU borders. But these companies know how to step into the breach, sway dialogue and turn opinions and political responses to their advantage. The solutions they’re selling are often extremely expensive, which doesn’t necessarily make them “effective”, even in regards to the official objectives of restricting the number of illegal immigrants getting to Europe. They play a key part in validating and even reinforcing policies and solutions that criminalise migration and make it easier to violate the rights of migrants.

This article is a summarised version of several pieces published by the Multinationals Observatory since 2016 on the the border business in Europe.
RESISTANCES AND ALTERNATIVES TO BORDERS
A. THE MEANS OF RESISTANCE
Tunnelling borders

BRYAN FINOKI  
Architect

The growing ubiquity of militarized borders has with it produced a subterranean network of cross-border tunnels. In tunnelling, global “urban burrowers” have begun to compose a new layer of multitude grounded in the struggles against global hegemony itself.

National borders are typically viewed as lines drawn with barbed wire, or fixed by concrete and steel. Politicians laud ‘walls’ as effective solutions to tides of foreign invaders aiming to steal jobs, terrorize populations, and dilute national identities. Beyond the ‘security theater’, walls are an architectural fallacy propped up by popular pretense and political fantasy, gross contractor profiteering, legal exception, institutional racism, and often brute colonization.

More recently, they have served as key infrastructure for a post-9/11 techno-militaristic opportunism, an internationalization of border security, and as a mock-hydrological system of surplus labor exploitation and incarceration. They also disguise a sub-political landscape of interlacing activities that operate through the wall in various shadowy vectors, many of which—due to increased migration criminalization, aerial surveillance, trade blockades, foreign occupation, and chronic bi-national corruption—have been forced to coalesce underground, driven further into both peril and “illegality.” But walls don’t merely sort or displace cross-border flows, rather they trigger informal tunneling as a way to compile unauthorized movements into a universal bottom class of extreme suspect. By forcing globalization’s “antagonists” to retreat underground it becomes a lot easier to treat their cause as its own kind of act of guerilla war, which only precipitates a legal rationale for warfare in retaliation.

[1] This article was originally published on OpenDemocracy.com, on 26 November 2013.
It’s no surprise then that parts of the US-Mexico border already look like the West Bank, while Kashmir conjures images of the Korean DMZ; or that Rio and Gaza have gradually come to reflect one another. Neither is it surprising that India, like Israel, is completely walling itself off from its Muslim neighbors, while most of the Arab world evolves as a region cleaved by military fence construction. Turkey’s proximity as a gateway from the Middle East to Europe, and more critically as Syria’s neighbor, has instigated a spate of border projects along its eastern edge as well as with Greece and Bulgaria. With the hardest stop gaps already in place like the US-Mexico fence, Israel’s dangerous barrier with Egypt, the Spanish fence installation in Ceuta and Melilla on Morocco’s coast, or the entire Mediterranean Sea and patrolled coastal waters surrounding the Caribbean and Australia for that matter, new walls continue to spawn from South Mexico and Myanmar to Russia’s borders with Georgia.

If current trends continue, even the lesser barricades are destined to become full blown militarized border zones before they fall. With global migration soaring at the thrusts of perpetual war, climate catastrophe and ‘disaster capitalism’, deepening civil conflicts, and the ever-polarizing effects of trans-global capitalism on systemic inequality, national borders are being reinscribed as part and parcel of a more universal carceral frontier composed of precarious settlements, refugee camps and detention centers. The more border zones urbanize, the greater the current model of securitization will unite them with all its usual subterfuge.
Yet just as every wall casts a shadow, so too does each inspire its own mechanism of subversion. Each wall invariably serves as the instrument of its own undoing, its own intrinsic failure. Migrants, refugees, smugglers, coyotes, cartels, militaries themselves, and various ‘others’ set in to motion have never failed to devise ingenious ways to pass unseen. The wall is an object that inadvertently designs its own negation in this way. It is a surface ultimately defined by the pressures exerted upon it, destined not to stand as a monument to efficacy but to its own delusional failure.

Geographer Michael Dear (2013) states, “Partition is the crudest tool in the armory of geopolitics, an overt confession of failed diplomacy.” Where there have been walls there too have often been tunnels. ‘The tunnel’ is the crude by-product of ‘the wall’ itself, a spatial sibling inseparably and geopolitically locked in a broken embrace. Tunnels and subterranean habitats have a long fascinating history dating back to the dawn of human kind. Military tunnels, mining and trench warfare have their own ongoing epic archeological narratives to tell. But so does the emerging micro-niche of cross-border tunnels whose excavation cannot be delinked from the history of the nation-state and the wall itself. Most have sprung up from smuggling or as a means of escape.

It remains somewhat of a myth, but the first border tunnels along the US’s southern boundary were allegedly said to have existed during the Prohibition era. The US, as Peter Andreas chronicles in his latest book, was largely built by smugglers. It’s also well known that both the CIA and Eastern German citizens constructed separate tunnels of their own for espionage and escape prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, contexts that hardly seem questioned today. During the siege of Sarajevo in the early nineties the Bosnian Army constructed a secret tunnel linking the city with the Bosnian controlled territory below Sarajevo’s airport. It was used to smuggle in aid, supplies and weapons while also escorting people out. In 2005, a tunnel was discovered under the border between British Columbia and Washington apparently designed to smuggle marijuana. There are numerous other past examples, but the trend has hardly slowed, nor should we expect it to.

Not only has history shown the ‘underground’ to be a vital space of transgression where the limits of (super)power have been contested and circumnavigated, but ‘the tunnel’ as a spatial political paradigm has proven humanity’s greater will to engineer triumph over unlawful barriers time and time again. Vietnam’s C C hi tunnels being perhaps the greatest example in recent history. Or, even the Al Qaeda and Taliban caves in Afghanistan. It only makes sense that with increased walls and a globalized surveillance state comes a new contingency of tunnelers and communities persisting underground.

These groups, while not directly linked, represent the vertical spatial practice of geography that Eyal Weizman first outlined on OpenDemocracy with his essay “The Politics of Verticality” (2002). Stephen Graham continues to explore this at
a larger geopolitical scale and stresses the necessity “to link the proliferation of tunnel complexes with the extraordinary intensification of state-backed technoscientific scrutiny that has marked vertical geopolitics over the past few decades.” (2012). I would contend these “urban burrowers” have begun to compose a new layer of multitude grounded in the struggles against global hegemony itself.

On October 7th 2013, the Israeli Defense Forces uncovered a 1,700 meter long cross-border tunnel stretching from the periphery of Gaza to the outskirts of a Kibbutz. Hamas claimed its intentions were to capture Israeli soldiers while preparing for Israel’s next round of hostilities. With Pentagon developed tunnel-detection technology, Israel and Egypt have destroyed much of Gaza’s highly sophisticated and nationally sanctioned tunnel network, rumored once to number over a thousand. They serve as both Gaza’s economic lifelines for obtaining goods via Egypt, and as Hamas’ controlled passages for arms movement and subterranean warfare. Essentially, the Israeli blockade of Gaza’s borders has left the Palestinians with no other means but to nationalize their tunnel infrastructure for basic trade. It’s estimated the ongoing destruction of these tunnels is costing Gaza millions.

By forcing the Palestinians to tunnel Israel has turned the bulk of their economy into a military target, since the economic tunnels cannot be accurately distinguished from Hamas’ militarized tunnels. The blockade is an insidious way for Israel to force Gaza to dig so the tunnels’ ambiguity can then be leveraged as a case being treated as legally-contentious “dual-use” targets, dubiously legitimating Israel’s perpetual campaign of urbicide against Palestinian statehood.

Ever since the Second Lebanon War in 2006, Israel has maintained extreme border vigilance after discovering an extensive network of “underground villages” connected with more complex Hezbollah bunkers, prompting the IDF to prepare in mock tunnels for a future “tunnel war.” Reports from a Lebanese newspaper last year claimed that Hezbollah controls an even more secretive series of tunnels and bunkers extending into Syrian territory.

On 30 October 2013, US federal agents shut down a narco “super tunnel” stretching 1/3 of a mile across the US-Mexico border joining warehouses in San Diego and Tijuana. It was one of the most elaborate of the roughly 140 tunnels that have been discovered along the border over the last twenty years, complete with its own electric rail cart system, ventilation, and concrete foundation. In Nogales, Arizona, migrants and drug smugglers alike have been known to use tunnels and the massive floodwater drainage canals straddling the border as a means of movement. And since the Border Patrol beefed up its own roboticized subterranean policing additional makeshift tunnels have been found hacking into the existing sewage conduits. If North America has a border tunnel capital, Nogales is it.
In 2007 and 2008, security crackdowns prior to the Summer Olympic Games in Beijing exposed three separate underground trade operations that deployed secret tunnels, cross-border tubing and pulley systems, and urban drainage ducts to ferry cheap electronic goods from Hong Kong to mainland China where they’re far more expensive. And about this time in November of last year, a 50-meter cocaine smuggling tunnel was found linking a Brazilian dealer’s house in the São Remo favela to an area outside the University of São Paulo through a wall separating the two. Student demand for cocaine prompted the tunnel apparently because many were too afraid of venturing into the favela.

This constant specter of walls cropping up along the world’s boundaries at first seems ignorant of its own porosity. Yet, the policy of walling hardly overlooks these routine practices of less visible trespass. In a so-called ‘borderless’ era of free trade walls strategically redirect unsanctioned cross-border flows further out of view and deeper underground by beckoning their own subversion this way, and for multiple reasons:

[1] Walls help to force a commingling of uncontrollable movements of various types with the illicit underground networks of criminal drug and human trafficking syndicates, and militant groups;
[2] by driving the world’s labor/refugee overflow underground it becomes easier to perceive such a superfluous population as less human and through a wider lens of “ferality” (a description Pentagon researchers have drawn upon to characterize the insurgents fighting the new urban wars of the 21st century—wars that would take place in the filthy spatial fallout of failed states/cities). This paves the creation of a more broad base subclass of borderzone criminality identified through a purposeful blurring of migrant/refugee/criminal/terrorist suspect categories. This pixelation only invites a greater juridical stripping of their legal status and harsh penalization under anti-terror national security frameworks; and,
[3] underground spaces can be deemed more viable military targets despite those that lack any violent intention by virtue of sharing a spatial typology that in nature coincides with other like-spaces that have been designed for more nefarious uses.

Today, not only do walls beget tunnels they co-construct them as an intended by-product that forces a multitude of forbidden cross-border sub-agencies into self-dug graves and abyssal legality. Rather than taking responsibility through progressive immigration and labor policy, or re-examining the failures of the War On Drugs, or preventing Israel’s annihilation of Palestinian statehood, national governments deploy a dehumanizing strategy of criminalization through forced tunnelization.
It all starts with a refusal. On the 12th of June 2015, at the toll booth of Balzi Rossi, in Ponte San Ludovico, on the border of Italy and France, drivers run into something blocking their way: just before they get to the toll booth, located near the reef and the sea, there is a group of about two hundred people chanting to the rhythm of their impromptu leader: “We are not going back / We need to pass / Where is the human right? / Where is the humanity?”¹

They stand in a tight group, holding banners and signs. They don’t really prevent cars getting through, but there’s no way anyone could miss them. Most of those that make up the group are from Eritrea, Somalia, Côte d’Ivoire or Sudan. They have set up camp on the traffic island between the two lanes, one of which goes to Italy and the other to France. There are men, women, families, those that are sick but refuse to leave, who wish to stay with the group on the border. “We don’t want to stay in Italy. Thanks for everything, Italy” says one sign written in French. “Together we stand” says another. “We don’t want to stay in France either, we just want to cross the border so that we can get to England, Germany, somewhere else… That’s why we’re not moving from here, we’ll stay here till we die, we’ll throw ourselves into the sea, we’re fine to stay here for a year, no problem…” says someone, helped by an Arabic-speaking member of the Red Cross, to the camera of a local journalist.²

¹ View the video by Il Secolo XIX: www.ilsecoloxix.it/p/imperia/2015/06/12/ARdpSbiE-ventimiglia_migranti_ingressi.shtml.
² View the video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2SnTWPWup0U (viewed 4 May 2017).
The French police block the way. The border has been closed since yesterday. Same traffic island the following day. There are only ten people left. The Italian police have recently thrust out the rest of the group. At around 5 pm the police and the Italian carabinieri, fully-clad in body armour, swooped in on the group, driving them to move 200 metres, up towards the tunnel that leads to the border zone. Some of the group were able to get closer to the mountains, with the intention perhaps of getting across the border unnoticed. But a group of around fifty people head for the sea and settle on the cliffs, where the police can’t get them, even though it is only a few steps to the road. An Italian police truck is parked between the cliffs and the road, blocking any way through, and the French police are dotted all around the toll booth. Even the sea is under careful surveillance in the event that someone might try to swim across. On the rocks, the group has made their message clear: it is the same message as before: we are not moving; we’re not going back. They are poorly equipped to spend a night under the stars but that isn’t going to stop them from doing just that. As night falls, the Red Cross and several supporters bring them blankets, sheets and cardboard boxes. “This is my house”, someone says, pointing his finger at a sheet he is spreading out on the ground. “I will sleep here,’ says someone else. A video from an Italian media outlet shows them both smiling, lying under a blue children’s blanket with little dogs on it. These two people, wryly full of determination, refuse to play the role of victims, defying the image that many might have of them.

The next day the images of migrants sleeping on the cliffs under survival blankets – a sprawl of sparkling squares – make their way around the world. Willing to endure anything, the group spends only another two nights sleeping on the cliffs.

On the 14th of June, an unpleasant surprise awaits them: a few members of the far-right group “Génération Identitaire” are holding a feeble protest (about ten fascists make up the group), shouting “Africa for Africans, Europe for Europeans.” They have conveniently forgotten that Modern Europe was built on colonising and looting Africa. The police intervene, standing between the group and the migrants, but an Italian woman is the only one to push through the rows of police and shout directly at the fascists: “Get out of here, you pigs!”

The Italian police suddenly swarm in on the rocks on the 16th of June, determined to put an end to the rebellion that is beginning to annoy them. The Red Cross bus is with them, as well as several other police vehicles, ready to take the migrants and dump them far from the border. Under one of the underpasses, police gather around a pile of clothes donated by people supporting the migrants’ plight. One migrant anchors his feet to the ground and grips on to a

---


traffic light with all his might. “Get on the bus and nothing will happen,” says a plainclothes police officer while two other riot police attempt to tear him off the pole. They eventually succeed and push him into a car. The sound of Italian voices crying out “Shame on you” resound. Several black-gloved policemen try to force someone into the Red Cross bus, pushing on their head to make them get in, yet they manage to get out. Shrii131l cries of protest erupt from another car. This is where the video that was to cause a scandal all over the world ends.5 It seems that France, the country that has chosen to close its border, is happy to let Italy do its dirty work, and Italy is happy to abide.

It is unlikely that the police or the Red Cross (and especially not the directors of the Italian local and nation-wide institutions) had any idea that these images were to trigger a resistance movement in the area that would go on for over three months. [...] 

• • •

“A CALL TO MIGRANTS EVERYWHERE
We stand strong and claim
our rights as refugees at a time when
we face insecurity, hunger and are condemned to wander the earth.
Please, let’s fight by ourselves and
stand united as if we were one,
so that we may finally have our rights and be free.
To all of the world’s migrants, those who have had to risk their lives
crossing the desert and the sea
to get to a place of peace like Europe.
To the migrants of Ventimiglia, Rome, Milan, Paris Calais, let us hold this fight within us.
We are not criminals or terrorists, if we stand united,
our voices have a chance of being heard.
Don’t try to smuggle your way across the border,
because that is not who we are.”
Ventimiglia migrants for FREEDOM, 11 July 2015.

• • •

Mangiarya!
It is now July. This short text, which takes the form of a leaflet printed in Arabic, English, Italian and French, is being distributed around Presidio (a permanent camp that has formed on the cliffs, expanding outwards from a makeshift kitchen) and on the internet. The camp is fully functional: the kitchen keeps getting.

bigger, there are more tents, there are toilets and showers, and a solar panel has even been built so people can charge their phones. But the main difference, as Nazario remarks, who returns to the camp on the 7th of July, after a week away, is the following:

“The camp looked more political, there was a big Presidio banner with ‘No Border Ventimiglia’ on it. It looked more like a protest camp, a place of resistance... It was a community, a fighting community I would say, a changing community, and a place of transit.”

[...] New people arrive at the camp every day, with the average number of campers sitting at around one hundred. Meeting everyone’s daily needs can seem like an immense task. Yet the residents mostly self-manage, at least when it comes to the daily chores. It is rare to see someone leave their dirty plates on the table at the end of a meal, and there is never any shortage of volunteers for the job of washing up in the collective kitchen. This conscientiousness towards camp life is due, for some, to finding relief in sharing life’s daily chores and necessities with other human beings, after spending way too much time being “managed” by others. As CazaMoza, who currently lives in Marseille, remarks:

“After everything we’d gone through in Libya, finding the support and solidarity of other people felt incredible! People that slept on the same beds as us, that ate the same food as us. After that, after the fear we felt crossing the sea and after being dragged from camp to camp, to get to Ventimiglia and be treated like a human being again, amongst other human beings, was more than I dreamed of. I got there and angels were waiting for me.”

[...] The camp’s objectives go beyond the simple task of welcoming new arrivals and ensuring the day-to-day chores get done. As time goes by, it becomes obvious that it is no longer a question of days or months: the border is not going to open. There are now many people that form the camp’s community. Day after day, the driving question – what is the best way forward – also becomes a story of different worlds intersecting. It is not just a question of language: people that have lived through different things, are from different cultures and from very different political backgrounds, all live together in the camp. It is not always easy to get through to one another but this doesn’t mean that the conversations are not fruitful, especially when they share the same enemy: the border. [...] Anna adds:

“It was also really devastating for us, I think. You went there to see, to help... And I’m sure there were many that went there to help, which is not bad in itself, except that when you get there, what you see changes you

completely and you start hating the border more than anything else in the world and you’re not there anymore to help someone else, you’re there for a thousand reasons, because you can’t pretend that this thing doesn’t exist.”

It is clear that living in the camp is a powerful experience, but this doesn’t make it idyllic. The interaction between different worlds requires constant work, particularly when it comes to finding common meaning in such a community. We realised this when we visited the camp and found that we were almost constantly working as translators from Arabic to French or from French to Italian. English is the dominant language but not everyone speaks it, and there are often translation needs. While people from outside Europe have always needed translators, translating from Italian to French was not necessary at first. After several weeks, though, this is also a much solicited need. In the beginning, the French people at the camp were happy with just understanding the gist of conversations.

Different sides of the border bring different political cultures and it isn’t easy to bring everyone together in the communal assembly. [...] Despite the initial hurdles, from July the assembly becomes part of the daily routine and this is how each day starts. Usually, everyone that wishes to speak does so in the language they feel most comfortable with and someone else translates. Two or three Europeans living in Presidio, who know a bit of Arabic, begin to get fluent enough to communicate one on one when translating all that is said in the assemblies becomes too laborious. Nazario sums up how the “language issue” was handled during the assemblies:

“Those that didn’t feel comfortable enough spoke in their own language, and we translated it into English. Sometimes three translations were needed: Italian-English-Arabic. Or English-Arabic. That was the way it worked.”

The how and the why of these assemblies is an ongoing question as there is a constant stream of new arrivals and, for those that manage to cross the border, departures. These conditions don’t make it easy to keep up a sense of continuity. Some feel that the Europeans are being too authoritarian by forcing others to take part in gatherings that are “not inclusive enough”. And yet others find the idea of a “white peoples’ assembly” absurd. As Francesca remarks:

“The assembly should not be something that is forced on people. It was a way to share opinions and work out what we could do together, work out what could be improved, but it was not obligatory. There were mostly people who said: we should let them hold the assemblies. But if they wanted to hold an assembly, they did it! There was no need to tell them to do so... Then there were those that said there should be a white peoples’ assembly because it was more direct. There was always that, this thing about a white peoples’ assembly... But later this division ended.”
Presidio’s three systematic activities are: protests on the border with the *battitura*, which consists of beating in unison on the safety barrier, on poles, on frying pans, on anything and everything that makes any noise. Then there is the cop-watching: monitoring police operations (racial profiling, expulsions, etc.) And lastly, there are information campaigns on abuse, violence and on the overall situation of migrants including those that end up in the Red Cross centre. 

Three days of talks and actions are planned for the weekend of the 24th, 25th and 26th of July. Many groups, collectives, organisations and individuals from both sides of the border have been invited to this event called “Living the Border”. 

People come from everywhere, from Lampedusa and all over Italy, from Calais all the way to the South of France, as well as many other places: those that come to take part in “Living the Border” have experienced situations that are similar to that in Ventimiglia. The fruitful discussions, the diverse meetings, everything being simultaneously translated into three or four languages, the presence of second and third generation migrants... Everything blurs together in the memory of these days, abuzz with chaotic excitement. 

The Presidio is a hive of activity. Despite the challenging moments and the stress, most of the objectives it sets itself are being met. It continues to hamper the border sorting and deporting machine. We often wonder why the camp hasn’t yet been dismantled. Perhaps that is because, over these first few months, a certain balance of power has been achieved. It’s also summer, so more Europeans are available to settle in Balzi Rossi. In August, however, there is a sense that strategies seeking to neutralise the resistance are underway. […]
How locals are approaching the crackdown on the French-Italian border. The experience of the association Roya-Citoyenne¹

LUCA GILIBERTI
Sociologist, Université Côte d’Azur/URMIS-ObsMigAM – Università di Genova/DISFOR-LSV

Since June 2015 – when the French-Italian border was turned into a militarised zone – thousands of African migrants have crossed the Roya Valley, a wedge of land between France and Italy, on their migratory journey to Europe. Most are intercepted by the police and sent back to Italy without any opportunity to seek asylum in France. Minors are not taken under the care of child protection agencies as required by law. A network of citizens offering support and solidarity has sprung up in the Valley, actively helping migrants, providing food and shelter, basic medical care and legal support – and yet these actions have been criminalised by the French State.

The residents of the Roya Valley are those feeling most acutely the effects of the crackdown on the French-Italian border. Forced to live in a militarised area, having to tend to the dead and the wounded on their own streets, the locals are somehow forced to take a stand on the issue, as attested by many we talked to. The issue has essentially divided the valley. On the one hand, a network of citizens has formed, who offer support

¹ This is a shortened version of the article “La militarisation de la frontière franco-italienne et le réseau de solidarité avec les migrant·e·s dans la Vallée de la Roya”, published in the journal Mouvements in the first half of 2018, No. 93: pp. 149-155.
and solidarity in the form of food, shelter, care and legal aid. On the other is a small minority that are against aiding migrants and argue that these forms of solidarity encourage illegal immigration and terrorism. The association Défendre la Roya (Defend La Roya), established in June 2017 and aligned with the French far-right National Front, has about forty members. It has accused Roya-Citoyenne (the association supporting migrants) of facilitating illegal immigration and has requested its dissolution. The request was dismissed by the Administrative Court of Nice in November 2017.

Roya-Citoyenne is a collective and association which, after a break of several years, has been revived, and is the main solidarity platform offering support to migrants in the Roya Valley. Around 150 families make up the network – about 10% of the population. There are a range of ages involved, including several young people in their twenties and thirties, but the majority of members are middle-aged or retirees. This makes sense given the amount of time that this kind of activism requires. Most of these people are not political activists in the typical sense. We have noted the emergence of discussions on whether their actions are driven by humanitarian or political reasons. Most members are from middle-class backgrounds, which have suffered processes of economic disempowerment as in all of Europe. Another key feature of the solidarity network is that at least two thirds of its members are from so-called “neo-rural” households – that is, people that were not born and raised in the Valley, but have been living there for the past ten or twenty years, having moved there from the city. The main objective of Roya-Citoyenne has always been to offer care, food, shelter and support to migrants so they may continue their journey. In the beginning, many offered migrants a place to stay in their own homes – this was sometimes done quietly and even surreptitiously – but over time, most migrants arriving in the Roya Valley began to stay on the land of Cédric Herrou, where different sized tents and several caravans have been set up.

Although there have been several occasions when people have helped refugees to cross the border from Ventimiglia, the main role of Roya-Citoyenne members has been to provide help to migrants that arrive in the valley alone. Locals are being taken to court and prosecuted both for helping migrants to cross the

---

2 There are also people living in the valley that are not members of the association but identify as people actively offering solidarity and support to migrants. Some prefer to remain anonymous while others don’t partake in Roya-Citoyenne’s activist tactics. It is a small cluster of people in the valley who have a more radical approach and is similar to the Italian No Border network.

3 Cédric Herrou is a farmer that recently moved to Breil-sur-Roya and produces oil and olive paste as well as selling eggs from his chickens. He has been one of the key figures of the migrant solidarity network from the beginning, setting up a campsite for them on his land, and is a very active figure in the sphere of civil disobedience. He is undoubtedly the person that has been most criminalised and received the most media coverage in this story. From the very first days, thousands of migrants have camped out on Cédric Herrou’s land. There are a lot of people coming and going and, in the Summer of 2017, more than 200 people stayed at the campsite. Since the end of the Summer 2017, both the number of migrants staying at the campsite and the number of migrants travelling through the Roya Valley in general has dropped considerably.
border and for providing them with transport on French territory. There are clearly some legal ambiguities around these “crimes of solidarity”: it is legal to provide migrants with food and shelter, for instance, but illegal to transport them, even when they are not crossing the border. People are being punished for actions motivated either by humanitarian or political values; and the risk of being prosecuted for “assisting illegal immigrants to enter into the country, providing them with shelter or transport” only incites them towards civil disobedience.

Roya-Citoyenne has also been very active in Ventimiglia for over two years, collaborating with other voluntary local and international activists to distribute meals to migrants. Giving food to migrants, however, is now a criminal offence, and has been for nearly two years (July 2015-April 2017) following a ban issued by the Mayor of Ventimiglia for reasons of so-called hygiene and sanitation. Nine members of Roya-Citoyenne have been arrested for this offence.

The association has also become involved in providing legal aid and works with a group of lawyers on asylum rights and procedures and France’s obligations in terms of child protection. They have had several successful cases, thanks to the work of the association and its lawyers, who have argued that migrants have the right to seek asylum in France and not be first sent back to Italy. On four occasions since 2017, the Prefect of the Alpes-Maritimes region has been prosecuted for “obstructing the right to asylum” by the Court of Nice, which has ruled that “it has committed a serious and obviously illegal violation of the fundamental freedom and right to seek asylum”. Roya-Citoyenne has thus succeeded in establishing, in collaboration with the Prefecture and the Police, a kind of application process for asylum-seekers in Nice, authorising listed asylum
seekers to cross the border at PPA\textsuperscript{4} points. But this agreement, which works when there are a small number of migrants, is not so effective when the list is longer and authorities override the process.

Up until the autumn of 2017 there were many migrants travelling through the Roya Valley, but it has become very quiet since. The events of these last few years have illustrated that the situation is ever-changing and is punctuated by abrupt and sometimes radical fluctuations. The future of this migratory route remains uncertain. The crackdown on actions of solidarity is ongoing and citizens continue to be prosecuted. They are, however, committed to blowing the whistle on the French State when it attempts to bypass its own laws. Criminalising solidarity has contradictory effects in the community: on the one hand, locals are outraged that they are being punished for showing solidarity to migrants, which serves to intensify their feelings of solidarity even more. This illustrates the extent to which the crackdown is completely counterproductive. On the other hand, criminalising solidarity fuels racist and xenophobic discourse and exacerbates social conflict in the areas through which migrants are crossing.

\textsuperscript{4} PPA stands for “Points de Passage Autorisés” (Authorised Border Crossing Points) – and is defined by the valley’s residents as 24-hour checkpoints for migrants crossing the border.
From Donations to Direct Actions: Queer Solidarity with Migrants in the UK

LESBIANS AND GAYS SUPPORT THE MIGRANTS
Queer activist group standing in solidarity with all migrants and refugees.

When and why, as a LGBTIQ+ collective, did you decide to organize to support migrants’ rights?

Lesbians and Gays Support the Migrants formed in late 2015 as a response to the UK government’s abysmal record responding to the unfolding refugee ‘crisis’. The UK government was ignoring the plight of refugees in Calais and mass media attacks on migrants and refugees were regular. Anti-migrant sentiment was gaining ground in a country that had suffered nearly a decade of austerity, and we felt that we, as queer people, had to take action.

To understand why LGSMigrants decided to organise in solidarity with migrants, it’s important to understand the history of the queer activist community in the UK. As recently as the 60s and 70s, openly queer people faced the rhetoric of being branded ‘illegals’, not too dissimilar to how migrants and refugees are currently, and historically have been, referred to in the mass media. Homosexual acts were still illegal in British law until 1967 and even in the decade after that, queer people were routinely kicked out of pubs and bars by the police, had no workplace protections and faced oppression in many areas of life.

It was during this time that queer activists created the Gay Liberation Front Manifesto. These radical demands for change influenced society’s understanding of the queer community, and the activists orchestrated disruptive direct actions against the organised right wing. A decade later, in the years following the essential queer organising on the HIV/AIDs crisis, a new phase of solidarity activism began.

The neoliberal economic program of the Thatcher government resulted in the decimation of working class mining communities across the UK. Those who decided to assert their rights as workers by going on strike had to deal with prolonged periods with little to no income, as well as severe repression from the state. It was in this context that a London based group called « Lesbians and Gays Support the Miners » was formed, in solidarity with a Welsh mining
community. The group organised fundraising events and coordinated actions with the miners’ protests. They recognised that they were both on the receiving end of the same state violence, even though both communities had very different priorities, it was a powerful act of solidarity.

In recognition of the tradition of solidarity activism in the queer community, Lesbians and Gays Support the Migrants have applied the learnings from the recent past to the current political context. In the years running up to and after Brexit, migrants have been the scapegoats for the economic and social issues of a country suffering from the implementation of austerity.

**How do you support the migrants? What kind of actions do you undertake?**
We believe in a diversity of tactics, and so there are a variety of ways we aim to support migrants. First, we regularly fundraise for migrant-led groups which are organising for migrant and refugee rights. For instance, our Christmas fundraiser was in support of Refugee Legal Support Athens, that provides legal support to refugees. This was because we recognise that in 2018, we also need to be organising against the border regime of Fortress Europe, and not simply the border crossing the English Channel. Through collecting money in bars, selling merchandise and organising fundraising gigs we’ve raised thousands of pounds for migrant causes.

LGSM sees direct action as essential to supporting migrants and disrupting xenophobic narratives. Detaining asylum seekers in detention centres, and daily involuntary deportations of migrants are acts of slow violence against migrants. To recognise this violence against migrants is to recognise that immediate direct action is required. An industry heavily complicit in the border regime is aviation; by allowing their planes to be used to deport migrants and asylum seekers. These same airline companies spend tens of thousands of pounds each year sponsoring UK Pride events, using queer identities to boost their brand. LGSMigrants mounted a successful campaign against Virgin Atlantic, an airline company that was the top sponsor of London Pride 2018. The airline committed to stop allowing their planes to be used for involuntary deportations. LGSMigrants now has an active campaign to demand competitor airline British Airways to follow suit and has been involved in taking direct action to pressure them into refusing to profit from deportations.

Finally, we also support the work of other collectives such as End Deportations, which works to end the use of charter flights for mass deportations. LGSMigrants stands in solidarity with the Stansted 15, a group of 15 activists who successfully blocked the takeoff of a charter flight which was due to deport over 60 migrants, mainly to Ghana and Nigeria. Eleven of those who were to be deported still had their asylum applications ongoing, and at least two have since been found to have been victims of trafficking. Despite this, the 15 activists have since been
found guilty of terrorism-related offenses. Amnesty International has condemned the result of this trial, as the defenders of human rights defenders have been effectively criminalized. The Standstead 15 will receive the sentences, following the verdict, on the 6th of February, 2019[1].

Any last message or statement you want to share from Lesbians and Gays Support the Migrants?
LGSMigrants calls on queer groups across Europe to use their voice and take action in solidarity with migrants and refugees because nobody is illegal. In the last few decades, queer people have gained new rights and protections, however, we must make a renewed commitment to keep the flame of solidarity alive. The walls of ‘Fortress Europe’ must be torn down.

[1] On Feb 6th, “Judge Christopher Morgan on Wednesday sentenced the so-called “Stansted 15” to 12 community service sentences and three suspended prison terms for their role in the 2017 protest.” They will therefore not face prison time. Read more here or here.
The Caravan of Mothers of Missing Central American Migrants: Resistance and the Quest for Truth and Justice for Missing Migrants

MARTA SANCHEZ
Mesoamerican Migrant Movement

The Caravan of Mothers of Missing Central American Migrants is a cross-border initiative that, for the last 15 years, has strived to locate migrant children who went missing as they weaved their way through Mexico, in the hopes of reaching the United States.

The Mesoamerican Migrant Movement (MMM) is an activist network that has geared its efforts towards accompanying Mexican and Central American migrants along their journey. Activists defined the movement as Mesoamerican because it refers to a broad geographical area that encompasses the space between Aztlan (today known as California) and the countries of the so-called “Northern Triangle” — also known as Central America. The main drive of this activist network and the strategies it applies to attain it can be summarized by a frequently repeated phrase: “All rights, for everybody”. The network also aims to grant visibility to two specific groups of people in Mexico: Mexicans abroad (including the more than 12 million undocumented Mexicans residing in the United States) and Central American migrants located in Mexico. Visibilizing them means that their voice as well as their demands and needs might be acknowledged, and that the eyes of Mexican society and the country’s government might finally open to witness the social and institutional racism these two diasporas are constantly subject to.

The Mesoamerican Migrant Movement emerged when a few of us activists returned to Mexico and took notice of the truly adverse conditions migrants are exposed to in our
country. Hence, we decided to do research into this phenomenon’s roots and magnitude, as well as analyze the level of organization for migration among the home communities. In the year 2006, we undertook a journey following the migratory route that begins in Central America. During this journey, we met a group of mothers from Progreso, Yoro (Honduras) who also travelled this perilous route in search of their children.

That is how our organization teamed up with these mothers who were searching for their missing family members; whom they had not heard from in some time and whose last message had been sent from somewhere in Mexico. And so, we began joining them on their yearly pilgrimage. During the 2008 caravan, we managed to bring about a qualitative change in the impact of these Search Caravans, garnering the attention of national and international media as well as that of Mexican politicians, which allowed us to place the issue of the violation of migrants’ rights front and center in the domestic agenda.

This joint journey alongside the Search Caravans represented a considerable challenge. The caravan led us to establish contact with more than 120 civil society organizations, ensuring that in each of the caravan’s strategic stops we could rely on local hosts. This also constituted a challenge given the political implications of what the mothers’ claim represents: they are demanding that the Mexican government account for their invisibilized children within their domestic missing persons statistics, and that they make an effort to search for them.

The MMM alongside the Caravan of Mothers of Missing Central American Migrants have located almost 300 missing migrants across Mexico. Through this caravan and other actions, the MMM aspires to bring reform within the
sphere of States’ responsibilities when it comes to missing persons, particularly migrants en route to the United States.

The World Summit Of Missing Migrants’ Mothers
On 2 November 2018 women from Algeria, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Morocco, Mauritania, Mexico, Nicaragua, Senegal and Tunisia gathered alongside their allies from Spain, Italy, Mexico and the United States, in order to march into the World Social Forum on Migration held in Mexico City, carrying with them flags from each of their countries as well as pictures of their missing loved ones. “We don’t speak the same language, but we understand each other because we share the same pain”, explained a mother from Senegal. That is how the convergence of these resistance groups gave way to the very first World Summit of Missing Migrants’ Mothers.

This Summit arose from a convergence between the Mesoamerican Migrant Movement (MMM) (link in Spanish), family organizations for migrants who disappeared in Northern Africa and the Carovane Migranti (link in Italian) from Italy. The fundamental goal of this extraordinary joint effort was to congregate the mothers of missing migrants from different parts of the world in order to build a women-led cross-border movement against the forced disappearances of migrants. As well as for the Caravan of Mothers of Missing Central American Migrants, one of the priorities for the Summit was to empower women by bringing to light their stories, experiences and knowledge, positioning them as agents for social change, researchers, detectives and human rights’ defenders.

During the first few days of the Summit, the women shared their testimonies as well as the action and search strategies they employ when searching for missing family members. Representatives from family groups—all in different stages of the organization process—learned and shared together; creating solidarity, broadening their horizons and through it all, building an international social movement. Based on their own experiences, the women shared survival, action, advocacy and support strategies.

Among other topics, Central American women discussed the importance of creating awareness-raising, self-support and collective strength networks among local groups in order to give prominence to their struggle and help other families experiencing similar situations. Women from North and West Africa debated the need to continue pursuing their struggle on two very different but complementary fronts, be it at the local, national or international level: on the one hand, public protests and on the other, the legal route. Mexican families of missing persons shared stories concerning the extraordinary field work they perform while searching for the remains of their family members in unmarked graves.

These exchanges highlighted the fundamental role that women continue to play in the construction of the human infrastructure that is needed in order to confront
governments and demand radical change. They also displayed the strategies used by women to overcome traumatic experiences and organize themselves in order to challenge violence and oppression.

The Summit’s participants came from different countries and backgrounds, but shared the same love for their missing family members; as well as the same pain and anger towards the unjust conditions that have led thousands of people to run away from their homes and disappear along the migratory path. All mothers who congregated at the Summit came from countries that have been ravaged by colonialism; the effects of which are still felt today under the guise of neoliberalism. Although often identified as merely victims of security and criminalization policies, migrants and their families are in fact agents of social transformation (link in Spanish), because they challenge geographical boundaries and bring visibility to the very structural violence that chases millions of people away from their homes and that others encounter in-transit.¹ Echoing the slogan repeated by the Latin American families of missing persons (“They took them alive, we want them back alive”), the families of missing migrants from all over the world continue to clamor for the safe return of their family members. The collective organization of migrants and the caravans of mothers of missing migrants embody an alternative to the death policies that predominate States’ responses and actions towards the phenomenon of migration.

To conclude the Summit, the women drafted a collective manifesto (link in Spanish) and a list of concrete actions that laid the foundation for the creation of a Global Network of Mothers of Missing Migrants. The most radical demands issued by the mothers of missing migrants are geared towards the prevention of further disappearances. The document that outlines the actions of the Global Network of Mothers stipulates that their goal is to fight against the dehumanization of migrants in order to prevent further disappearances and create a peaceful world. It demands the acknowledgement of migrants’ humanity as well as recognition for the undeniable value of their lives and for the lamentable loss of human lives.² The prevention of dehumanization, in turn, requires a fundamental change in the symbolic and economic systems that render certain populations, including migrants, particularly vulnerable. It clamors against militarization campaigns and security policies that use the death and disappearance of migrants as “deterrence” (link in Spanish).

The Caravan of Mothers of Missing Migrants already employ strategies to attain this very goal. Through the display of photographs of their missing loved ones in highly-frequented public squares throughout Mexico and Europe, the women raise

¹ See also: Varela Huerta, Amarela. 2017. “La trinidad perversa de la que huyen las fugitivas centroamericanas: violencia feminicida, violencia de estado y violencia de mercado.” Debate Feminista. 53: 1-17. https://www.academia.edu/32924525/La_trinidad_perversa_de_la_que_huyen_las_fugitivas_centroamericanas_violencia_feminicida_violencia_de_estado_y_violencia_de_mercado

awareness about much more than just the number of missing migrants; but about their humanity and the suffering that their disappearance has caused. During press conferences and interviews, the mothers retell the story of their family members, identifying them as people who matter, who are worthy of being protected and searched for. The demand for truth and justice is the cornerstone of their struggle: they demand to know what happened to their family members and place the responsibility for the suffering of migrants and their family members squarely on the government.

The prevention of disappearances also requires a fundamental change in the material conditions that force people to flee their communities. The mothers’ manifesto highlights all human beings’ right to migrate, but also to not migrate; hence denoting worry for the youth in their communities as well as for future generations, who they believe should have the choice to decide whether to remain in their homes in decent and safe conditions, or to look for opportunities elsewhere. The mothers call us to value the lives of indigenous peoples, of peasants, of women and diverse populations, so that we may build new economies that benefit all.

The mothers’ struggle extends far past the individual struggle to focus squarely on the fundamental human right to life with dignity, allowing all to lead their lives in fullness. They are agents for social change who demand close attention be paid to the causes of forced displacement, while at the same time they dream of a brighter future, free of disappeared loved ones. The mothers concluded their first manifesto this way, rejecting the current policy of death and envisioning other alternatives that may grant a fulfilling life for all:

To Migrate is a Right. To not migrate also is. Hence, we place the blame for the suffering that has convened us at this Summit on the States of the world, and we claim the right for men and women to live in dignity, no matter which country they reside in. The caravans of mothers searching for their sons and daughters, do not just embody a response to the States’ inability to carry out this search; the caravans are, in and of themselves, a way to search for people and at the same time, demand truth and justice, create other possible worlds which are directly opposed to one ruled by “geographical terror”.

We are the mothers of the world and its strong and unstoppable ally. We have replaced our tears with mobilization and hope, until we are reunited with our sons and daughters. Our struggle is sustained by an unwavering love, one which attempts to create another world in which everybody shares their resources with kindness, sowing life instead of death.³

Aboriginal Passport Ceremonies and Asylum Seekers and Refugees

JOSEPH PUGLIESE
Academic-activist, Department of Media, Music, Communication and Cultural Studies, Macquarie University, Sydney.

WARNING: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander readers are warned that the following article contains images of deceased persons.

In the course of 2012, the late Uncle Ray Jackson, President of the Indigenous Social Justice Association (ISJA), working with an Indigenous and non-Indigenous collective, worked to realise the first Aboriginal Passport Ceremony, which took place on 15 September 2012, at The Settlement, Redfern - a suburb just outside Sydney’s CBD that has long been one of the epicentres of Indigenous activism in the Australian context. A second Aboriginal Passport Ceremony was also staged at The Settlement, Redfern, on 13 September 2014.

In this article, I discuss the range of meanings that these ceremonies generated. Uncle Ray Jackson, in the context of these ceremonies, effectively generated the Indigenous resignification of the very technology – the passport – deployed by the settler-colonial Australian state in order to consolidate and reproduce the ongoing usurpation (as a state-sanctioned form of theft) of Indigenous sovereignty. Precisely by resignifying the passport as an Aboriginal artefact, crucial in legitimating non-Indigenous people’s movement through Australia’s Aboriginal Nations, the ceremonies at once marked Aboriginal people’s unceded and unextinguished sovereignty over Country and their right to offer welcome and hospitality within their own lands. It is in this context that it is relevant to examine the critical intersection of the settler-colonial state’s violent treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, the ongoing assertion of Aboriginal sovereignty and the possibility of justice.
Uncle Ray Jackson describes the aims of the Aboriginal Passport ceremony thus: ‘the issuing of the Passports covers two areas of interactions between the Traditional Owners of the Lands and migrants, asylum seekers and other non-Aboriginal citizens in this country. Whilst they acknowledge our rights to all the Aboriginal Nations of Australia we reciprocate by welcoming them into our Nations’ (ISJA Media Release 2012). In the course of the ceremony, non-Indigenous Australians were required to purchase an Aboriginal passport and to pledge a formal acknowledgment of unceded Aboriginal sovereignty over the various Indigenous Nations that cover the Australian continent (figure 1), an effective act of decolonisation that refused the illegitimate authority of the settler state.

Following the Australian government’s deployment of the so-called ‘Pacific Solution’ (2001-2007), which entailed the excision of large parts of the continent and its islands from the migration zone, all asylum seekers who arrived by boat were precluded from making landfall on Australian soil and were intercepted by Australian Customs and Border Protection authorities and the Australian Defence Force and then forcibly removed to islands in the Pacific such as Nauru and Manus. The ‘Pacific Solution,’ in other words, entailed the establishment of a neo-colonial gulag of immigration prisons. The prisons are characterised by squalid and unsanitary conditions, with lack of adequate medical care.

In forcibly dispatching asylum seekers arriving to Australia by boat to either Manus or Nauru, the Australian Government is abrogating its responsibility towards asylum seekers and refugees (it has both signed and ratified the UN Convention on Refugees). By placing them in isolated offshore camps where their
lives are at risk and by denying them the possibility of ever entering Australia, the Australian government is instrumentalising asylum seekers and refugees into ‘weapons of deterrence,’ that is, they are made to stand as abject examples for all prospective asylum seekers and refugees not to attempt to make the journey to Australia. This is something that is examined in acute detail by the academic-activist project: *Deathscapes: Mapping Race and Violence in Settler States*.

A number of Indigenous scholars, artists and activists have brought into focus the connection between Australia’s violent border control policies, its immigration detention regime and the ongoing usurpation of Indigenous sovereignty (for example, Birch 2000, Jackson 2011, Bell 2014). Put simply, there can be no claims to statehood unless one has control over one’s borders. As the Australian settler state is founded on a violent act of colonisation on unceded Indigenous lands, its violent border policies must be seen as a way of consolidating its illegitimate rule over Indigenous lands and of thereby buttressing its claims as a legitimate and independent nation-state.

**The ceremony and the flag-draped empty chair**

With the first Aboriginal Passport Ceremony, Uncle Ray Jackson not only issued passports to a number of asylum seekers and refugees, but he also proceeded to acknowledge, in a profoundly moving gesture, the absent asylum seekers and refugees who could not attend the ceremony because they were locked up in Australia’s immigration prisons or because they had died within those prisons. He placed centre stage an empty chair over which was draped the Aboriginal flag (figure 2).

In this context, a domestic piece of furniture became charged with a complex range of significations. It was at once a quotidian piece of furniture and a loaded symbol of both usurped and unextinguished Aboriginal sovereignty. The Aboriginal flag-draped chair is a symbol of usurped Aboriginal sovereignty precisely because the law of the settler-colonial state has overridden Indigenous law and continues to imprison asylum seekers. At the same time, the chair is also a powerful symbol of unextinguished Aboriginal sovereignty as, in the face
of this ongoing settler-colonial violence, Uncle Ray Jackson proceeded to offer welcome to Australia’s refugees and asylum seekers in the face of their incarceration by the Australian state. Of course, it is important to highlight that in no way is there any intention to configure some sort of homogenised Indigenous response to asylum seekers and refugees. This is something that Uncle Ray Jackson (2011) clearly underscores in all of his position statements on refugees and asylum seekers. He writes, for example, that:

I realise, of course, that other Aborigines may have different views to mine and, of course, that is their right. But I will state most strongly in their defence that these refugees did not invade us, they did not steal our lands, they did not suppress our culture and language, they did not commit genocide, they did not steal our children, they did not steal our wages, they did not steal our human rights as a first people to exist and to grow. The parliament of the invaders have done that and more. Again, I say to the asylum seekers, you are welcome to our lands.

The Aboriginal flag transforms the chair into a political symbol that gestures to the preclusion of Aboriginal people from the seat of governmental power and the attendant right to decide who can or cannot enter their Aboriginal Nations. In an open letter to Kevin Rudd, then Australia’s Prime Minister, Uncle Ray Jackson (2013) writes in order to vent his outrage at the government’s violent immigration policies and then proceeds to say that:

I am further insulted and denigrated that you Politicians even believe you have any moral right to say who can and who cannot come to this country, to the Aboriginal Lands of the Aboriginal Nations. Always was, always will be Aboriginal Land. Your disgusting premise is built on theft and Genocide so perhaps it should not come as too much of a surprise that you wish to force it upon others outside of your ethnic and religious kind.

In addition to these political meanings, an Aboriginal flag-draped vacant chair generates a number of funereal meanings. The flag represents a type of shroud that marks the absent-presence of those killed by the Australian government’s exercise of state violence through its carceral apparatus. In this context, it also evokes those other settler-colonial state deaths: Aboriginal deaths in custody that now number in the hundreds (for the documentation and analysis of both Indigenous deaths in custody and asylum seeker and refugee deaths in custody and at the border see Deathscapes).

The flag-draped chair, covered with its funereal shroud, evokes the names of the refugees who have died in Australia’s onshore or offshore sites of detention and who could not attend this ceremony, including: Habib Wahedy, Mehmet al Assad, Alamdar Kakthiari, Adeeb Kamal Al-Deen, Hassan Sabbagh, Josefa
Rauluni, Reza Barati, Ahmad al-Akabi, Hamid Kehazaei, Leo Seemanpillai and all the other named and unnamed asylum seekers who, in the Australian context, have died in the process of claiming asylum. It is important to name these dead in order to disrupt the Australian government’s imposition of a regime of censorship and secrecy that renders the suffering and loss that transpires daily within Australia’s immigration prisons as both disembodied and anonymous.

The funereal dimensions evoked by the flag-draped chair were movingly embodied in Uncle Ray Jackson’s (2014) conferring of a posthumous Aboriginal passport, during the 2014 ceremony, to the family of Hamid Kehazaei, a refugee who died due to lack of proper medical care on Manus:

after consultations with the family of hamid kehazaei, agreement has been made to give his family an aboriginal passport, in his name, to honour both their son and their decision to donate his organs to australian citizens. this magnificent gesture by his family totally shames the foul abbott government and, especially, his disgraceful and shameful minister for incarcerating innocent asylum seekers in this country. (Lower case in the original)

The Aboriginal Passport Ceremonies evoked and politically resignified and reclaimed the citizenship ceremonies that are held annually across Australia in order to confer citizenship on non-native subjects (figure 3). These are ceremonies that labour to confirm the unresolved illegitimacy of the settler-colonial state precisely by enacting and reproducing the ongoing governmental expropriation and effacement of Aboriginal sovereignty through acts of ‘naturalisation’ that work symbolically to nativise, and thereby occlude, the outsider and illegitimate status of the subject of the settler-colonial state engaged in acts of conferring citizenship.
Aboriginal sovereignty and hospitality in the face of racialised violence

The Aboriginal Passport ceremonies call into question the legitimacy of the Australian state, even as they enunciate an Indigenous call for justice. A number of Aboriginal activists and writers have addressed this issue of Indigenous sovereignty in relation to the offer of hospitality to asylum seekers and refugees. Tony Birch (2000: 21-2), in his analysis of the regime of terror inflicted upon Australia’s imprisoned refugees and asylum seekers, argues that, as Aboriginal people:

we must also assert moral authority and ownership of this country. Our legitimacy does not lie within the legal system and is not dependent on state recognition. It lies within ourselves... We need to claim our rights, beyond being stuck in an argument about the dominant culture’s view of land rights or identity. And we need to claim and legitimate our authority by speaking out for, and protecting the rights of others, who live in, or visit our country.

Citing this same passage in her analysis of the relation between Aboriginal sovereignty and the question of welcome for refugees and asylum seekers, Suvendrini Perera (2009: 63) underscores the cluster of issues that are at stake in this assertion: ‘To assume the role of host is to claim and enact ownership of the land. But Indigenous people, while retaining moral authority over the land, also share with asylum seekers experiences of being physically dislocated and dispossessed.’ Birch’s ethical exhortation offers the possibility to begin to envisage a future in which a different dynamic determines the outcome and fate of those seeking asylum in Australia.

The contemporary Aboriginal artist, Richard Bell (2014), in a public lecture, has staged a scathing indictment of Australia’s brutal refugee policy, calling it an ‘unspeakable abomination.’ In his talk, Bell (2014) articulated his strong commitment to a multi-ethnic Australia in opposition to the manner in which a type of white Australia Policy is being redeployed in the context of the exclusion of refugees and asylum seekers arriving by boat – all people of colour, in contradistinction to the white overstayers who come into Australia by plane and who rarely ever get sent to immigration detention prisons.

In his public lecture, Bell affirmed the critical role that a number of Greek, Lebanese and Italian migrants played in breaching the apartheid practices in his native town of Charleville, Queensland. Bell (2014) remarked how non-Anglo migrants, who established milk bars, fish and chip shops and grocery stores, refused to exclude Aboriginal people from their shops and proceeded to serve them, thereby overturning the unwritten racist laws that had systematically discriminated against Aboriginal people in his town. In a personal conversa-
tion, he also outlined how he had taken on board the welfare of a young Tamil refugee who had recently been released from Australia’s immigration prisons. Unemployed and penniless, the young Tamil refugee was going from door-to-door selling the only commodity he could produce: hand-made drawings. He knocked on the door of Bell’s studio asking him if he would like to buy a drawing. Bell asked him if he could paint and then proceeded to take him in and to pay him a stipend as an assistant. Bell made clear in the course of his public talk, and in private conversation with me, that Aboriginal people have never ceded their sovereignty and that they were beholden to exercise their sovereignty as a way of marking their emancipation from Australia’s white settler-colonial regime and as a way of materialising their self-determination.

Conclusion
Following in the wake of Birch’s exhortation, an Aboriginal Summit was held in January and February 2010 in the Australian Capital Territory, titled the New Way Forward for Aboriginal People. One of the participants, Uncle Ray Jackson, has been at the forefront of interlinking the reinstatement of Aboriginal sovereignty with the issue of non-Indigenous Australia’s treatment of refugees and asylum seekers. He has offered his official welcome to refugees and asylum seekers during his visits to immigration detention prisons, while also drawing attention to the structural, if differential, relations between Aboriginal deaths in custody and refugee deaths in the immigration prisons. Jackson (n.d.), in his discussion of the aims of this Indigenous Summit, declares that the time has come:

for our people to take full control of our own every day affairs. These include our Sovereignty within our own Traditional Nations and Australian Government Treaties with those Nations that want them … We must operate and manage all of our Resources on our own Lands, Waterways and Seas. We must operate our own civil and social structures within our independent Nations as decided by the members of each Nation. In fact, a return to the Traditional practices and procedures of the pre-invasion times but modernised as decided by each Nation. We must take full responsibility for our own Law, Lore and Culture, each within their own borders.

In this statement, Uncle Ray Jackson interrogates the legitimacy of settler-colonial law, precisely as he underscores his assertion of unextinguished Aboriginal sovereignty.

Settler-colonial Australia’s immigration policy is inextricably tied to the unresolved issue of unextinguished Aboriginal sovereignty and the illegal occupation of the continent and its islands. This political nexus is incisively illuminated by

Uncle Ray Jackson’s (2013) concluding statement in his letter to former Prime Minister Rudd on Australia’s treatment of refugees and asylum seekers. Through his exercise of Indigenous sovereignty, he enunciates what he terms an ‘Act of State’ in offering welcome and hospitality to refugees and asylum seekers, simultaneously as he enacts the instantiation of Indigenous justice – precisely as practice:

We have one very clear and simple message to give to ‘our representatives’ in Canberra and that is to loudly confirm that Refugees are welcome here. From whence ever they come.

You Parliamentarians do not speak in my name!

FOR KOORI JUSTICE

Ray Jackson
President, Indigenous Social Justice Association
(Jackson 2013)

Acknowledgements
The photos of Uncle Ray Jackson were reproduced with kind permission of Carolyne Jackson. This is a modified version of the original essay, ‘Geopolitics of Aboriginal Sovereignty: Colonial Law as a “Species of Excess of Its Own Authority,” Aboriginal Passport Ceremonies and Asylum Seekers,’ first published in Law Text Culture, vol. 19, 2015: 84-115. It has been reproduced with kind permission of Marett Leiboff, Managing Editor, Law Text Culture.

REFERENCES
- Bell R 2014 ‘Public Lecture 8: Richard Bell’ University of Technology Sydney 28 April.
- Jackson R 2014 ‘hamid kehazaei family to receive aboriginal passport [lower case in the original]’ email to ISJA list 9 September.
B. IMAGINING ANOTHER WORLD?
The alter-globalisation movement draws in many ways on the principles of internationalism – a political movement and philosophy grounded in the belief that humanity’s common interests should transcend nationalism and puts forward the idea of an international regime that goes beyond States and their borders.

The First International was an organisation founded in 1864 and played a key role in defining the workers’ movement and upholding it as a strategic social movement of the time. Proletarian internationalism sought to build unity between workers (labourers, farmers, employees, wage earners, people in unstable situations, the unemployed, etc.). It is based on an analysis of the social class system and seeks to build the working class into an organised politically-conscious group. The class struggle is not simply a confrontation between the working class and the bourgeoisie; today all social classes bar the ruling class fall into this category. The internationalist community emphasise the idea that the emancipation of the working classes will lead to the emancipation of all the world’s societies.

Instrumental in building an alliance between anti-colonial independence movements and workers’ movements, internationalism has also played a decisive role in the decolonisation process. National struggles, both historically permanent and ever-changing, cannot be reduced to the nationalist ideology. In the history of internationalism, there have been many debates over the difference between nationalism and patriotism, as exemplified by Jaurès. A quote comes to mind: “The middle class is cosmopolitan and nationalistic; the working class is internationalist and patriotic.” The sort of nationalism brandished by States is one where the interests of the ruling class (national or global bourgeoisie) take precedence and the class conflicts at play within a society are swept under the carpet. Internationalism emphasises the importance of the class struggle and its international dimension.

Globalisation was always founded on capitalism; and capitalism has always been a global phenomenon. The current phase of capitalist globalisation – neoliberalism – is undergoing a social, ecological and geopolitical crisis. And the response to this crisis has been “austeritarian”, a combination of authoritarian and austerity, policies, which triggered widespread violence and conflict. At the same time, almost as a response to unbridled global capitalism, we are witnessing the emergence of more and more nationalistic, xenophobic and security-obsessed ideologies, with migrants being used as a convenient scapegoat. In order to combat this situation, the alter-globalisation movement is taking an internationalist approach which is oriented towards a world revolution.
PART III RESISTANCES AND ALTERNATIVES TO BORDERS

Internationalism rejects nationalism and the idea that national identity should overshadow all other forms of identity. Internationalism initially claimed that social class was the most significant, or even predominant, form of political identity. But over time it acknowledged the importance of communities and of the sense of belonging to groups which can’t be defined by the social class structure, even if this structure remains crucial. The late 20th century brought diverse movements (feminism, LGBT, ecology, anti-racism, “decolonial”) to the fore. These drew attention to the importance of intersectionality, which highlights how social issues of class, gender and race are interconnected. Internationalism thus underwent a process of reinvention over this period. This required thinking through a number of issues (some of which had been around since the beginning), opening up new horizons and reinventing internationalism.

Actual historical events also reflect movements of ideas. We can’t separate the First International from the Paris Commune in 1871, from the radical municipalism of Petrograd in 1917, Hamburg in 1923 or Barcelona in 1937. Resistance to capitalist globalisation are expressed as national movements and emphasise the contradiction of states, both subservient to economic capitalism and equipped to challenge it. Globalisation has adapted to different geographical and cultural regions. Borders no longer only demarcate different States, but also different regions. The very concept of the border requires rethinking because, within regions, it cuts across communities, groups and even categories of thought. Borders may separate people but they also represent a meeting point, much in the same way that a street in a neighbourhood may be a place where one encounters others, or it may a be a place where one avoids this encounter. The choice is a political one: build indestructible walls or tear these down and replace them with bridges.

International solidarity draws on the principles of internationalism. International law should strive to reinvent sovereignty, basing it on the rights of peoples. International solidarity emphasises the notion of peoples, defined by the struggles they have undertaken over the course of history, as well as the complex system of class, communities, nations and States that has shaped them. International solidarity involves a three-pronged approach: solidarity between oppressed peoples in order challenge the dominant powers, solidarity between all the world’s peoples in order to overthrow the dominant system, and solidarity in developing and inventing a new form of internationalism in the era of globalisation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:
• Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Classe, Ed. La Découverte, 2007.
Freedom of Movement: Value or Strategy?

ANTOINE PÉCOUD
Sociology professor, Université Paris 13

Introduction

In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia marked the end of the Thirty Years’ War, which had torn Europe apart, and the beginning of the international system of sovereign States. The previous political system involved complex, interdependent relationships and power struggles between different authorities situated on different rungs of the hierarchy (central authority, local lords), whereas the so-called Westphalian State had absolute power over its territory and in return agreed not to interfere in the affairs of neighbouring States.

The world thus consisted of a series of clearly-defined States separated by distinct borders. And these borders not only separated areas of land but also the people that lived on these lands. Each State had exclusive sovereignty over “its” piece of land and “its” population; a section of land couldn’t belong to two States at once, and neither could a population. Yet people, unlike towns, fields and mountains, are mobile. This mobility raises a number of practical, political and philosophical questions: How should State citizens be treated when they are not at “home”? Can we belong to several States at once?

In this discussion, “freedom of movement” refers to the principle that human beings have the right to travel from one State to another without being constrained by the link that ties them to one specific State. This is different to “freedom of residence” although the distinction is a subtle one. It really comes down to the length of one’s stay. A foreigner may move freely from place to place but only within a certain period of time unless he/she obtains the right to reside in a certain country. So tourists, businesspeople and students are welcome as long as they leave again. In some cases, there is no restriction on the amount of time that a foreigner stays provided they retain the status of an outsider (diplomats,
expatriates and retirees for example). Only settling permanently in this country – or becoming a resident of it – would allow them to no longer be an “outsider”.

**Freedom of movement as a value**

Two rights are enshrined under Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The first is that “everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State.” And: “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.” Thus a distinction is made between the national and the international: freedom of movement is a right within a country but not between countries. In terms of international travel, however, leaving the country is recognised as a human right but entering another country is not. This falls under the sovereignty of each State.

This isn’t entirely logical. We might imagine a scenario where someone is given the right to leave their country but is unable to exercise this right because they haven’t been given permission to enter another country. In the event that leaving the country is an absolute necessity, the right to asylum is a way to get around this obstacle, guaranteeing refugees access into another country as well as the principle of non-refoulement. But one has the right to leave a country even when there is no necessity: an individual doesn’t have to justify their choice to leave. The right to leave should therefore go hand in hand with some kind of minimal right of entry.

For others, however, particularly proponents of “communitarianism”, the fact that leaving and entering have differentiated values is justified because these
two actions are “morally asymmetric” (Walzer 1997). The right to emigrate is fundamental to the rule of law because it gives individuals the choice to leave, without which the relationship between the ruler and the ruled would be forced and therefore illegitimate. The right to emigrate is thus a condition of democracy. The same cannot be said for the right to immigrate, which is more peripheral to the rule of law. It could even be said that such a right could pose a threat to democracy as it could potentially undermine the integrity of societies and values upheld by nations (identity, cohesion, social solidarity as expressed by the welfare state).

This issue is particularly critical in our democratic modernity, which is based on a quest for ever greater individual freedoms. This is how discrimination, whether based on gender, race, religious or sexual orientation, has become unacceptable. And yet we accept the idea that one has to hold a certain passport or be born in a certain place in order to cross the border. If the features with which a person is born (skin colour, gender, etc.) should not affect how they are treated, then nor should their place of birth or their nationality (factors which are also out of their control) affect their ability to travel or settle in another country (Carens 2013).

**Freedom of movement as a means**

In addition to this ethical debate is the question of strategy, in which freedom of movement is not so much a value but rather a means. The Westphalian State is indeed built on clearly-defined borders, but its wealth comes from an economy that transcends these borders, and which requires that goods, capital – and individuals – can move freely. Freedom of movement in this case therefore serves a utilitarian purpose. According to neo-classical economics, the mobility of individuals is the only way to ensure a perfect mobility of labour, which should not be regulated by the State but by the market. Even without going to this extreme, freedom of movement could be justified not so much as a value representing the freedom and equality of all human beings, but rather as an economic strategy. This suggests that, just as governments are free to end free trade policies if they deem they are not producing the desired effect, so could they decide to take away the right to travel.

In terms of public policies, States often use both sides of the argument: tackling climate change is, for example, a moral obligation (out of respect for the environment and for the sake of future generations) and an economic necessity (in order to avoid the costs of climate change). Assistance is provided to the poor both for moral reasons and also because it encourages social cohesion, productivity, public health, etc. And yet there is obvious tension around these two conceptions of freedom of movement: if it is a value based on fundamental principles, it should be respected regardless of the practical consequences. If it is a strategy, however, it only has meaning if it improves the economy.
Contradictions and inconsistencies between the regional and international systems

Free movement of individuals between countries in a given area constitutes a political objective in many areas of the world. The European Union (EU) is the best-known example, but there are a number of others: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been striving since the 1970s to establish an area of free movement for the citizens of its Member States. In South America, the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) has more or less the same objectives. On the other hand, Canada, the United States and Mexico are united under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) but separated (the USA and Mexico at least) by one of the world’s most militarised borders (Nita et al. 2017). These different cases illustrate the complexity of the dynamics at work in establishing freedom of movement.

This is partly due to the fact that individuals have a supranational identity. Without going into the global dimension that makes them citizens of the world, processes of regional integration recognise that the identity of residents of a certain region is not only based on their connection to the State, but also on a kind of collective identity – which forms the basis for collective citizenship. But the other side to this argument is that it is a strategic move to facilitate travel for individuals who play a key role in the region’s economic development.

In Europe, for example, initially it was only those workers who could secure a job in the destination country that were granted freedom of movement. The goal was to promote growth by allowing companies to hire workers across the EU’s six founding countries. It was only later that the right to move freely between EU States was progressively extended to all citizens (workers’ families, the unemployed, the inactive, retirees, etc.). In some areas, this vision of freedom of movement as an economic tool meant that it was “tailored” to certain categories of people. NAFTA, for instance, made it easier for investors, entrepreneurs, and corporate employees to move freely between countries included in the agreement. Movement is only “free”, therefore, for those who play a role in the region’s economic integration, a category that is extremely selective as it only concerns individuals that are qualified and “business-oriented”. In cases such as these, regional integration is primarily focussed on free trade. People may only move around freely when it benefits free trade.

Although there are questions around freedom of movement at regional level, there has been no attempt to address international concerns. The UN, although not unambitious when it comes to achieving peace, eradicating poverty and protecting human rights, never addresses the issue of freedom of movement – even as an unattainable ideal that is nevertheless relevant both morally and politically. This is highlighted by the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, adopted by the UN in December 2018, which “reaffirms the sovereign right of
States to determine their national migration policy and their prerogative to govern migration within their jurisdiction”. There is not even a minimal level of consensus on freedom of movement at international level. This inconsistency between the regional and global is problematic: a goal that is valid at regional level should also be valid at international level. It is difficult to understand why what is acknowledged as being beneficial at regional level is out of the question at global level.

There are generally two arguments behind restricting freedom of movement to only regional travel. The first concerns the amount of migratory flows within regional zones. It is true that, contrary to certain depictions of migration as an invasion of the “West” by the “East”, a significant amount (the majority even) of migratory journeys are between neighbouring countries within the same region. From this point of view, regional freedom of movement enables many migrants to move to other countries as long as these countries are located within their region. Although this appears to make sense, this viewpoint overlooks the connection between regional and inter-regional migration and the repercussions that the former have on the latter. “Regional” and “inter-regional” travel should not be relegated to different categories, as empirical research has highlighted how these journeys are cumulative: one migrates from a rural area to the city, from the city to a neighbouring country, and from this country to another region – in a process that may be spread out over more than a generation. In addition, when people are allowed to move freely within a regional area but not allowed to move between two regions, it automatically increases the tension around the line that separates two regions.

The second argument concerns the socio-economic dimension. Although migratory flows between the Global South and the Global North involve countries that are on the opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of development, this is not the case when it comes to countries located within the same region, which should reduce migration pressures and therefore alleviate governments’ fears that opening borders would result in a “swarm” of migrants entering the country. It should be noted, however, that there are differences in terms of development, which affect regional migratory flows as well. Although these are obviously not as stark as differences between different regions, they are nonetheless significant. In Africa, many people migrate to countries such as South Africa and Nigeria to find work. Similarly, in Europe, inequalities between EU Member States have prompted transitional periods where restrictions on freedom of movement were imposed in order to allow the countries concerned to “catch up” economically (this was the case of Spain and Portugal in the eighties and is currently the situation in Bulgaria and Romania).

**Conclusion: freedom of movement, equality and solidarity**
The ethical argument advocating freedom of movement for all is one of equality. It assumes that mobility is correlated to opportunities that all human beings should be able to access regardless of where they were born or what passport they hold.
In a highly inegalitarian world, it appears that it is indeed only mobility that frees individuals from having their fate determined by the place they were born. In this light, border control seems to be a self-centred strategy to prevent many of the world’s citizens from accessing the wealth that, due to various historical events which were not necessarily fair, ended up in certain regions of the world instead of others. Given this situation, there are three approaches we could take to close the gap between freedom of movement and equality of opportunity.

The first consists of putting aside the issue of free movement and instead focusing on redistributing the world’s wealth. This is the standard approach to development as an alternative to migration: instead of allowing inhabitants of disadvantaged regions to move elsewhere, wealth is transferred to these regions. This argument has some basis from a moral viewpoint. If everyone in the world had access to the same opportunities no matter where they lived, and didn’t have to leave these countries, we might consider that freedom of movement was not necessary in terms of equality. The problem, however, is that this option is obviously unrealistic, and even if it were a long-term strategy, it would offer no immediate solution. In addition, this argument overlooks the geopolitical and economic structure of the world, which for centuries has been based on asymmetric and inegalitarian relations between the world’s regions.

The second option consists of disassociating mobility and opportunity. People are given a certain amount of freedom of movement, but this has no impact upon their fate or their chances. This is, unfortunately, a scenario that exists in the form of guest worker programmes where many migrants leave their home countries to work in jobs where they are exploited. Instead of contesting their subservience, these programmes only serve to perpetuate it. This scenario raises the question how we define the “border”. Discussions on freedom of movement tend to focus on the borders between countries. Yet other borders obviously affect equal opportunities such as legal, social and cultural borders (labour laws, discrimination, racism, etc.). Crossing a border between two countries often means encountering other borders that represent obstacles to migrants’ socio-economic or political mobility. The employment conditions of illegal immigrants illustrates the way in which borders are shifted: migrants have a degree of freedom insofar as they are able to move between countries, but once they arrive in the destination country, they are deprived of a number of rights due to legal, administrative and socio-economic borders.

The third option is the most ambitious and undoubtedly the most attractive from an ethical perspective, but also the most difficult to achieve. It consists of unrestricted mobility while also conserving the solidarity-based relationships and rights on which national communities are built. This looks a bit like a Utopian dream; all forms of solidarity require a community in which this can be expressed. Mobility thus represents a structural obstacle to solidarity and to the
feelings that it invokes (social cohesion, a shared history and identity). Yet there are alternatives: it is no coincidence that the Catholic Church has historically played a key role in offering support and solidarity to migrants based on its universal idea of brotherhood. The current forms of support and solidarity that are burgeoning in the current migration crisis also serve to illustrate that it is not only governments that can offer solidarity and rights: “cities of refuge” for example strive to protect migrants even if this is only limited to local protection as, without any sovereign power, they can’t bestow any legal status.

Freedom of movement thus exists, but “from below”, allowing migrants to slip through the gaps of the sovereign State system and forge a place there. This freedom is achieved not through the State, but against the State, thanks to different actors of civil society (solidarity organisations, Churches and even employers). This may not appear, at first glance, to be real freedom of movement because the State is doing everything it can to stop it. But we should not overlook the fact that new rights rarely come from governments themselves. They are fought for; and it is not unusual that activists fighting for new rights spend a good part of their lives breaking the law, as is the case for many migrants today (as well as those that help them). Freedom of movement that is granted by the State, which serves a utilitarian purpose, is thus both challenged and complemented by informal channels. It is through this dual strategy – and apparent contradiction – that we are seeing the emergence of new forms of action, and new approaches to the State and to solidarity.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Tuareg Nomadism: a World in Motion in a World of Walls

HÉLÈNE CLAUDOT-HAWAD
Anthropologist and Research Director at CNRS

According to a Tuareg myth, humans’ original transgression deprived them of earthly paradise, plunging them into a hostile environment, a wilderness they had to tame in order to survive. In order to come to grips with this blank space, this desert or this “emptiness” (essuf) over which they have no control, they try to mark out the land, to make their own landmarks and to set up shelter. It is by mapping out each path and each step in their nomadic journey that humans clear the unknown universe and give it meaning, order and a sense of direction that makes it intelligible and controllable. “Conquering the emptiness” is to truly recreate the world; to follow cosmic currents, endlessly replacing the human being in the cyclical trajectory plotted out by a universe in motion, of which everything forms a part.

This vision of a world made up of interlocking cycles applies to each level of reality: it represents the physical or symbolic anatomy of the body, of the human being, of society and of the land. The relationship Nomadic communities have with the geographical, physical or human environment is defined by this cosmological interpretation of the universe. So the way in which the Tuareg structure their land or their societies is similar to the structure of the human body or a tent, held up by several poles – each limb or each pole represents both a separate entity and a part of a whole, both designed in the same way.

All social units, from the smallest (the encampment) to the biggest (society as a whole) are connected to an area of land, which sit within a larger area of land, which the social unit has prioritised (although not exclusive) access to. The resources available

[1] This article comprises two excerpts from “L’oubli du désert. Regard nomade sur la modernité territoriale”, published in Ethnies Documents, 1999, pp.73-86. <halshs-00748910>
are mostly pasturelands, natural or artificial water sources (springs, ponds, catch basins, gueltas, wells), game, wood and products that may be picked and gathered. These goods can’t be individually appropriated. They are managed by arbitrating leaders who take responsibility for managing the land and its resources, taking neighbouring communities into account as well as liaising with authorities higher up in the hierarchy. The place where two areas of land meet is of great importance: these are the hinge lines where wells, markets and caravan routes are located.

From this angle, the nomadic trajectory is a way to connect and foster dialogue between these two mutually-dependent sides of the world, which are opposing but complementary. The two sides representing the untamed and the tamed space, the desert and the tent, the unknown and the known, otherness and identity...

The notion of territory is defined by the land travelled, ordered and managed; the places where humankind has left its footprint. There is no exclusive appropriation over this space, there is an open approach to it because it represents a junction where paths cross, and where the world of nature and world of culture is under constant negotiation.

Reciprocity is integral to this conception of the universe – whether in the abstract or the concrete sense – and whether it comes in the form of a philosophy, a superstition, a feeling or a practice. Without sharing and exchanging what is the same and what is different, no kind of existence is possible.
The land which a nomad may travel through and use (within the pastoral system which defines conditions of use of nature’s resources) includes not only their usual routes, but all the land of tribal confederations or Tuareg society as a whole, and even extends as far as the whole world. Because once statutory beneficiaries have taken what they are entitled to from the land during the dry season, nothing should prevent people and their herds from moving. This conception fits with the Tuareg’s cosmogonic vision of a universe in motion. The elements, human beings, animals, plants, things and particles are all part of a cycle whose end marks the beginning of a new cycle, until they merge in cosmic currents. Anything that prevents a nomad from continuing their journey in recreating the motion of the universe is a threat to this world. Nomadism appears as a “natural” need, both eternal and universal, enshrined in the cosmic laws. Following one’s path “on the back of the earth” throughout the seasons is, for the nomad, a basic, almost biological need, as humanity itself forms an integral part of the cosmic whole. If a nomad is prevented from fulfilling their purpose in life, there is nothing left for them to do but die.

If breaking grazing rules and disrespecting the nomadic approach to land violates the rights of people, then preventing free movement and imposing an immobile, sedentary existence upon them represents a threat to the entire universe. How can borders that enclose, fences that imprison, barriers that obstruct be viewed as useful over the long-term? What is the purpose of Nation-states and their fenced-off areas of land, their sealed-off, rigid borderlines that cut through valleys, families and trajectories?

In terms of the biological, ecological and ideological preservation of nomadic social life, the basic rights of the nomadic community can be defined as freedom of movement following the cycle of the universe, in accordance with established rules such as the pastoral system, which has its own economic logic.

The land on which we walk, like the air or the water, is an integral element of our existence that cannot be individually sectioned off and carved up. Managing it properly is always a collective responsibility safeguarded by the elected representatives that represent the different levels of a society.

In both regulations on land management as well as in other spheres of social existence, this vision of a universe that is perpetually in motion is undermined by rules that immobilise living beings, things and goods. The idea of private property whereby land and property are permanently divided and alienated, runs counter to a vision of the world where capital is indivisible and rights of use are temporary. A human being’s existence is linked to that of their “tent”, a concept that applies to the different circles to which he/she is connected, from the inner circle (close and extended family) to the outer circles (Tuareg society
and humanity). Without any land or herd, a tent cannot ensure one’s survival. And without a tent, without shelter, the human being is at risk of extinction. In order to avoid this fate, the role of those responsible is to protect the goods which will ensure the survival of their lineage, their tribe, their confederation and their society as a whole. This collective capital, which is by and large passed down through the female line, can’t be alienated or divided, thereby guaranteeing the existence of the tent, which provides food and shelter. Each time that a statutory beneficiary becomes independent, they are lent a share of this good, thus ensuring their survival. It is true of the land as of other goods. So a provision of livestock is assigned to a newly-wed woman as well as to any recently-freed dependants because in both cases they establish a new “tent”. When the recipient of this share disappears, his/her share will go back into the pool of indivisible collective goods that is managed by the mother-tent. All social rules concerning the assignment and delegation of human beings, goods, rights and powers follow the same logic.

From a theoretical viewpoint, each area of land, each good and each tent are all components which together form a vast structure which gives them their meaning. Each level in the structure is identical. Thus a small area of land is organised in the same way as the larger areas of land belonging to a tribe, a confederation or a federation. The tent which provides shelter for a family unit is built in the same way as the “symbolic” tent of the extended matrilineal family. The undivided property of brothers and sisters are managed in the same way as the undivided property of a confederation; and the same way humanity’s common heritage is.

By breaking away from the laws of nature, the modern State is in fact showing cruelty towards the nomadic community. Its actions only reveal the extent to which the cycle of humanity is misaligned with the cycle of the universe, which will eventually lead to the world’s dissolution and the extinction of life.

How can we overcome the helplessness and “disorientation” (taqenéghaf) that the harm inflicted upon the earth has given rise to? Some therapies used in Tuareg countries illustrate particularly well the idea of the homological relationship, deeply internalised, between the human body and the body of the earth. Thus one of the techniques used to cure the soul and the body of miseries caused by the modern order consists of reeling off a frenzied litany of places, hills, wells and the first steps in the nomadic journey in order to reconnect, through words, the dislocated organs of the sick body, and to weave the torn threads together again so as to reestablish order and meaning of a world in motion; to rebuild the earth by rebuilding oneself.
Democratic Confederalism and Borders

LOEZ
Independent (photo)journalist

The notion of borders is of major importance to the Kurdish people. From a line drawn on paper in the numerous treaties that colonial empires and powers have signed over the years, the border takes the form of barbed wire fences, mines, armed men and customs checkpoints. Turkey recently built a three-metre high wall which stretches nearly 700 km along the Turkish-Syrian border, the long strip of concrete fracturing fertile plains. Instead of building it on the official border line, which follows the former Berlin-Baghdad railway line for 350 km, the Turkish State encroached upon Syrian land by as much as 100-300 metres in certain areas. But for Kurds divided between four nation-states, the border doesn’t represent the outline of a nation, particularly when this nation is active in denying their existence and hellbent on culturally assimilating them. It is an obstacle that separates families and tribes.

Kurdish nationalist movements initially sought to create a new state, the great Kurdistan, for which provisions were made in the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, signed by the great colonial powers. And this may indeed have become a reality if it were not for Mustafa Kemal “Atatürk”, leader of the very new Republic of Turkey, who rejected the idea. The 1921 Lausanne Agreement made the Kurds the largest ethnic group without a state of their own, formalising their division with four artificial borders unconnected to any social or geographical reality: those from Turkey (North Kurdistan, Bakur), those from Syria (Rojava – formerly known as West Kurdistan), those from Iraq (South Kurdistan, Bashur), and those from Iran (East Kurdistan, Rojhelat). Although an autonomous Kurdish political structure has existed in Northern Iraq since the nineties, this does not constitute a State. The federal government of Iraq rejected the referendum for independence held in September 2017, illustrating the degree to which their autonomy is held in check.
Modern political movements advocating democratic confederalism are moving away from conventional nationalism in favour of another approach. Abdullah Öcalan – leader of the Kurdistan workers’ party (PKK) established in 1978 and which in 1984 began a guerilla war against the Turkish State – is behind the thinking of this new political paradigm, which rejects the concept of the nation-state, seen as an oppressive structure closely aligned with the capitalist system. The situation in South Kurdistan, where the feudal system is dressed up as a democracy so as to preserve its own existence, where corruption is rampant and where extreme neoliberalism reigns supreme, is, for the PKK, a concrete example of why there is a crucial need for another approach.

**Democratic communities living on the fringes of (and fighting) the nation-state and its borders**

“The right of self-determination of the peoples includes the right to a state of their own. However, the foundation of a state does not increase the freedom of a people. The system of the United Nations that is based on nation-states has remained inefficient. Meanwhile, nation-states have become serious obstacles for any social development. Democratic confederalism is the contrasting paradigm of the oppressed people,” states Öcalan.

He began challenging the concept of the nation-state in the nineties with the collapse of the Soviet bloc. He was arrested in 1999, and has been in solitary confinement on the island of Imrali since. This is where he wrote his defence statement, which he turned into a political manifesto that defines the new paradigm of democratic confederalism, which the Kurdish movement would officially adopt in 2005. It is focussed on achieving peace and equality between all communities through the pillars of direct democracy, gender equality and social ecology.

Communities self-govern by way of grassroots assemblies called “communes”, made up of twenty or thirty families living in the same geographical area who make decisions about everything that concern them: community justice, self-defence, education, economic matters, etc. These communes link together with other communes at village, city and regional level to make decisions on collective projects and manage them together. So building a hospital within each commune would make no sense: several communes come together with the purpose of creating a hospital for everyone’s use. Communes work together via confederal councils, in order to form democratic regions.

In the Summer of 2018, Riza Altun, head of PKK’s foreign relations, made the following statement to Mediapaskan journalists Mireille Court and Chris den Hond: “I think the best way to achieve equality and freedom for our people is not through...

---

[1] See the bibliography for more information.
independence. [...] What we want is a federal solution. There needs to be a true decentralisation of power in Syria.” Democratic confederalism has been developed across Northern Syria thanks to external constraints that are less severe than those imposed by the Turkish State. On March 17, 2016, in its preamble, the Social Contract of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, proclaimed that “The tyrannical nation-state regime, which has been unfair to the different components of Syrian people, has led the country to destruction and fragmentation of the society fabric. To end this chaotic situation, the democratic federal system is an optimal solution to address the national, social, and historical issues in Syria.”

It is indeed true that for nation-states, borders delineate where their sovereignty begins and ends. Within these borders, nationalism often develops through the imposed existence of a single language and culture, and the often forced negation of other identities living within these same borders. The ban on speaking Kurdish came with the knowledge that language is a strong marker of identity and thus a vehicle for nationalism. The Kurdish people were denied the right to speak their language and to express their culture. The names of their villages and towns were changed to Turkish and Arabic equivalents. The relationship with Iran, however, is a little particular: Although Kurds face brutal repression, according to Öcalan, they are also regarded as their “ethnic counterparts”\(^4\). In his view, “Democratic confederalism in Kurdistan is an anti-nationalist movement as well.”\(^5\) He sees it as a way, not only in regards to Kurdistan, but also Turkey and the entire Middle East, for different peoples to live peacefully together: Kurds, Arabs, Turks, Armenians, Syrians, and many others. But for PKK’s leader, challenging nationalism also means tackling Kurdish nationalism, deep-rooted in Kurdish mentality, and which flourished in the early 19th century as well as in the early 20th century, when the concrete question of borders was raised. Although borders began to appear as early as the 12th century, when the Seljuk sultan Sanjar established an administrative region he called “Kurdistan”, the Kurdish nationalist movement sought to extend these borders into all areas where Kurdish languages were spoken. Democratic confederalism thus needs to come to terms with this historical heritage in its rejection of the nation-state, although Öcalan highlights that “Borders have lost their former meaning when it comes to social unity. In spite of geographic boundaries today’s modern communication tools allow for a virtual unity between individuals and communities wherever they are.”\(^6\)

This remark is undoubtedly based on the fact that Kurds have always found a way around borders: since borders were first established, the cross-border economy has been an important source of business for Kurds. Trading used to be legal within the Ottoman Empire. The existence of borders meant that their way of earning a living suddenly became illegal. The “çaçaççı” goods smugglers are experts in their field,

and smuggle goods from one state to another by way of carefully-paid bribes and, if necessary, violence. They also form part of what is described as a “sub-political” resistance movement. The Kurdish expression “attacking the border” sums up their approach, evoking the idea of crossing through an area with an obstacle that needs to be knocked down. Even today Kolbers carry goods across the mountains of Iraq into Iran, either on their backs or using mules. Iran has turned a blind eye to this, and has even established a system of quotas, legalising some of this trading as a way to impose taxes. But because quotas aren’t enough to earn a living, most workers take illegal trips and risk being killed by Iranian border guards, an occurrence that happens several times a month. Borders have also proved ineffective at preventing marriages between people from different sides of the border, reinforcing a cross-border dynamic and normalising border crossings which happen regularly for family visits. Within the PKK itself, there are Kurds from all over Kurdistan as well as from the Diaspora. On 19 September 2014, Salih Muslim, co-chair of the PYD and foreign relations official for the autonomous administration of Rojava, argued before the Flemish Parliament, in Brussels that, “drawing and dying for borders is a European illness from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,” adding that, “the confederated council model is the model for the future.”

[8] PYD: Democratic Union Party, the political party aligning itself with democratic confederalism in Syria.

Al Yaroubiyeh (rabia, tel kocer) border station between Iraq and Syria. The YPG kurdish forces from Syria took control over the terminal, inside the iraqi village of Al Yaroubiyeh after iraqi soldiers abandoned it. Peshmerga kurdish forces from Iraq took position just in front of them.
Building alternatives and weakening the nation-state within existing borders

The paradigm of democratic confederalism recognises nation-state borders and even their legitimacy. It no longer seeks to redefine them in order to create a new Kurdistan. As stated by Öcalan: “Simultaneously, this model is suitable for the building of federal administrative structures in all Kurdish settlement areas in Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran. Thus, it is possible to build confederate structures across all parts of Kurdistan without the need to question the existing borders.”

Although it doesn’t question the existing borders of nation-states, it does seek to create autonomous groups within these nation-states that establish structures equivalent to those run by the State and which function according to democratic principles. These structures, supported and run by local communities, will serve to gradually overcome the State. The creation of legal political parties in Turkey fighting for the Kurdish people’s right to self-govern plays a role in this respect. The guerilla thus becomes a means of self-defence which doesn’t so much seek to conquer land, which would prove difficult given the forces they are up against, but seeks rather to multiply civil structures within communities.

“It is not realistic, though, to go for the immediate abolition of the state. This does not mean that we have to take it as it is. The classic state structure with its despotic attitude of power is unacceptable. The institutional state needs to be subjected to democratic changes. At the end of this process, there should be a lean state as a political institution, which only observes functions in the fields of internal and external security and in the provision of social security.”

This is what the political movement in North Kurdistan sought to achieve in the two or three years of relative freedom, which ended with the coup attempt in July 2016, marking the beginning of a brutal repression. Grassroots councils, cooperatives and cultural associations established in the areas governed by the HDP were closed and their leaders imprisoned. For this area of Kurdistan, this was a step back in establishing autonomy. There was also an uprising in several towns in North Kurdistan where (young) PKK activists had declared independence and which turned violent. The movement, which did not get the massive grassroots support that was expected, ended in bloodshed, violently stamped out by the Turkish State.

It was in this context that the Syrian Democratic Council appealed to international courts on several occasions (when Turkey attacked the province of Afrin

---

[12] HDP: Peoples’ Democratic Party, whose leaders and many of its representatives are currently in prison.
[13] Political branch of the autonomous administration of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria; the Syrian Democratic Forces are the military branch.
and, more recently, following the Turkish army and its Syrian troops’ threat to launch an offensive on the region of Manbij to denounce Turkey’s attempts to undermine Syria’s territorial integrity and asked Syria to send armed forces to the border. This also explains why the autonomous administration has agreed to negotiate with Russia and the Assad regime. However, so far the demands made in the name of federalism and autonomous governance have fallen on deaf ears, and confederalists have been labelled “traitors” by Assad.

Democratic confederalism driving a cross-border perspective
Democratic communities don’t work well when they’re isolated. As a confederation, however, they can help one another. When Daesh attacked the city of Kobanê in late 2014, Kurds living in Turkey were encouraged to help their Syrian brothers and sisters. Hundreds of people crossed the border to take arms. Others took care of looking after Kurdish refugees fleeing into Turkey. Later in 2015/2016, when younger members of the PKK declared independence in several cities in North Kurdistan, urban guerilla fighters trained in Syria came to support them. Similarly, PKK fighters from the mountains in northern Iraq came to the help of Ezidis, attacked by Daesh in August 2014, travelling through extensive mountainous areas with the tacit agreement of certain Iraq-based Kurds.

Over the long term, borders will become obsolete if democratic groups work together as federations and confederations, thereby gradually weakening the power of nation-states whose prerogatives are being progressively curtailed thanks to the success of autonomous structures set up within state-controlled equivalents.

“The state will be overcome when democratic confederalism will have proved its problem-solving capacities with a view to social issues. This does not mean, though, that attacks by nation-states have to be accepted. Democratic confederations will sustain self-defence forces at all times. Democratic confederations will not be limited to organise themselves within a single particular territory. They will become cross-border confederations when the societies concerned so desire.”

Lastly, although democratic confederalism currently recognises State prerogatives with regard to foreign policy, border security and customs duties, cross-border confederations will eventually override the State, thus making these redundant. This approach, which involves a long-term process of change rather than a “revolution”, is a distinct feature of democratic confederalism, which aims to gradually change society through the participation of its people.

[14] Democratic Confederalism, p.34.
The declaration made by the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria\textsuperscript{15} offers several interesting insights in regards to this cross-border focus.\textsuperscript{16} It states that every population and community is entitled to manage their own international relations provided these adhere to federalist values. Point 9 calls for a system of democratic federation in the Middle East and concludes that: “If we overcome national borders, we will be able to live as brothers and sisters, in peace and security.” Borders are thus clearly labelled as a factor which divides peoples, and overcoming them a way to achieve peace. These words are particularly resonant at a time when the Turkish State, under the pretext of defending its borders, is threatening to create a bloodbath in Northern Syria.

The cross-border dimension of democratic confederalism is also present in the Diaspora community, where the Kurdish movement is attempting to instil its values. This is taking place in refugee camps in Lavrio, Greece for example, home to Kurdish and Turkish refugees and which have not received any official support from the Greek State since 2016. The residents of these camps are attempting to self-govern by way of communes. Life for the Diaspora community is structured around events in Kurdistan, street demonstrations, commemorations honouring martyrs, and so forth.

Democratic confederalism is more than just a Kurdish political movement. It is an invitation to think deeply about democracy in action as well as the concept of the nation-state and the borders that are inseparable from it. At a time when Europe is withdrawing from the rest of the world, sealing off its borders and leaving thousands of refugees, who are only in search of a better life, to die, where the rise of nationalism is sparking fears of another Brown Plague, and yet, where, in a roundabout way, we are rediscovering direct democracy, Öcalan’s paradigm offers ideas on how we can live together in a way that would enable the people to once again be in charge of their lives, and where communities can live peacefully side by side.

\textbf{BIBLIOGRAPHY:}

* \textit{Un autre futur pour le Kurdistan}, Pierre Bance, édition Rouge et Noir.
* “Les Kurdes et le(s) Kurdistan en cartes”, Michel Bruneau and Françoise Rollan, \textit{Anatoli 8}.

\textsuperscript{15} 17 March 2016.
\textsuperscript{16} http://www.kedistan.net/2016/03/17/kurdes-syriens-federalisme/.
Borders and Membranes

PIERRE CALAME
Chair of CITEGO, honorary chair of the Charles Léopold Mayer Foundation

All communities, regardless of their political organisation and the institutions they create, have to consider their interior and their exterior. The exterior includes the other parts of humanity that don’t form part of the community as well as the rest of the biosphere. Yet there are variations on this: in many societies, there is no border between humans and non-humans; the eco-system forms part of the community, which is centred around a certain area of land.¹ The issue of the border or the membrane is essentially one of how the community identifies and its desire to know or control its relations with its exterior.

But what is a community? The most universal definition is: a group of people where everyone feels accountable to others for the impact of their actions. This definition implies the recognition of common values.

The question is always where a community begins and ends, what its rules of governance are, as well as the rules governing its relations with the rest of the world, particularly its neighbours or those sharing the same area of land. Communities are not necessarily monolithic. They are embedded into one another and there is often one set of rules used to govern the inner community and another set for its relations to a wider community. The following examples serve to illustrate this idea.

The first example is from the Middle Ages in Western Europe. What in France were called “nations” were not any national community but smaller groups: the Normans, Picardians, Bretons, Poitevins, and so forth. The only thing that made these groups a “national community” was that they shared the same sovereign. And this national community was itself part of an even wider community, that of Western Christianity. These distinct groups self-managed according to customary law while the “scholarly law”, the “jus commune”, was used to manage relations.

---

¹ This is the case of Andean and Amazonian peoples for whom the word “person” may mean a human being or any other kind of living being. The term “person” (human or not) implies a relationship of reciprocity in their responsibilities, respecting and acknowledging the existence of the other which includes the entire ecosystem in a given area.
between communities in France or within Western Christianity. The second example is that of Islamic law: as the empire established by Islamic fighters included communities of diverse religions, it became necessary to make a distinction between religious law which applied to a single community of faith (Muslims) and “empire law” which governed the relations between the various communities. The intersecting of different laws reflects, as it did in Western Europe’s Middle Ages, the intersecting of communities. Similar distinctions can be found in Chinese law: Due to its imperial power, China applied Chinese law within its borders but also obliged its neighbours to abide by international relations based on this law.

**National communities elbow out other forms of community with the emergence of absolutism in Europe**

The issue of borders, understood today as the line between two sovereign States, is in fact only a particular form of relationship between communities. This modern nationalist conception of borders is the outcome of two joint evolutions: the assertion of an absolute, centralised sovereign power, and the focus on a specific community, rather than communities in their diverse forms. The national community is all those communities which fall under the sovereign’s power, all those that live within the area of land over which the sovereign reigns. This results in a situation where all foreigners authorised to reside on the national territory are identified and monitored.

The dominance of the national community, symbolised by the existence of borders, goes hand in hand with mercantile economic policies focussed on securing the means to maintain power and ensure a monopoly over the national currency used by this community: this money monopoly, orchestrated by the sovereign, was underway in the late Middle Ages and resulted in the disappearance of a number of local currencies that had previously existed and which had enabled smaller communities to function independently. Getting rid of local currencies was a powerful way for the State to wield control over domestic and international trade. The gradual disappearance of regional languages (in France at least) can be seen as the culmination of this process.

“National” legal systems more or less cut off from one another, a “national economy”, and a single language used in schools are all manifestations of the emergence of exclusive national communities. It was in this specific context in the history of Europe that it became necessary to identify an area of land, a community, a power, an economy, all of which were demarcated by state borders requiring residence permits and customs duties. And this historical shift had many consequences; transnational communities have disappeared (and with them the idea of a common humanity or to use a modern term, a global community) replaced by inter-State relations. No global law exists that governs the relations between this vast community of people; all we have is international law with States as the sole subjects.
Consequently, by maintaining that the national community is the only valid community, individuals are prevented from belonging to many diverse communities, from the local to the global. This vision of so-called “Westphalian” State sovereignty (the doctrine of the modern State was delineated by the Treaty of Westphalia which put an end to the internecine Thirty Years’ War), undoubtedly strengthened Europe in the modern era, but also was the source of innumerable conflicts. It also constitutes a serious obstacle when the interdependent world we live in requires that we recognise that we belong to many different local, regional and global communities, and are connected to them through solidarity and interdependence. The very scope of global interdependence that now exists means that we effectively form a global community that share a “common destiny”, as symbolised by the climate crisis and its global challenges, an issue which should take priority over all others.

The membrane – key to our knowledge of a territory

The merging of the community and the governing state, and the confusion between membranes (which measure the type and quantity of exchanges between communities) and national borders, means these membranes disappear where there are no borders. This is all the more obvious in a centralised system.

Much like a cell in its organism, all communities need a membrane, whether this be real or virtual, separating its interior from its exterior, in order to measure what comes in and what comes out, and in order to manage internal flows. These may be material or immaterial flows of energy, matter, information or money. In our modern societies, these flows are concealed by what I call a monetary veil, by analogy with the corporate “legal veil”, which obscures the domination of corporations over other types of actors. The fact that a single currency is used for all kinds exchanges irrespective of what they are, means that is impossible to identify, in an act of consumption, whether it is local, domestic, or connected to somewhere else in Europe or even China.

It is striking how much we know about the flows between the national community and the outside community, which are measured by the membrane or border – and how little we know about the internal flows within this national community. Of these we know less and less. Sectorial knowledge (exchanges between different industrial sectors) has replaced regional knowledge. In France, data on energy consumption or transport is derived from information systems based in national monopolies EDF and SNCF, making it it extremely difficult to obtain decentralised regional information. We may also note that after the euro was introduced and customs duties within Europe and the Schengen Area were eliminated, knowledge of flows within the former “French” community could only be approximate.
And it’s impossible to manage what we don’t know. The fact that regions have very little knowledge of themselves, for lack of a membrane that separates their interior from their exterior, means it is extremely difficult to work towards a global energy transition and develop local policies on development and social cohesion.

**Multi-level governance and intersecting local and global communities**

In order for our societies to survive and become sustainable, our only option is to move away from our border-centred societies. We need to stop confusing the border with the membrane, and recognise that individuals belong to diverse local, regional and global communities.

Managing these intersecting communities, at a time when the energy transition is forcing us to know, understand and control flows of human activity, requires recreating regional membranes that would allow us to know and control all kinds of flows that connect one region to the rest of the world and the biosphere. Recreating these membranes essentially means rekindling a sense of belonging within these local communities, and their connection to a particular region. This could be achieved by developing social and complementary currencies or reviving and encouraging the use of regional languages that are currently dying out.

On the other end of the spectrum – the global scale – if we are to manage the interdependent nature of our communities effectively and foster the emergence of a global community, we need a global law – a single law that would apply to all types of actors; not an inter-State law. Such a law, which would reflect a global community, should be based on recognising mutual responsibilities – a requirement for any community. This could take the form of a Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities and Global Commons whereby shared responsibility would be legally established and binding. Only adopting such a declaration, which should be developed and validated by the world’s peoples, will give substance to a growing feeling of belonging to a single global community united by a common destiny. This is particularly important at a time when current international relations, centred around borders, are orchestrating confrontations between national and State interests, and diverting us from this global awareness. This also implies moving beyond borders and developing direct dialogue between the world’s societies. The Alliance for a Responsible and United World, the World [2] See the documentary file by Ritimo on social and complementary currencies: https://www.ritimo.org/Monnaies-sociales-complementaires
[3] “Commons” refers to “nature’s goods or resources produced, maintained or shared between users living in a ‘community’ whose size and features may vary. It implies a commitment on behalf of citizens, and that they define rules of use according to traditional know-how. Nature’s commons - water, land, forests, the sea and the oceans, all that is living, is currently being appropriated on an unprecedented scale, which instead of conserving these resources, is upsetting the ecological balance and endangering the lives of the people whose existence depends upon them.” (Declaration by Rio +20 Collective, August 2011, p. 9).
Citizens Assembly held in Lille in December 2001 and the China Europa Forum are all examples of how such dialogue might take place.

Society’s problems can no longer be addressed on one level alone. We need a system of multi-level governance where the interaction between levels is more important than how authority and competence are shared between them. The European union has progressively taken on and even adopted, in a recent recommendation (23 October 2018), the concept of “active subsidiarity”[^4], a concept that I shaped in the nineties in order to outline how these different levels should cooperate. The monopoly of the national community has led us into a dead end over the last few centuries. Taking this approach is crucial if we wish to get out of it.

We often talk about a “post-modern” society. Such a post-modernism involves unravelling the ties between community, border, State, economy and law that we have inherited in order to think more subtly and more effectively about our community of destiny, about levels of governance, about interlocking laws and the membranes that reflect different layers of community.

[^4]: Active subsidiarity is a philosophy and method of governance that is based on reconciling unity with diversity. As no solution can be found to an important problem on one level alone, in future, compartmentalising authority will be the exception and interaction between levels will be the rule (Definition inspired by the Coredem).
Before it took the concrete form of institutions and procedures, the border was an invention which, over time, made its way into our minds through various forms of education and culture, and which served clearly-identifiable interests. The aim of this issue was to shed light on the specific conditions that led to the emergence and normalisation of the unjust situation that we find ourselves in today: closed borders, closed communication channels, pervasive monitoring of people’s movements, and serious violations of human dignity and fundamental rights.

This fictional representation of national sovereignty has similar consequences all over the world. Imposing a border may, in some cases, go against the traditions and experiences of communities: in the Alps, the pass, which we now associate with the border, has always been a geographical and communication gateway used by those that speak the same language and share the same food, yet who happen to live on either side of it. In other areas, these border zones concretise social hierarchies of class, race and gender, fuelling and exacerbating violence. Here it is the political and economic interests of the world’s powerful actors at play, which are being underhandedly forced upon communities. Understanding the border will allow us to get a better grasp on the inner workings of our reality and begin to consider real alternatives.

Because, as strange as it may seem, the more oppression there is, the more resistance there is. It is not only about helping people to cross borders; it is about joining forces and going beyond the idea of borders. If the border is a construction, then it can also be deconstructed. Going beyond borders means seeing that the Other is not an exotic Other, but that, increasingly, we are bound by the same realities and are fighting the same battles, with different languages, different perspectives and different stories. By recognising that which binds us together, aside from our diversity, those crossing the border are enabling us to go beyond the border. They are also enabling us to have a clearer view of the social and political forces governing the border, prioritising certain lives over others and denying our common humanity, so that we may find the best approach to tackle these forces.
One thing is clear: in order to redefine the border, we need to redefine our human community, redefine the social pact that connects us, redefine globalisation, reorienting the highly connected and interdependent world we wish to build. We are well aware that this redefinition isn’t going to come from “above”, from a fixed ideological stance that churns out prefabricated answers to extremely diverse realities. It is rather by experimenting with concrete solutions on the ground, by exploring different ways of objecting, different solutions adopted by the diverse individuals navigating the border, and forging another kind of humanity, even in heavily militarised zones. These are the people that are creating a mosaic of another kind of world, a collaborative work in progress.

In this effort to redefine a collective approach that would take us beyond borders, it is essential that we keep track of these tactics and experiments. Indeed, for many, resistance to the border, and building alternatives is self-evident, because anything else would be absurd. It is unimaginable to refuse to help someone dying of cold on one’s doorstep. But without documentation, without the wider public’s awareness, these gestures remain isolated actions, confined to a particular time and place, and don’t fully take on the political and human dimension that they might have. Only through the accumulation and articulation of such actions can we begin to create a different kind of world. Sharing and disseminating them is indispensable so that we may take inspiration from them, use them as a basis for discussion, reflect upon them, thereby decolonising our minds from the notion of borders. This issue of Passerelle is but a step towards documenting these actions and ideas, and inspiring debate. We hope that it encourages people to continue sharing their tactics of resistance and building alternatives, and that these will flourish.
CONTRIBUTORS

1. Anne-Laure Amilhat-Szary, specialist in political geography, professor of geography at Grenoble-Alpes University and chair of the CNRS Pacte research unit (UMR 5194).

2. Emmanuel Blanchard, chair of Migreurop, lecturer at the University of Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, researcher at CESDIP and historian specialising in policing and migration.

3. Papa Demba Fall, researcher and head of the Human Sciences Department at the Institut fondamental d’Afrique noire - Cheikh Anta Diop (African Institute for Fundamental Research), Director of the African International Migration Study Network, member of the ETHOS – Social sciences & Development Graduate School.

4. Carlos Agudelo, research associate - URMIS (Migration and Society Research Unit) IRD-University, Paris VII University, Nice Sophia Antipolis University.

5. CDTM 72-Monde Solidaire La Flèche, local and international solidarity association also involved in salvaging items and reselling them.

6. Diana Rivas Gutierrez, anthropologist, specialising in urban anthropology, space, territory, gender and discrimination.

7. Lola Courcoux, Master’s student in political science at Paris Nanterre University and activist.

8. Brigitta Kuster, junior research professor specialising in gender-focused cultural science films at Humboldt University (Berlin), and Vasilis Tsianos, professor of sociology and migration studies at the University of Hamburg.


10. Laure Blondel, co-director of Anafé (a French organisation dedicated to Border Assistance for Foreigners).

11. Beatriz Plaza Escrivà, social researcher specialising in international affairs and feminism, and activist involved in the platform ONGUI ETORRI ERREFUXIATUAK (Welcome to Migrants and Refugees).

12. Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, CNRS research director, PhD in Political Science, author of (amongst other books) Faut-il ouvrir les frontières ?

13. Damien Simonneau, doctor of political science - Move In Louvain, post-doctoral researcher at CReSPo (Center for Research in Political Science at the Saint Louis Bruxelles University).

14. Frédérique Lévêque, communication officer at CNCD-11.11.11 (platform of Belgian French-speaking and Flemish-speaking NGOs and associations focussed on international solidarity) and coordinator of Barril.info

15. Collectif Cévennes Sans Frontières, a solidarity collective that works with refugees and takes actions against borders, advocating freedom of movement and freedom of establishment for all.

16. Nicholas De Genova, anthropologist, geographer, social theorist and critical researcher on migration, borders, race relations, citizenship and work.

17. Emmanuelle Hellio and Juana Moreno Nieto, sociologists at the University of Aix-Marseille working on the effects of the global agribusiness system and the role that borders play in the labor markets of intensive farming enclaves in Morocco, Spain and in France.

18. Olivier Petitjean, Rachel Knaebel and Anne-Sophie Simpere, members of the Multinationals Observatory, a corporate watchdog group providing information on French companies, corporate social responsibility, the economy and democracy.

19. Bryan Finoki, architect and founder of the blog Subtopia. He has taught at the Woodbury School of Architecture and co-founded DEMILIT.
20. **Le Maquis**, (linguistic, cultural and political) translation collective based in Marseilles that aims to build bridges of mutual understanding and knowledge.

21. **Luca Giliberti**, doctor in “Educación, Sociedad y Calidad de Vida” and sociological researcher at the University of Genoa and University of Cote d’Azur in Nice. He is also a contract professor of sociology at IEP - Sciences Po Menton and fellow at the Institut Convergences Migrations.

22. **Lesbians and Gays Support the Migrants**, queer activist group (LGBTIQ+) that, through fundraising and direct action, stand in solidarity with all migrants and refugees.

23. **Marta Sanchez**, member of Movimiento Migrante Mesoamericano, an activist platform that stands in solidarity with migrants and advocates freedom of movement, recognising international workers’ rights in Mesoamerica, the USA and the rest of the world.

24. **Joseph Pugliese**, activist and researcher in the Department of Media, Music, Communication and Cultural Studies at Macquarie University, Sydney.


26. **Antoine Pécoud**, professor of sociology, Paris 13 University, associate researcher at CERI/Sciences Po and fellow at the Institut des Migrations.

27. **Hélène Claudot-Hawad**, anthropologist, linguist and research director at the CNRS. Most of her work concerns the Tuareg world (Sahara, Sahel).

28. **Loez**, independent photojournalist who over the past four years has been working on the struggles of the Kurdish people, with a particular focus on democratic confederalism as a form of resistance to the nation-state.

29. **Pierre Calame**, chair of CITEGO, chairman emeritus of FPH, founding member of an Alliance for a Responsible, Plural and United World, member of the Alliance for Sustainable and Responsible Societies. He organised the World Citizens’ Assembly held in 2001.
BOOKS

AMILHAT-SZARY Anne Laure (2015)
Qu’est-ce qu’une frontière aujourd’hui ?

WITHOL DE WENDEN Catherine (2014)
Faut-il ouvrir les frontières ?
Paris: Presse de Sciences Po, 100 p.

RODIER Claire (2012)
Xenophobie business

JONES Reece (2017)
Violent Border

BABELS (2018)
Méditerranée : des frontières à la dérive

BROWN Wendy (2010)
Walled States, Waning Sovereignty

DOUZET Frédéric and GIBLIN Béatrice (Coord) (2013)
Des frontières indépassables ? Des frontières d’État aux frontières urbaines

LE MAQUIS Lucia (2017)
Nous ne ferons pas marche arrière ! Luttes contre la frontière franco-italienne à Vintimille

LE MAQUIS Lucia (2017)
Calais, face à la frontière. Textes et entretiens

DULLIN Sabine and FORESTIER-PEYRAT Étienne (2015)
Les frontières mondialisées

PECOUD, Antoine and DE GUCHANTENEIRE, Paul (2009)
Migrations sans frontières : essais sur la libre circulation des personnes

BOUCHERON, Patrick and PROCHIANTZ, Alain (2017)
Migrations, réfugiés, exil

TERTRAIS Bruno, LABORDE Xemartin, PAPIN Delphine (2016)
L’Atlas des frontières : Murs, conflits, migrations

Réseau Migreurop (2012)
Atlas des migrants en Europe : Géographie critique des politiques migratoires

NIEL, Frédéric (2011)
Contre les murs

CLOCHARD, Olivier (2017)
Atlas des Migrants en Europe : Approches critiques des politiques migratoires

JOURNALS

La frontière dans tous ses états

Le réveil des frontières : des lignes en mouvement

Sur le front des frontières

Le réveil des frontières : des lignes en mouvement
Questions internationales, N°79-80, May-August 2016

Politiques des frontières
REPORTS

Dedans, dehors : une Europe qui s’enferme
La Cimade, June 2018.

Coups et blessures. Rapport sur les opérations des forces de l’ordre menées dans le nord du Maroc entre juillet et septembre 2018
Gadem and Anafé, September 2018.

Chronique d’un chantage. Décryptage des instruments financiers et politiques de l’Union Européenne
La Cimade, Collectif Loujna-Tounkaranké, Migreurop, December 2017.

Aux frontières des vulnérabilités – Rapport d’observations dans les zones d’attente 2016-2017
Anafé, February 2018

Transnational digital networks, migration and gender

No Wall They Can Build. A guide to borders & migration across North America.

Ceuta et Melilla: centres de tri à ciel ouvert aux portes de l’Afrique

Les solidarités face aux flux migratoires : quelles marges de manœuvre en France aujourd’hui ?
Groupe URD – LEON Valérie, 2018

DOCUMENTARY RESOURCES

Les frontières dans le monde
La documentation française, November 2016

Un monde qui s’emmure...
CDTM-Monde Solidaire La Flèche/Ritimo, April 2015
https://www.ritimo.org/Un-monde-qui-s-emmure

Espace ressource du Collectif Migrants Var Est
http://ritimo.paca.free.fr/mve-ressources.htm
SITOGRAPHY

Migreurop
Border watchdog group
http://www.migreurop.org/

Anafé
French association on border assistance for foreigners
http://anafe.org/

Délinquants Solidaires
Decriminalising crimes of solidarity
http://www.delinquantssolidaires.org/

SOS Méditerranée
European organisation for the rescue of lives at sea
http://www.sosmediterranee.fr/

États Généraux des Migrations
Processes involving hundreds of local and national collectives and associations working alongside refugees and migrants
https://eg-migrations.org/

La Cimade
Defending the dignity and rights of refugees and migrants
https://www.lacimade.org/

FASTI
Federation of associations that stand in solidarity with all immigrants
http://www.fasti.org

GISTI
Providing information and support for immigrants
https://www.gisti.org

Des Ponts Pas Des Murs
The network, which was founded in 2008 and represents some 300 associations, denounces European anti-immigration policies and advocates the right to freedom of movement

Welcome to Europe!
For freedom of movement: Independent information for refugees and migrants coming to Europe
http://w2eu.info/

Afrique Europe Interact
For freedom of movement and equitable development
https://afrique-europe-interact.net/?article_id=113&clang=2

Sans papiers ni frontières
Against borders and their prisons
https://sanspapiersnifrontieres.noblogs.org/

Cériscope Frontière
An online scientific publication of CERI (International Research Centre) produced in partnership with the mapping centre of Sciences-Po
http://ceriscope.sciences-po.fr/frontieres

Selection of websites on migration issues
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1NyFwwo7xH193LHBqYXtK_P4HZC30W_A13eBvBYgPqsY/edit#gid=1020759044

The human and financial cost of 15 years of Fortress Europe
http://www.themigrantsfiles.com/
In Central America. Avenging the death of his gang in Mexico, one of the most frightening gangs to the USA. Casper is a member of the "Mara" and wants to put his criminal past behind him, and hopes for a better future. Will the pair manage to escape their fate and make it across the border?

Hope Boris Lojkine, 2014, 91 min: Hope is the story of a Cameroonian and a Nigerian who meet on their journey to Europe. Despite the obstacles that come their way and the world of migrant ghettos they are faced with, they never leave each other's side.

From the Other Side Chantal Akerman, 2013, 103 min: A documentary that follows Mexican migrants as they navigate an extremely well-guarded US border. Fleeing poverty, they are faced with America's most sophisticated technologies, used by the US immigration service whose only goal is to stop them.

Frontière reconduite Cécile Canut, 2011, 115 min: In West Africa, men take to the road in search of a better life, usually in the direction of Europe, and France in particular. Many of them don't succeed; others are detained and forced to go back. Frontière reconduite tells the story of those who have tried, tempted by what they see as an "adventure".

Le Dessous des cartes : Les Nouveaux Murs Alain Jomier, authors: Jean-Christophe Victor and Delphine Papin: Broadcast for the first time in 2008. Globalisation seems to have created a borderless world, and yet more and more walls are appearing that separate and divide human beings, from the US-Mexican border to Jerusalem, Bagdad and Melilla.

Io sto con la sposa Antonio Augugliaro, Gabriele Del Grande, Khaled Soliman Al Nassiry, 2014, 89 min: In November 2013, a wedding procession makes its way from Milan to Sweden. It turns out that the fifteen guests travelling in the three cars are not guests at all. Five of them are Syrian and Palestinian asylum-seekers trying to get to Sweden so they can apply for asylum.

Nameless Cary Joji Fukunaga, 2009, 96 min: In Honduras, Sayra is reunited with her father after being separated from him, and can finally fulfill her dream of emigrating with him and her uncle to the USA. Casper is a member of the "Mara" gang in Mexico, one of the most frightening gangs in Central America. Avenging the death of his fiancée, he kills a gang leader and runs away. On
RECENT ISSUES OF THE PASSERELLE COLLECTION

N°18/2018: Water as a Commons. Climate, Land, Democracy  
(Co-published with Olivier Petitjean – Multinationals Observatory, available in French and English)

N°17/2017: Féminismes ! Maillons forts du changement social  
(Available in French and Spanish)

N°16/2017: La vigilance sociétale en droit français  
(Co-published with Sherpa, available in French)

N°15/2016: Unveiling the Right to the City  
(Co-published with HIC, available in French, English and Spanish)

N°14/2016: Democratic Information in a Time of Corporate Power  
(Co-published with Multinationals Observatory, available in French and English)

N°13/2015: The Climate: Active Transition or Change Inflicted?  
(Available in French, English and Spanish)

N°12/2015: La Prochaine Révolution en Afrique du Nord : la lutte pour la justice climatique  
(Co-published with Platform London and Environmental Justice North Africa, in French and Arabic)

N°11/2014: For Free Information and Open Internet: Independent Journalists, Community Media and Hacktivists Take Action  
(Available in French, English and Spanish)

N°10/2014: Take Back the Land! The Social Function of Land and Housing, Resistance and Alternatives  
(Co-published with Aitec, available in English, French and Spanish)

N°9/2013: Paysages de l’après-pétrole ?  
(Co-published with La Compagnie du Paysage)

N°8/2012: L’efficacité énergétique à travers le monde, sur le chemin de la transition  
(Co-published with Global Chance)

N°7/2012: Housing in Europe: Time to Evict the Crisis!  
(Co-published with Aitec, available in English and French)

N°6/2012: Commons, a model for managing natural resources  
(Updated version, available in English and Portuguese)

N°5/2011: Le pouvoir des entreprises transnationales
As we make our way into the 21st century, closed borders seem to be a defining feature of our times. But not only is the toughened stance on migration achieving little of its stated objectives; it is contributing to an alarming rise in human rights violations all over the world.

Borders, border control, and what is happening in these spaces are at the centre of public debate and media coverage of migration issues, fuelling controversies and misconceptions, particularly in Europe and North America. The border embodies a great number of social, (geo)political, economic and historical issues, generating a proliferation of ideas, projects and actions. It is therefore crucial to examine and think deeply about the border and everything that it symbolises in order to imagine an alternative future for territories and their people. We need to move beyond the “migration crisis” narrative to a more comprehensive approach that puts human dignity at the forefront of our concerns.

This issue of Passerelle aims to inspire people to analyse and think through the issues surrounding borders: What do borders look like in a globalised, deterritorialised world rife with “invisible” walls? Why are borders open to some but closed to others? What are the political and economic forces at play? This issue also explores the different forms of resistance and action going on in the world, as voiced by those challenging closed border policies; and it offers ideas and alternatives to the current border regime.

Beyond Borders seeks to link up what is an extremely topical issue to the more long-term dynamics involved in different areas of the world. It seeks to shed light on the various forces at work, as well as draw attention to past and present civic actions and movements. The latest issue of Passerelle thus strives to stimulate debate and reflection, to provide first-hand accounts and suggest avenues for political action that will enable us to get a better grasp on border issues. In this way, we will be better equipped to work, through international solidarity, towards achieving social justice and protecting the fundamental rights of everyone.

**Ritimo**

Ritimo coordinates the Coredem and publishes the Passerelle Collection. Ritimo is a network for information and documentation on international solidarity issues and sustainable development. Ritimo holds public information seminars on global issues, organises civil society campaigns and carries out awareness-raising and training sessions in 75 locations throughout France. Ritimo is actively involved in the production and dissemination of plural and critical information: [www.ritimo.org](http://www.ritimo.org)